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A bstract
The series of banking and currency crises occurring in the 1990s have stimulated the 
study of financial crises. The research for this thesis has been conducted in the midst 
of this cluster of events: the Asian flu in 1997-98 and the disturbances in the Russian 
and Brazilian markets in 1998 and 1999, respectively. The aim of this work is to pro­
vide some empirical evidence on the general and systematic factors driving currency crises.
After a summary of the literature on currency crises conducted in Chapter 1, the sec­
ond chapter analyses the determinants of currency crises for 20 OECD countries for the 
period from 1970 to 1997. We use duration models in order to investigate the causes 
behind the duration of non-crises periods. Fundamentals are revealed as important de­
terminants in assessing the likelihood of currency crises. Variables concerning the state 
of the external sector (exports, imports, degree of openness), the REER, foreign portfolio 
investment and net claims on central government help explain the onset of currency crises.
Following historical events, the subsequent chapters in this thesis study currency crises 
in developing and emerging markets’ economies. Chapter 3 develops an indicator called 
the Emerging Markets Risk Indicator, whose monthly scores reflect the currency risk for 
36 emerging markets. We evaluate the contribution of the explanatory variables of this 
model to the probability of the main crisis events. In order to judge the forecasting power 
of this model, we estimate two reduced samples: the first one until December 1996 and 
the second one until December 1997. With these two models we can study the predictive 
power of the model on the onset of the Asian crisis in 1997 and the Russian and Brazilian 
crises in 1998-99, respectively. The results shows that had this model been used at those 
times, it would have predicted those crises.
Chapters 4 and 5 analyse the joint occurrence of banking and currency crises, i.e. con­
tribute to the debate on twin crises. In Chapter 4, we develop a currency crisis model 
with explicit reference to banking crisis indicators as possible determinants of currency 
crises. Deepening the subject of twin crises, Chapter 5 endogenises the banking crisis 
variable and jointly estimates two equations, one for banking crises and another for cur­
rency crises. This procedure allows us to fully test the interdependence of banking and 
currency crises, i.e. the direction of a causal link (if any) between both types of crisis. The 
results indicates the existence of bidirectional causal link between banking and currency 
crises. The phenomenon of twin crises is rather a case of banking and currency crises 
being closely intertwined. Which crisis type occurs first is a matter of circumstance.
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0.1 Introduction
Research on financial crises has been stimulated by the series of currency and banking 
crises occurring in the 1990s: the turbulence of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM) in 1992-93, the meltdown in Mexico 1994, the Asian flu in 1997-98 and the dis­
turbances of the Russian currency markets in 1998 and the Brazilian real in 1999. The 
fact is that each wave of crises seems to elicit a new “generation” or style of theoretical 
models to explain such a crisis.1
This thesis has been conducted in the midst of these events, and, in a way, moulded 
by the new episodes of financial crises. The aim of this work is to provide some empirical 
evidence on the factors driving currency crises. The emphasis is made on general and 
systematic determinants of the probability of a currency crisis. The consideration of large 
samples, over time and across countries, allow us the characterisation of the systemic 
causes driving currency crises.
Before the technical analysis is made, in Chapter 1 we offer an overview of the theo­
retical and empirical literature on the subject. We review the “first-generation” models 
of speculative attacks initiated by Krugman (1979). These models stress the fact that 
excessive expansionary fiscal and monetary policies result in a persistent loss of interna­
tional reserves, ultimately forcing authorities to abandon a fixed exchange rate. “Second- 
generation” models state that currency crises can be self-fulfilling if agents expect the 
government to switch to an inflationary domestic credit policy in the presence of a specu­
lative attack. These models were pioneered by Obstfeld (1986). The 1997-98 Asian crisis 
has produced a new generation of models, in which emphasis is laid on moral hazard 
problems and liquidity constraints.
We also undertake a brief survey of the empirical literature on financial crises, differ­
entiating among several approaches to the problem: descriptive studies, the probabilistic 
approach to the occurrence of a currency crisis, the leading indicators methodology, and 
the analysis of linkages between banking and currency crises.
The second chapter of this thesis is devoted to currency crises in developed countries. 
This work has been motivated by the episodes surrounding the ERM in 1992-93. For 20 
OECD countries we construct a data set for the period 1970-97. We adopt a duration 
model approach towards the determination of the origins of a currency crisis event. The 
use of duration models allows to account for duration dependence among the determinants 
for the likelihood of speculative attacks, without neglecting time-varying explanatory vari­
1 As Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995) have already suggested.
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ables as used by previous studies. The aim of employing duration models is to investigate 
the duration pattern of non-crisis periods.
The results point to the existence of a negative duration pattern, meaning that the prob­
ability of a currency crisis is always higher for new exchange rate agreements, decreasing 
with the credibility earned through the functioning of the exchange rate system. Economic 
variables such as export growth, import growth, openness, exchange rate overvaluation, 
capital inflows in the form of portfolio investment, claims on government and bank de­
posits help to explain the occurrence of currency crises for developed countries.
Following historical events, the subsequent chapters in this thesis concentrate on develop­
ing and emerging markets’ economies. The goal of Chapter 3 is to assess a methodology 
to help forecast currency crises for a group of 36 emerging markets. We construct an indi­
cator called the Emerging Markets Risk Indicator (EMRI), whose monthly scores reflect 
the currency risk in these markets. We also evaluate the contribution of the explanatory 
variables of our model to the probability of the main crisis events. To appraise the fore­
casting power of our model, we estimate two reduced samples. The first one restricts the 
sample to end in December 1996 with the aim of studying the predictive power prior to 
the 1997 Asian crisis. The second exercise estimates our model with sample data ending 
in December 1997 in order to evaluate the predictive power prior to the Russian and 
Brazilian crises. The results show that had this model been used at those times, it would 
have predicted those currency crises. This is depicted in the increasing values of our 
EMRI indicator ahead of the events.
Subsequent to the debate on twin crises —the joint occurrence of banking and currency 
crises— Chapters 4 and 5 consider the linkages and chains of causality between these two 
types of financial crises. In Chapter 4, we develop a currency crisis model with explicit 
reference to banking crisis indicators as possible determinants of currency crises. This 
study focuses on 92 developing and emerging markets’ economies for the period 1975-97, 
with quarterly observations. Empirically, we test whether episodes of banking system 
unsoundness lead to currency crises by estimating a multiperiod dynamic probit model 
with maximum smoothly simulated likelihood techniques.
The main feature of this type of econometric model lies in the dynamic component. This is 
specified by introducing a lagged dependent variable among the regressors, which requires 
the explicit consideration of unobservable heterogeneity and autocorrelated errors. With 
these components, we want to test the possible presence of state dependence, i.e. if past 
occurrences of currency crises influence the probability of a future currency crisis. The 
unobservable heterogeneity reflects political, historical and institutional factors, which are
12
country-specific and time-invariant, as well as difficult to control by traditional variables. 
The autocorrelated structure of the error term captures country-specific but time-varying 
factors. These two determinants are needed in order to avoid spurious state dependence.
The main results of Chapter 4 can be summarised as follows. Domestic macroeconomic 
and financial variables are important determinants of instances of currency crises. Global 
factors such as the international level of interest rates and commodity prices help explain 
currency crises. There is statistical evidence of banking crises leading currency crises. 
This result is robust across different specifications of the model and reinforces the results 
of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) given the more stringent temporal window adopted in 
our work. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) allow for a period of 48 months when analysing 
the power of banking crises as a leading indicator of currency crises, whereas we restrict 
that period to 12 months only. Moreover, the determinants of currency crises differ ac­
cording to the type of exchange rate regime. Currency crisis episodes under fixed exchange 
systems are less frequent and require a greater deterioration of domestic fundamentals. 
Finally, the panel structure of the model (allowing for unobservable heterogeneity and au­
tocorrelated errors) is revealed to be of crucial importance. If we omit this panel structure 
and pool together all the observations, the banking crisis indicator substantially increases 
its significance. This questions the robustness of results obtained in previous studies.
Finally, Chapter 5 deepens the examination of twin crises. In this chapter we endogenise 
the banking crisis variable. With this aim, we estimate a simultaneous equation system 
with two equations (of the kind used in Chapter 4), one for currency crises and another 
for banking crises. We explore the causal link from banking to currency crises, controlling 
for leading and contemporaneous effects of the banking variable on the currency event, 
as well as for common causes of both events. Within this structure, we can also reverse 
the causal link and allow for currency crises leading banking crises, and study the effect 
of past and contemporaneous currency crises on the likelihood of banking crises. In this 
way, we can further test the existence of chains of causality vs. the mere fact that both 
types of crises are predicated on the same determinants and it is a matter of circumstance 
which occurs first.
Summarising the main results, we can state that, after the liberalisation of financial 
markets, banking and currency crises become closely intertwined with a slight tendency 
for currency crises to precede banking crises. Nevertheless, we cannot find an exclusive 
unidirectional and general causal link between currency and banking crises. Both types 
of crises share common factors, and which crisis surfaces first is often only a matter of 
circumstance.
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0.2 Overall Conclusions
Overall, the evidence from this thesis is suggestive of the following:
•  When studying the determinants of currency crises in developed countries, we find 
evidence of the importance of economic fundamentals. Variables concerning the 
state of the external sector (exports, imports, degree of openness), the REER, for­
eign portfolio investment and net claims on central government help predict the 
onset of currency crises.
•  Regarding the duration dependence that characterises the non-crisis periods for the 
same set of countries, there is a clear negative duration dependence. The highest 
probability of exit into a crisis period is given at the start of the peg. This probability 
decreases after the first year of the currency peg. This fact may suggest the existence 
of a political cost of realignment that changes over the duration of the peg: growing 
credibility surrounding an exchange-rate-based stabilisation program might reduce 
the probability that the peg will be abandoned.
•  To forecast the likelihood of currency devaluation for 36 emerging markets, we use 
a small set of economic variables. Our Emerging Markets Risk Indicator reflects 
monthly currency risks, and can be used in sovereign risk analysis or in current 
portfolio investment decisions. The exercises done in order to evaluate the predictive 
capacity of the model show that had this model been used to predict the Asian 1997, 
Russian 1998 and Brazilian 1999 crises, it would have forecasted those events.
• In an empirical test to assess whether banking crises lead currency crises in a set 
of 92 developing and emerging markets’ economies from 1975 to 1997, we find that 
banking crises occurring a year before a currency crisis event help predict that crisis 
event.
• For the same set of countries, we find that domestic macroeconomic and financial 
variables are important determinants of instances of currency crises. Furthermore, 
an overvalued exchange rate increases the probability of a currency crash. An in­
crease in the stock of external debt can undermine the stability of the domestic 
currency. The composition and maturity of this debt are also key determinants. 
Changes in the global macroeconomic conditions (international interest rates, US 
inflation, commodity prices) help explain currency crises.
• Interestingly, the determinants of currency crises differ according to the type of 
exchange rate regime. Currency crisis episodes under fixed exchange rates are less 
frequent and require a much greater deterioration in domestic fundamentals to be
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triggered. Also, the international macroeconomic environment seems to have a 
stronger impact on pegged exchange rates than flexible regimes.
• Endogenising banking crises and estimating a system of two equations, one for 
banking crises and another for currency crises, allows us to compare the factors 
behind those two crises. Both crises are driven by several economic fundamentals. 
Our results raise doubts about the self-fulfilling nature attributed to financial crises 
by second-generation models.
•  The real sector (output growth) plays a more important role in determining bank­
ing than currency crises. Another important difference between the two types of 
crises lies in the relevant component of the domestic credit variable to explain crisis 
probabilities. Claims on the private sector help explain banking crises, whereas it is 
the net claims on the central government ratio the relevant one to explain currency 
crises.
• Judging the causal link between banking and currency crises requires a careful in­
vestigation of all the possible determinants of crises and the consideration of enough 
crisis lags. Once we control for a sufficient number of lags of the dependent variable 
(past currency crises in the currency equation and past banking crises in the bank­
ing equation), the causal link between crises vanishes. Notwithstanding, we can still 
find evidence of a causal link running from currency crises to banking crises, however 
only for the 1990s. Moreover, if we include unsuccessful attacks in the definition 
of currency crises or if we consider severe currency crises (depreciation of the cur­
rency above a 15 percent threshold), this causal link holds: currency crises precede 
banking crises. These results let us conclude that there is not a unidirectional and 
general link between banking and currency crises. Both type of crises seem to be 
closely intertwined and which crisis occurs first is mainly a matter of circumstance.
Chapter 1 
Literature R eview  on Currency 
Crises
1.1 Introduction
New research on currency crises has been developed both on the theoretical and empir­
ical fronts following the crisis events of the 1990s. It has been stimulated both by the 
frequency and the magnitude of these episodes of financial stability. The aim of this 
chapter is to provide some perspective on this research from both sides, the theory and 
the empirics of currency crises.1
In the theory of currency crises a collection of “new generation” models for currency 
crises has thrived since the early study by Krugman (1979). The “first generation” of 
speculative attacks models, pioneered by Krugman (1979), have stressed the fact that 
crises are caused by weak economic fundamentals. Excessive expansionary fiscal and 
monetary policies result in a persistent loss of international reserves that ultimately force 
authorities to abandon the exchange rate parity.
The development of “second-generation” models was prompted by the 1992-93 European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) crisis. Here, other factors are cited as responsible 
for the ERM crisis. These models, initiated by Obstfeld (1986) —adopting a framework 
developed by Flood and Garber (1984)—, state that currency crises can be self-fulfilling 
if agents expect the government to switch to an inflationary domestic credit policy in the 
presence of a speculative attack.
As a result of the ‘unexpected’ Asian crisis in 1997-98, a “third generation” of models 
has been studied. These models highlight the importance of moral hazard and liquidity
1A more extensive survey on currency crises can be found in Flood and Marion (1998). More recently, 
Chui (2000) provides a comprehensive review of the balance-of-payments crises literature.
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considerations as determinants of currency crises.
The empirical literature debates whether first- or second-generation models are more 
valid. Empirical papers on currency crisis try to explain and/or forecast currency crises 
in order to provide policy makers with advice to ward off crises. We can differentiate 
among four strands of research according to the methodology employed. A first group 
of studies rely mainly on purely descriptive statistics and are primarily concerned with 
particular episodes of currency distress.
The second group uses a probabilistic approach. After grouping the country and time 
observations into crisis and tranquil periods, a probability distribution function of these 
episodes is used to evaluate the likelihood of a currency crisis conditional on a set of 
indicators. The most well-known study in this particular context is by Eichengreen, Rose 
and Wyplosz (1996c).
An early warning system constitutes the third group and is initially proposed by Kamin­
sky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998). This methodology involves monitoring the evolution 
of several indicators that tend to exhibit an unusual behaviour in the periods preceding 
a currency crisis. Every time an indicator exceeds a certain threshold value, this is inter­
preted as a warning signal that a currency crisis may take place within the following 24 
months.
The fourth category of studies on currency crises analyses the joint occurrence of banking 
and currency crises. These studies claim that both types of crises are intertwined. Few 
papers can be grouped under this category, exceptions are Miller (1996) and, the more 
well-known, Kaminsky (1998).
In the next two sections we briefly summarise the main theoretical and empirical works 
on currency crises.
1.2 Theories o f Speculative A ttacks
Exemplary of the first-generation models, Krugman (1979) assumes that an exogenous 
government budget deficit lies at the root of the balance-of-payments crisis. Domestic 
credit expansion in excess of money demand growth leads to a gradual but persistent loss 
of international reserves and, ultimately, to a speculative attack on the currency. This 
attack immediately depletes reserves and forces the authorities to abandon exchange rate 
parity.
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In Krugman’s words,
“the logic of a currency crisis is the same as that of a speculative attack 
on a commodity stock. Suppose speculators were to wait until the reserves 
are exhausted in the natural course of events. At that point they would 
know that the price of foreign exchange, fixed until then, must rise. This 
would make holding foreign exchange more attractive than holding domestic 
currency, leading to a jump in the exchange rate. Foresighted speculators, re­
alising that such a jump is in prospect, sell domestic currency just before the 
exhaustion of reserves —and in doing so advance the date of that exhaustion, 
leading speculators to sell even earlier. The result is that when reserves fall 
to some critical level —perhaps a level that might seem large enough to fi­
nance years of payments deficits— there is an abrupt speculative attack which 
quickly drives those reserves to zero and forces an abandonment of the fixed 
exchange rate.”
The empirical implication of this model is that one should observe expansionary fiscal and 
monetary policies prior to speculative attacks. Those policies should be accompanied by 
a gradual decline in international reserves.
Flood and Garber (1984) extend Krugman (1979)’s model by introducing uncertainty 
about the rate of domestic credit creation. Unanticipated increases in domestic credit 
can cause the shadow exchange rate to exceed the pegged rate temporarily. Speculators 
attack the peg as soon as this situation makes arbitrage profits possible. But as domestic 
credit grows, an attack becomes increasingly likely. This widens the differential between 
domestic and foreign interest rates accompanied by a growing forward discount on the 
domestic currency. Moreover, the greater the uncertainty about the central bank’s credit 
policy, the faster reserves should be depleted.
Other research has focused in relaxing some of Krugman’s assumptions regarding the 
degree of capital mobility. For example, Wyplosz (1986) analyses devaluations in the 
presence of capital controls which limit capital mobility. The more stringent the con­
trols, the longer the pre-attack period over which the standard correlation of speculative 
crises will persist. With sufficiently stringent controls, collapses of the peg can be averted.
Obstfeld (1986) and Obstfeld (1994) have provided examples of multiple equilibria and 
self-fulfilling attacks in foreign exchange markets, constituting the second-generation mod­
els of currency crises. This view offers a whole new perspective on the causes of currency 
crises.
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A crucial assumption in the second-generation models is that economic policies are not 
exogenous, but instead respond to changes in the economy. Economic agents take this 
relationship into account in forming their expectations. At the same time, the expec­
tations and actions of economic agents affect some variables to which economic policies 
respond. This circularity creates the scope for multiple equilibria, and the economy may 
move from one equilibrium to another without a change in the fundamentals. Thus, the 
economy may initially be in an equilibrium consistent with a fixed exchange rate, but a 
sudden worsening of expectations may lead to changes in policies that result in a collapse 
of the exchange rate regime, thereby validating agents’ expectations. A fixed rate is costly 
to defend if people now expect that it will be depreciated in the future. To defend the 
currency in the face of expectations of future depreciation requires high short-term rates. 
But such high rates may either worsen the cash flow of the government or depress output 
and employment.
After the Asian crisis of 1997-98 and the failure of the currency crisis models to an­
ticipate this crisis, a new wave of models has emerged. Krugman (1998) states that the 
adoption of a new approach different from that of the traditional models of currency crises 
is needed to understand the nature of the Asian crisis. According to Krugman (1998), the 
type of crisis experienced by Asia were part of a broader financial crisis. To understand 
this crisis we need to focus our analysis in the role of financial intermediaries (moral haz­
ard issues), and the prices of real assets such as capital and land. The Asian financial 
institutions were accumulating liabilities that, apparently, were perceived as government 
guaranteed. But these institutions were mostly unregulated and subject to severe moral 
hazard problems. This lending practice by the financial intermediaries, based in excessive 
risk, created asset price inflation. The proliferation of risky lending raised the price of 
risky assets, making the financial condition of the intermediaries seem sounder that it re­
ally was. This process went on until the bubble created this way burst. At that point, the 
insolvency of intermediaries was visible, deflating asset prices even more. The currency 
crisis that followed was more of a symptom than a cause of this process.
Chang and Velasco (1998) focus on an open version of the banking model by Bryant 
(1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Their argument places international illiquidity 
at the center of the problem. International illiquidity is defined as a situation in which the 
financial system’s potential short term obligations exceed the liquidation value of its as­
sets. Using this model, the authors show that capital flows from abroad, after an opening 
of the capital account and/or an increase in the country’s access to international credit, 
can amplify the illiquidity problem. Banks are more vulnerable when foreign loans are of 
the short term nature. A panic by creditors, and therefore a refusal to roll over the short 
term loans, may cause a self-fulfilling bank run. Financial liberalisation can exacerbate
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the maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities for commercial banks. Distorting 
government policies (such as government deposit guarantees and investment subsidies that 
lead to overinvestment and overborrowing) increase financial fragility. The authors also 
claim that “the combination of an illiquid financial system and fixed exchange rates can 
be lethal”. Central banks acting as lender of last resort may avoid a bank run but cause 
a currency crisis. But if the central bank does not act as a lender of last resort bank runs 
are unavoidable.2
Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999b) emphasise the role of the moral hazard as a crucial 
factor in the Asian crisis. National banks were borrowing excessively from abroad — 
following financial liberalisation— and lending excessively at home. Even in the absence 
of explicit promises to “bail-out”, the close links between private and public institutions, 
as well as regulatory inadequacies, provided strong incentives to undertake risky projects. 
Capital inflows were directed to real estate and the stock markets. The banking system 
was clearly undercapitalised and accumulating a growing share of non-performing loans. 
Regarding policy, there was no commitment to structural reforms. These financial and 
real imbalances made the region very vulnerable to market sentiments. When in 1997 asset 
prices collapsed, wide losses and defaults in the corporate and financial sectors emerged. 
The reversal of capital inflows in the summer of 1997 led to the collapse of the domestic 
currencies.
Similarly, Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999a) analyse the Asian crisis by develop­
ing a model of financial and currency crises focused on “moral hazard as the common 
source of overinvestment, excessive external borrrowing, and current account deficits in 
an economy with a poorly supervised and regulated financial sector.” The authors claim 
that it was the complex web of structural distorsions and fundamental weaknesses that 
caused the Asian crisis in the summer of 1997. Foreign creditors were willing to lend under 
the implicit assumption that there existed public guarantees on corporate and financial 
investements, that is, a public bail-out was expected if things went wrong. This led to 
excessive borrowing and investment in unprofitable projects. Such a process translated 
into an unsustainable path of current account deficits. When things went wrong and the 
low profitability of the investments was revealed, the eventual refusal of foreign creditors 
to refinance the country’s cumulative losses forced the government to intervene. The gov­
ernment needed to guarantee the outstanding stock of external liabilities. To guarantee 
solvency, fiscal reforms were needed, with the possible recourse to seigniorage revenues 
through money creation. This created inflationary expectations and speculative attacks 
in the foreign exchange market, causing the collapse of the currency and anticipating the
2In a similar paper, Chang and Velasco (1999), the same authors analyse the same problem of illiquidity 
but focusing in its policy implications.
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event of a financial crisis.
Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2000) propose a theory to link banking and currency 
crises. The authors claim that both fundamentals and self-fulfilling beliefs play crucial 
roles. The relevant fundamentals are government guarantees to domestic banks’ foreign 
creditors in the presence of a devaluation. This implies that banks expose themselves to 
exchange rate risk and declare bankruptcy when a devaluation occurs. These guarantees 
create the possibility of self-fulfilling crises. When the market participants believe that a 
devaluation is imminent and the government will bail-out the banking system, they will 
exchange domestic currency for foreign currency to the point of devaluation. The result 
of these expectations is a currency crisis and a banking crisis. In this sense fundamentals 
—government guarantees— determine whether a crisis will occur, and self-fulfilling beliefs 
determine the timing.
Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2001) develop an explicitly dynamic monetary model 
with nominal rigidities as a key factor. “If nominal prices are rigid in the short run, a 
currency depreciation leads to an increase in the foreign currency debt repayment obliga­
tions of the firms, and consequently a fall in profits. Since lower profits reduce net worth, 
it may result in less investment and lower output in the next period. This, in turn, brings 
a fall in the demand for money, and thus a currency depreciation. But arbitrage in the 
foreign exchange market then implies that the currency must depreciate in the current 
period as well. In other words, if people believe that the currency will depreciate, it may 
indeed depreciate. Multiple short-run equilibria in the market for foreign exchange are 
thus possible. A currency crisis occurs either when expectations change or when a real 
shock shifts the economy to the ‘bad’ equilibrium”. Aghion et al. (2001) conclude that the 
proportion of foreign currency debt is a key determinant in the likelihood of a currency 
crisis. Given that the primary source of a currency crisis is the deteriorating balance sheet 
of private firms, currency crises may occur independently of the exchange rate regime in 
place. Public sector imbalances are determinants of currency crises via crowding-out ef­
fects. Whenever credit supply does not strongly react to changes in nominal interest rates 
it is desirable to increase interest rates as a mechanism to avoid a currency crisis. Finally, 
restrictive monetary policy will always produce a debt-burden effect on medium-term eco­
nomic activity.
Agenor, Miller, Vines and Weber (1999) is a selection of academic papers covering the 
causes, consequences and remedies of the Asian financial crisis. The authors intend to 
answer questions related to (a) the interconnection between currency crises and financial 
crises and the effect of twin crises on the economy; (b) the contagion mechanisms; and 
(c) what can be done after the crises have taken place. The editors in their introduction
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to the book consider four parts. The different chapters in part one provide a systematic 
overview of the Asian crisis. The first chapter emphasises the role of an inappropriate 
macroeconomic policy to bear the large capital inflows in a weak domestic financial sys­
tem and poor governance. In a second chapter the interconnections between financial 
and currency crises are analysed. “In the wake of the liberalisation of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s there was a wave of very substantial borrowing, encouraged by the widespread 
perception that financial systems would be bailed out in the event of difficulty. Given 
quasi-fixed exchange rates, this borrowing was done in foreign currency and unhedged. 
Once a shock caused the domestic currency to depreciate significantly, the increase in 
the domestic-currency value of foreign debt provoked financial crisis.” Chapters 3 and 4 
revisited the moral hazard problem.
Part two is a collection of theoretical papers analysing aspects such as the boom-and- 
bust feature of rapid investment in combination with financial liberalisation, the role of 
capital inflows in an economy where the financial sector is liberalised but underregualted 
and the consequences of a capital reversal, and multiple equilibria issues.
Part three deals with the controversial issue of contagion, its definition and role in the 
Asian crisis. Theoretical and empirical analysis is presented.
Finally, part four of the book studies policy alternatives toward crisis resolution with 
special emphasis in redesigning world financial institutions, the unsustainability of con­
tinuous creditor bail-outs as a solution, and the inefficiency of financial markets and the 
need of national governments playing a key regulatory role in the functioning of successful 
financial markets.
1.3 Em pirical Studies o f Currency Crises
Aziz, Caramazza and Salgado (2000) have sought to identify common characteristics 
among a variety of macroeconomic and financial variables for a large sample (50 coun­
tries, covering the period 1957-97) of currency crises in industrial countries and emerging 
market economies. Their definition of a currency crisis is based on an index of foreign 
exchange market pressure constructed as a weighted average of (detrended) monthly ex­
change rate and reserve changes. The weights are chosen so as to equalise the variance of 
the two components.
Aziz et al. (2000) do not use an econometric model but instead conduct graphical anal­
ysis. To do this, they first define a crisis window as some number of periods centered 
on each crisis date. They divide the sample into crisis and tranquil observations. Next,
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they compute the averages of the explanatory variables across all crisis events for each 
period in the crisis window. These averages for the crisis window are then plotted against 
the averages for the entire period. Aziz et al. (2000) conclude that prior to a currency 
crisis the economy is overheated, inflation is relatively high and the domestic currency 
overvalued, affecting the export sector and the current account balance. Monetary pol­
icy is significantly expansionary, with domestic credit growing strongly. The financial 
vulnerability of the economy is increasing, with rising liabilities of the banking system 
(unbacked by foreign reserves) and falling asset prices. Furthermore, some trigger, such 
as increasing world real interest rates or declining terms of trade, usually exacerbates the 
vulnerability of an economy to a crisis. However, these results are not robust across all 
crisis sub-samples.
Eichengreen et al. (1995) are among the first to systematically investigate the causes 
and determinants of speculative attacks.3 The authors analyse currency crises in a sam­
ple of panel observations for OECD countries since 1959. They construct a measure of 
speculative attacks that excludes devaluations and flotations short of a crisis but tries 
to capture unsuccessful attacks. Their index of crisis is a weighted average of changes 
in the exchange rate, changes in international reserves and changes in the interest rate 
differential. The last two variables are included to take into account the government’s 
response to a speculative attack. In fact, an increase in interest rates or the depletion of 
international reserves are the two main instruments at the disposal of the central bank 
to defend the currency. This method of identifying instances of currency crises has been 
widely used in the subsequent literature and is known as the Exchange Market Pressure 
(EMP)  index approach. Eichengreen et al. (1995) find that countries which devalue are 
more prone to experience problems on the external balance, reserve losses, high levels of 
unemployment and have loose monetary policy.
In a subsequent paper Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996b) use the same indicator 
to identify currency crises in a panel of quarterly data on 20 industrial countries for the 
period 1959-93. To analyse possible contagion effects, they ask whether the probability 
of a crisis in a country at a point in time is correlated with the incidence of crises in other 
countries at the same time, after controlling for the effects of political and economic funda­
mentals. The results of their probit estimations suggest that a crisis elsewhere in the world 
increases the probability of a speculative attack, even after controlling for economic and 
political factors. Notwithstanding, their fundamentals —with the exception of unemploy­
ment and inflation— are not significant in determining the probability of a currency crisis.
3 The emphasis is on “systematic” because all the previous studies referred to a single historical episode, 
like Sweden 1992 or Mexico 1994.
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Frankel and Rose (1996) use a different approach to identify episodes of currency crises 
in a sample of developing countries. Their argument behind the definition of a currency 
crash is that
“ . . .  it is much more difficult to identify successful defenses against specu­
lative attacks. Reserve movements are notoriously noisy measures of exchange 
market intervention for developing countries. In addition, few countries have 
market-determined short-term interest rates for long periods of time. The 
standard defenses against speculative attacks of interest rate hikes and re­
serve expenditures may also be less relevant in these countries than sudden 
tightening of reserve requirements, emergency rescue packages from the IMF or 
other foreign institutions, and especially the imposition of formal or informal 
controls on capital outflows.”
Using annual data, Frankel and Rose (1996) define currency crises as a depreciation of the 
domestic currency of at least 25 percent. To deal with countries that satisfy this criterion 
year after year, they impose a second condition: the depreciation in one particular year 
has to exceed the depreciation of the previous year by a margin of at least 10 percent. 
To assess the importance of a set of explanatory variables that are possible determinants 
of currency crises, the authors use a probit estimation approach, as in Eichengreen et al. 
(1996b). They find that crashes tend to occur when foreign direct investments dry up, 
reserves are low, domestic credit is high, interest rates in developed countries rise and 
the real exchange rate is overvalued. Government and current account deficits are not 
significant in their specification.
Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) ask why some emerging markets in 1995 were hit by 
financial crises while some others were not. The concepts of weak fundamentals and low 
reserves are used to assess the relationship between the REER, a lending boom, and the 
resulting incidence of a currency crash. Their main conclusion is that some degree of pre­
vious misbehavior was a necessary condition for crisis. This misbehavior took the form 
of overvalued real exchange rates and recent lending booms, coupled with low reserves 
relative to the central bank’s short term commitments. These results support the idea 
that the level for central banks’ reserves relative to short-term liabilities is important in 
determining whether a country is vulnerable to a self-fulfilling attack. Moreover, Sachs et 
al. (1996) also found that some common explanations for the occurrence of financial crises 
are not supported by the data from their sample of 20 emerging markets. The behavior, 
during the period 1990-94, of current accounts, the size of capital inflows and fiscal policy 
stances in and of themselves do not help explain why some countries experienced greater 
financial crises than others.
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Kaminsky et al. (1998) examine the empirical evidence on currency crises and propose a 
specific early warning system. The paper compares the merits of alternative approaches 
in providing early indications of currency crises and, based on this comparison, proposes 
a methodology for the design of such a system. Their methodology involves monitoring 
the evolution of several indicators that tend to exhibit unusual behaviour in the periods 
preceding a crisis. Every time an indicator exceeds a certain threshold value, this is in­
terpreted as a warning signal that a currency crisis may take place within the following 
24 months. The threshold values are calculated so as to strike a balance between the risk 
of having false signals versus the risk of missing crises. The authors find that exports, 
deviations of the real exchange rate from trend, the ratio of broad money to gross inter­
national reserves, output, and equity prices are the variables with the best track record 
in anticipating crises.
Berg and Patillo (1998) examine the models of Kaminsky et al. (1998), Frankel and Rose 
(1996) and Sachs et al. (1996). Berg and Patillo’s objective was to test the capability of 
those models to predict the 1997 crises. For each model, they try to reproduce as closely 
as possible the original specification and then test some reasonable modifications.
According to Berg and Patillo (1998), Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart’s model issued an 
alarm during the 1995:5 to 1996:12 period. The forecasted cross-country ranking of the 
severity of crisis was a significant predictor of the actual ranking. In contrast they find 
that the models of Frankel and Rose, and Sachs, Tornell and Velasco, would have been of 
little use in predicting the 1997 currency crises.
Modifications to the three models perform differently. Adding variables to Kaminsky, Li­
zondo and Reinhart’s model, such as current account and M2 over reserves ratio, improved 
the performance of this model, whereas plausible modifications to the Sachs, Tornell and 
Velasco and Frankel and Rose’s models did not yield useful forecast improvements. Berg 
and Patillo also estimated a set of alternative probit models using data and a crisis defi­
nition borrowed from Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart. Those models provided generally 
better forecasts than the model by Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart.
A different stream of the empirical literature on currency crises considers banking crises 
as possible determinants of currency crises. The works by Rossi (1999), Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1999) and Glick and Hutchison (1999) can be classified within this group.
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) examine currency and banking crisis episodes for indus­
trial and developing countries from the 1970’s throughout 1995. In order to investigate 
if banking crises help to explain currency crises, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) calculate
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conditional probabilities. The authors claim that if knowing that there is a banking crisis 
within the past 24 months helps predict a currency crisis then the probability of a cur­
rency crisis, conditioned on the previous occurrence of a banking crisis, should be higher 
than the unconditional probability of a currency crisis. The conditional probability takes 
on a value of 46 percent, whereas the unconditional one is 29 percent. The conclusion 
is, therefore, that knowing that a banking crisis was underway helps to predict a future 
currency crisis.
To further investigate this problem of twin crises, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) analyse 
the evolution of 16 macroeconomic and financial variables around the time of the crises. 
This time their results point to common causes for banking and currency crises. Both 
crises are preceded by recessions or below normal economic growth, an overvalued ex­
change rate, an increasing cost of credit and a fall in exports. Whether the currency or 
the banking problems surface first is only a matter of circumstance.
Rossi (1999) estimates a logit model of currency crises for a sample of 15 developing 
countries over the period 1990-97. After including some temporal dummies (to account 
for the fact that currency crises tend to be clustered in time), real growth, terms of trade, 
the quality of institutions, the degree of liberalisation of capital outflows, the banking 
supervisory framework and the degree of depositors’ safety, the emergence of banking 
problems or the occurrence of a banking crises help predict a balance-of-payments crisis, 
especially within a two-year period. In a similar equation to explain banking crises a 
currency crisis indicator do not help forecast banking crises.
Glick and Hutchison (1999) empirically investigate the causal linkages between bank­
ing and currency crises for a sample of 90 industrial and developing countries over the 
period 1975-97, using annual data. Glick and Hutchison (1999) use a simultaneous equa­
tion methodology, following Maddala (1983), to estimate the structural coefficients and 
standard errors in a two-equation system where both dependent binary variables (in a 
probit context) are endogeneous. Their results suggest a very strong and robust contem­
poraneous correlation among the onset of banking and currency crises in emerging market 
countries. There is a much weaker evidence of this contemporaneous link with a broader 
sample of developing countries and for the full sample of countries. The other strong 
result, found by the authors, is that banking crises are a statistically significant leading 
indicator of currency crises in emerging markets. Currency crises, by contrast, are not a 
good leading indicator of impending banking problems.4
4Other interesting papers on financial crises are Gourinchas, Valdes and Landerretche (1999), Weller
(1999), Burkart and Courdet (1998), Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) and Moreno and Trehan
(2000).
Chapter 2 
A Duration M odel Approach for 
Currency Crises
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we seek to explain the origins of currency crises for a group of developed 
countries. Specifically, we attempt to illustrate the mechanism that generates currency 
crises by relating their occurrence first, to realisations of explanatory variables and, sec­
ond, to the duration pattern of the non-crisis periods.
For 20 OECD countries we construct a data set for the period 1970-97, consisting of 
68 periods of tranquility . These spells are defined as those episodes for which a particu­
lar currency does not suffer from a speculative attack. In a broad sense, we can talk of a 
spell as synonymous of peg peg.1 We define a tranquil state or episode as a period of time 
in which there is no pressure on the currency, while a crisis state is defined as a period 
characterised by the presence of a speculative attack, either successful or not.
We use duration analysis to study the countries’ probability to leave a tranquil state 
by exiting into a currency crisis state. The use of duration models is an innovative strat­
egy for estimating the probability of exiting a currency peg. This method allows us not 
only to study the determinants of the likelihood of a currency crash, but also the dura­
tion of spells of tranquility, how much this varies over the business cycle and how the 
duration of tranquil states varies across countries.2 We are looking for the determinants 
of the length of time a currency spends in a tranquil state. The duration of the spells of 
tranquility is important in assessing currency stability. Exchange rate credibility depends 
not only on the reaction to a speculative attack, but also on the time already spent in a
1We use the expression currency peg understood as an episode of currency stability.
2 These are the classical questions that Kiefer (1988) raised in his seminal paper on duration methods 
applied to unemployment data.
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tranquil episode.
The real world is characterised by the existence of non-stationarities. The character­
istics of, say, financial markets change over time, therefore, the probabilities of exit into 
a currency crisis state also change with the length of the spell.
Traditional models of currency crises —of the probit and logit nature— include time- 
dependent explanatory variables in order to incorporate those non-stationarities. But 
these models miss duration dependence as a second kind of non-stationarity. A duration 
model approach of the type proposed here permits us to capture both kinds of non- 
stationarity.
Duration models allow us to test for the length of time already spent on the spell as 
a determinant of the likelihood of exit into a turbulent episode. The specific pattern 
of the duration dependence lets us test if the likelihood of a devaluation is higher for 
tranquil periods, say, in the first quarters, than for periods that have lasted longer, after 
controlling for other time-varying factors. We can argue that the political costs of realign­
ment change over the duration of the spell, maybe due to changes in the credibility of 
the peg. Growing credibility surrounding an exchange-rate-based stabilisation program 
might reduce the probability that the peg will be abandoned. In short, we would like to 
understand the role played by the time spent on the peg in determining the likelihood of 
exit into a currency crisis.
Klein and Marion (1997) suggest that, even if some of the determinants for the dura­
tion of a fixed exchange-rate spell may remain constant over a spell, others will change. 
A simple correlation of the length of each spell with some constant measure of each ex­
planatory variable (e.g. the value of the variable at the beginning or at the end of a spell 
or its change over the spell or its average value during the spell) fails to capture impor­
tant information about the time path of the variable during the spell. Therefore, they 
call for an empirical approach that allows the consideration of time-varying determinants, 
rejecting explicitly the use of ordinary least squares or duration analysis. They use logit 
models instead.3 Nevertheless, in this chapter we propose more sophisticated duration 
models with the added feature of time-varying variables, so we do not miss the explana­
tory power of time-varying determinants and, moreover, incorporate duration dependence 
as a second class of non-stationarity within spells.
The remainder of of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 concentrates on
3Their model is estimated for sixteen Latin American countries and Jamaica during the 1957-91 
period.
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methodological issues. Section 2.3 depicts the measure of speculative pressure used to 
analyse the empirics of speculative attacks. We describe the data in Section 2.4. In 
Section 2.5 we present the main results, and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 M ethodological Issues
In analysing the process of transition from a tranquil state to a crisis state, we define a 
tranquil state as a period of time in which there is no pressure on the currency. A crisis 
state is defined as a period characterised by the presence of a speculative attack, whether 
this is successful or not. This process generates a sequence of points on the time axis: 
the times at which speculative attacks occur and, therefore, at which the transitions are 
made. These movements are random, so the evolution of the state of a country over time 
is a realisation of a stochastic point process.
Following Eichengreen et al. (1996b), we do not identify currency crises with actual de­
valuations, revaluations and instances in which the currency is floated. The reason for 
this is twofold. First, not all speculative attacks are successful. The currency may be 
supported by the intervention of the national central bank via expenditure of reserves, 
or by foreign central banks and governments or, even, by the threat or actual imposition 
of capital controls. The use of interest rates and austerity policies are other alternatives 
to repel an attack. Second, realignments are undertaken in tranquil periods in order to 
preclude future attacks.
Since the monetary authority can accommodate the exchange market pressure by run­
ning down its international reserves or by raising interest rates, a measure of speculative 
attacks has to reflect those possibilities. For that reason, we adopt a measure of exchange 
market pressure similar to that of Eichengreen et al. (1996b).4
For the specification of the duration model,5 we use the Cox (1972) approach of pro­
portional hazards.
The proportional hazard specification in continuous time leads to a hazard function6 
of the form:
A (t , x (t), /3, A0) =  <t> (x (t), /?) A0 (t) . (2 .1 )
4The concrete specification of this measure is presented in the next section.
5See Kiefer (1988) and Lancaster (1990) for a discussion of these models. See also Narendranathan 
and Stewart (1993) as an application of this type of models.
6That is, the part of the hazard (the conditional probability) that is common for all individuals in a 
proportional hazard model.
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Here x (t ) denotes time dependent variables, P is a vector of unknown coefficients and 
A0 (t) is the base-line hazard corresponding to (f>(.) = 1. The first component of Equation 
(2.1), <£(.), describes the way in which A shifts between individuals endowed with differ­
ent x's at given length of time t spent on the peg. The second component, the base-line 
hazard, is a functional form for the dependence of A on t.
A commonly used specification of 0 is:
0 (x ( t) , p) = exp (x (;t)' P) (2 .2 )
This specification is convenient because the non-negativity of 0 does not impose restric­
tions on p. Moreover, the vector of coefficients can be interpreted as the constant propor­
tional effect of x on the conditional probability of ending the spell. This is the analogue, 
in a hazard setting, of the usual partial derivative interpretation of a linear regression 
coefficient.
In the discrete specification used for the estimation the hazard function denotes the prob­
ability of moving to a crisis state in period £ +  1 conditional on being in a tranquil state 
until period t. Assuming that the covariates are constant between t and t + 1 we can write 
the hazard function as:
h (t) =  1 -  exp{- exp (x (t )' p +  7  (t ))} (2.3)
Where
/
t+i
A (u)du (2.4)
This follows directly from the proportional hazard specification without any further dis­
tributional assumptions.
We have to express these probabilities in terms of a likelihood function to be estimated.
The contribution to log likelihood made by the ith observation, which fails or is cen­
sored7 in the interval tj (that is, tj is the ith observation, either completed or censored) 
is:
7 A  spell is censored when we do not observe the duration of the spell until its conclusion. We do not 
have information on the transition to a currency crisis state.
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t j - 1
Lj (6) =  dj In (hi (tj)) +  ^  In (1 -  hi (t)) (2.5)
t=i
=  di In { 1  -  exp [ -  exp (x{ (tj)' +  7  ( i,))]}
t j —1
-  exp [(Xi + 7 w] (2-6)
t=i
where di = 1 if the «</l spell is uncensored —the transition from a traquil state to a currency 
crisis state is observed—, and di =  0  if censored —the transition is not observed.
2.3 M easuring Exchange M arket Pressure
The first issue in any empirical analysis of currency crises is to define speculative attacks. 
As stated previously, we do not want to limit this study to successful speculative attacks, 
that is, to the cases in which the exchange rate regime was altered (and the currency 
was either devalued or floated). Studies of this type are Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (1998) 
and Frankel and Rose (1996). These works define currency crises based only on unusual 
movements of the exchange rates.
With our definition of currency crises, we want to capture those unsuccessful attacks that 
have been warded off by central banks and governments. The monetary authorities may 
accommodate the pressure on the financial markets by running down their international 
reserves or deter the attack by raising interest rates. In these circumstances, currency 
market pressures will be translated into steep increases in domestic interest rates and/or 
great losses of foreign exchange reserves. Therefore, a measure of speculative attacks 
should capture these three different forms of currency market turbulences.
Eichengreen et al. (1996c) construct a measure of speculative pressure by means of an 
index. This index is a weighted average of exchange rate changes, changes in reserves, 
and interest rate changes. The index of exchange market pressures is defined as:
EM Pitt = aAeiit +  bA (ii>t -  i*t ) -  c (Arift -  Arf )  (2.7)
where a, b and c are the chosen weights, Aeijt is the change in the exchange rate, ii)t 
denotes the domestic interest rate, i* corresponds to the same variable but for the coun­
try of reference, r^t is the ratio of foreign reserves to domestic money for the domestic 
country and, r£ denotes the same concept for the country of reference.
This is a common measure used in several studies by the same authors (Eichengreen
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et al. (1996b), Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996a)) and by Sachs et al. (1996) as well 
as Kaminsky et al. (1998), with variations in the weights given to the three components.
Defining the E M P  index of Equation (2.7) as an unweighted measure has the obvi­
ous advantage of simplicity. The disadvantage is that the volatility of exchange rates, 
interests rates and reserves are very different.8 Eichengreen et al. (1996c), Eichengreen et 
al. (1996b), Eichengreen et al. (1996a) and Kaminsky et al. (1998) work with the E M P  
index weighting the three components so as to equalise their volatilities. In this way they 
prevent any of the components from dominating the index.
The next step is the identification of a currency crisis using the E M P  indicator. Eichen­
green, Rose and Wyplosz identify quarters in which their index is at least one and a half 
standard deviations above the sample mean as instances of speculative attacks. To avoid 
counting the same crisis more than once, they exclude the later observation(s) when two 
(or more) crises occur in successive quarters.
We believe that this way of defining a currency crisis is faulty for the sample considered. 
Here first, the unweighted E M P  index is defective because it disregards the inherent dif­
ferent volatility of its three components. Second, the weighted E M P  measure (according 
to the particular volatilities of its components) is inadequate because it cannot capture 
those episodes in which the monetary authorities were very successful in controlling a 
speculative attack but, however, ended with an important loss of reserves.
For these reasons we construct a third measure of speculative pressure. We use the same 
three indicators (exchange rate changes, changes in reserves, and interest rate changes9) 
but in a rather different way. Episodes where changes in the exchange rate are greater 
than +1.5 standard deviations over the means are selected first as episodes of speculative 
attacks. For the remaining episodes we look at the reserves indicator. If changes in rela­
tive foreign reserves are below the -1.5 standard deviation band, we clasify them as crisis 
episodes. As new episodes of currency crisis I add those ones for which the change in the 
interest rate differential is above the +1.5 standard deviation band.
The remaining observations are classified as periods of tranquility. Some remarks are 
in order here. First, whenever we find that only one of the three variables lies outside
8 The volatility of the percentage changes in the reserves (scaled by the monetary base) is several 
times the conditional volatility of the percentage change in the exchange rate, which is several times the 
percentage change in the interest differential.
9These variables are measured in relative terms with those prevailing either in Germany or in the US, 
depending on the country of interest. Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Japan are related to the US 
dollar.
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the band, we look at the deviation from the band and the behavior of the two other vari­
ables. If the case is such that the deviation from the band is marginal and the two other 
variables show a normal behavior, we disqualify that episode as a turbulent one and it is 
classified as a tranquil period. If, on the contrary, we observe that the three variables are 
in the margin of the band, we qualify the episode as turbulent. In order to prevent the 
continuation of a speculative episode from being identified as a new episode, I exclude the 
later observation(s) when two (or more crises) occur in successive quarters.
Tables A.l to A.7 in Appendix A report the identified turbulent episodes by the three 
measures. Tables A .8  to A.14 and A.15 to A.20 (see Appendix A) report the official cur­
rency events and the identification of a turbulent period and the associated official event 
when applicable. In that way, we can check for the appropriateness of the measure of 
speculative pressure proposed here when the attacks were successful, and the location of 
the unsuccessful speculative attacks.
From these tables we can conclude the superiority of the third measure over the other 
two. The first index, the unweighted E M P , identifies too few crises according to the 
official events. The second measure, the weighted E M P  (weighted in order to equalise 
the volatility of its three components) misses, mainly, unsuccessful speculative attacks 
that were faced by unusual movements in foreign reserves. A clear example is Denmark 
in 1992 and 1993 at the time of the tensions in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM). In late 1992, Denmark warded off attacks by a huge loss in foreign reserves. This 
is what we call an unsuccessful speculative attack and should be included in this study. 
An E M P  index of the type of Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz would miss these crises 
since relative foreign reserves have the largest volatility (of the three components) and 
given that the three indicators are weighted in order to equalise their volatilities, foreign 
reserves lose quite a lot of their importance, failing to capture this kind of crisis.
Another example along the same lines is France in 1992. Using an index of the type 
proposed by Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz, we do not identify the events of 1992 as a 
speculative attack for France. Whereas, if we use our proposed measure, we do classify 
the episode as a speculative attack, given the huge loss in reserves that took place at that 
moment in order to prevent the crisis.
To shed some light on the characteristics of speculative pressure episodes we report the 
proportion of times that a change in either the exchange rate, relative foreign reserves or 
relative short term rates is the criterion that qualifies an episode as a period of speculative 
pressure. A total of 62 percent of turbulent episodes is explained by unusual behavior in 
the real exchange rate. Relative reserves identify 29 percent of the crises, and the rest, 9
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Figure 2.1: Crises per Q uarter
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percent, is due to  extrem e movements of the short-term  interest rate.
Since episodes th a t are classified as turbulen t ones due to  unusual movements in ei­
ther relative reserves or relative interest rates are not accom panied by large adjustm ents 
in exchange ra tes (according to  our m easure of speculative attacks), we can sta te  th a t 
m onetary au thorities have intervened actively in foreign exchange m arkets, using reserves 
and interest rates, to  face speculative pressures 38 percent of the time. T h a t is, m onetary 
authorities have succeed in those occasions to prevent large movements of the exchange 
rate. This is w hat we call unsuccessful speculative attacks.
In Figure 2.1 we report the d istribu tion  of the currency crises along the tim e axis and Ta­
ble 2.1 shows the num ber of crises identified by countries. Denmark, France, Sweden and 
the UK are the countries w ith the greatest num ber of speculative attacks. At the other 
extrem e, C anada, Portugal, the N etherlands and A ustralia have the sm allest num ber of 
currency crises.
Before explaining the results of our estim ates, we have to report some of the charac­
teristics of the  duration  of the spells. Rem em ber th a t a spell is defined as th a t period 
when a particu lar currency does not suffer from a speculative attack .
Inform ation abou t the duration  of the spells is provided in Table 2.2. The num ber of 
crises identified was 149, bu t in the econometric analysis we only considered 68 due to 
d a ta  restrictions regarding the explanatory variables (see Table 2.3).10
10This is unlikely to generate any selection bias since the data restrictions in the explanatory variables 
are randomly distributed across countries.
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Table 2 .1 : Number of Crises by Country
Country Number of Crises1
Denmark 16
Prance 15
Sweden 14
UK 14
Belgium 13
USA 13
Austria 11
Ireland 11
Italy 11
Norway 1 1
Finland 10
New Zealand 9
Switzerland 9
Greece 9
Japan 9
Spain 9
Australia 8
The Netherlands 7
Portugal 7
Canada 5
mean 1 0 .6
standard deviation 2.9
dum ber of total crises, we do not have 
excluded consecutive crises yet.
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Figure 2.2: D uration Frequencies
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It is assum ed th a t a tranquil sta te  ends when the country leaves th a t s ta te  to enter 
another one (here a currency crisis s ta te), otherwise the spell is right censored. Censored 
observations are easily handle w ithin the likelihood framework.
From Tables 2.2, 2.3, and Figure 2.2, we see th a t the exit ra te  into a tu rbulen t episode 
is higher in the early quarters of the peg. One th ird  of the tranquil states in the sample 
end, or are right censored in the first year of the peg, and half of them  end or are right 
censored w ithin two years and a half. In addition, 64 percent of the durations are below 
four years in length. According to these proportions and given the lim ited num ber of 
crises, we concentrate the estim ates for the behavior of the base-line hazard ( th a t is, of 
the duration  param eters) in the four years since the beginning of the peg. This argum ent 
is reinforced for the com pleted spells, w ith 70% of the population ending spells in four 
years time.
2.4 The Data
We have assembled quarterly  d a ta  from 1970 through 1997 for twenty OECD countries: 
A ustralia, A ustria, Belgium, C anada, Denmark, F inland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
the U nited Kingdom  and the U nited States. The d a ta  base is constructed from the In ­
ternational Financial S tatistics (IFS) published by the In ternational M onetary Fund and 
the M ain Econom ic Indicators datase t published by the OECD.
To define the  indices of speculative pressure, we use d a ta  from the IFS. The exchange rate 
is expressed in term s of the national currency of country i a t tim e t  over DM or US dollar.
T;
10 20  30  40  50
duration in quarters of a tranquil spell
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Table 2 .2 : Distribution of Total Tranquil Spells
Duration of Spell 
in Quarters
Frequency Percent Cum.
1 7 8.64 08.64
2 8 9.88 18.52
3 6 7.41 25.93
4 6 7.41 33.33
5 4 4.94 38.27
6 1 1.23 39.51
7 2 2.47 41.98
8 2 2.47 44.44
9 2 2.47 46.91
10 3 3.70 50.62
11 1 1.23 51.85
13 3 3.70 55.56
15 1 1.23 56.79
16 6 7.41 64.20
18 1 1.23 65.43
19 4 4.94 70.37
2 0 4 4.94 75.31
2 1 4 4.94 80.25
2 2 2 2.47 82.72
23 2 2.47 85.19
33 1 1.23 86.42
35 2 2.47 88.89
36 1 1.23 90.12
37 1 1.23 91.36
38 2 2.47 93.83
40 2 2.47 96.30
47 2 2.47 98.77
54 1 1.23 1 0 0
Total
Mean
Median
Standard Deviation 
Range
81
14
17
13
[1,54]
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Table 2.3: Distribution of Completed Tranquil Spells
Duration of Spell 
in Quarters
Frequency Percent Cum.
1 7 10.29 10.29
2 8 11.76 22.06
3 6 8.82 30.88
4 6 8.82 39.71
5 4 5.88 45.59
6 1 1.47 47.06
7 2 2.94 50.00
8 2 2.94 52.94
9 1 1.47 54.41
1 0 3 4.41 58.82
11 1 1.47 60.29
13 3 4.41 64.71
15 1 1.47 66.18
16 2 2.94 69.12
19 3 4.41 73.53
2 1 4 5.88 79.41
2 2 2 2.94 82.35
23 2 2.94 85.29
35 2 2.94 88.24
36 1 1.47 89.71
37 1 1.47 91.18
38 2 2.94 94.12
40 2 2.94 97.06
47 1 1.47 98.53
54 1 1.47 1 0 0
Total 6 8  
Mean 13 
Standard Deviation 13
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We use market rates, that is the exchange rate determined largely by market forces and 
defined as period averages.
The discount rate, preferably, or the money market rate, depending on the availabil­
ity of data, is the measure of the interest rate entering the definition of the E M P  index.
International reserves enter the E M P  index as a ratio of reserves (excluding gold) to 
narrow money (Ml).
The independent variables can be grouped as follows. As indicators of the economic 
domestic conditions we introduce real GDP growth at 1990 prices, the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI), with base year 1990, to construct the inflation indicator, and the rate of 
unemployment.
To measure the external conditions we consider merchandise exports (f.o.b.) and mer­
chandise imports (c.i.f.), both in terms of growth rates and defined over GDP. We also 
consider an indicator of the degree of openness of the country, constructed as exports plus 
imports over GDP.
A Real Effective Exchange Rate index (REER) is defined as the nominal effective ex­
change rate index adjusted for relative movements in a national cost indicator of relative 
normalised unit labor costs in manufacturing. The nominal effective exchange rate is 
an index of the period average exchange rate of the currency in question to a weighted 
geometric average of exchange rates for the currencies of selected countries. The weights 
are derived from trade in manufactured goods among industrial countries over the period 
1989-91.
As an indicator of the domestic monetary condition we include domestic deposits. This 
variable is defined as demand deposits plus time and saving deposits, deflated by GDP 
and in terms of rate of growth. Domestic credit, claims on government, and claims on 
private sector are our indicators of a possible credit expansion or lending booms.
To take into consideration the debate on capital account liberalisation and the extent 
to which measures to increase transaction costs may alter the composition of capital flows 
and influence the vulnerability to sudden outflows, we include portfolio flows and Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) in the analysis.
We have to keep in mind that quarterly observations may not be a good periodicity to 
identify every speculative attack, especially unsuccessful ones. Pressure against pegged
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Table 2.4: Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameters Estimates Est./s.e. Expected sign
Growth -0.06 -0.76 -
Inflation 0.08 0.90 +
Unemployment 0 .0 1 0.47 +
Export Growth -0.04** -1.97 -
Import Growth 0.03** 1.92 +
Openness -0 .0 1 ** -1.81 -
REER (deviation from trend) -0.08*** -2.38 -
Deposits/GDP (rate of growth) -0.05* -1.47 -
Claims on Government/GDP 0 .0 1 * 1.49 +
Portfolio Investment/GDP 0.06*** 2.41 +
FDI/GDP -0 .0 1 -0.08 -
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Note: the inclusion of a dummy variable to account for lagged duration dependence 
turns out to be not significant, so we excluded it from our analysis.
currencies can occur and be repelled quickly through a rise in interest rates or foreign- 
exchange-market intervention within the quarter. When an attack occurs and is repelled 
with immediate action, the average behavior of both interest rates and international re­
serves over the quarter are probably not going to reflect the intensity of speculative pres­
sures. But the availability of data restricts the frequency data to quarterly observations 
in order to capture the maximum spectrum of countries throughout a long time period.
2.5 R esults
The results are reported in Table 2.4. The dependent variable is the conditional probabil­
ity of leaving a tranquil state. The estimates for the parameters of the model are shown 
in the second column with their standard errors in the third column. The expected sign 
for the coefficients of the explanatory variables are reported in the last column.
The use of a proportional hazard model allows for an easy interpretation of the esti­
mated parameters. If the sign is positive, the effect on the hazard rate will be positive 
(shorter durations). If it is negative, the effect will be negative (larger durations).
The baseline rate has been defined through a set of dummy variables, one for each quarter 
till the fifth. Prom the sixth to the eleventh it has been defined with a dummy for every 
two quarters. One more dummy is introduced for the next five quarters. Prom then on, we 
do not include any more duration dummies, since we only estimate the base-line hazard 
for the four first years due to the reasons stated previously. The main feature of this kind
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of function (also known as piecewise constant hazard rate) is that it is constant in each 
interval, but may vary from one interval to the other. The first interval is used as the 
reference level.
2.5.1 Time-Varying Variables
Variables from quarter t are used to determine the probability of exit in quarter t +  1 in 
order to avoid feedback effects of the occurrence of a currency crash into the macroeco­
nomic variables. 11
Consider the first variable, GDP growth. The negative sign of the estimated parame­
ter indicates that a decline in GDP growth leads to an increase in the probability of 
ending the spell of tranquility. That is, a weakening in economic activity is likely to be 
associated with an increase in the vulnerability of the currency to attacks. The underlying 
explanation of this result is the following: an increasing rate of growth may generate buoy­
ancy in the domestic asset markets, attracting capital inflows and, therefore, supporting 
the currency. Conversely, if growth is declining there would be pressures to ease financial 
policies, among them currency depreciation, to stimulate activity. Notwithstanding, the 
coefficient is not significant.
The inflation variable has the expected sign but it is not significant. High inflation 
increases the likelihood of exit into a turbulent period. Kumar, Moorthy and Perraudin 
(1998) argue that high inflation can increase vulnerability to crises through an impact on 
resource allocation, competitiveness, and macroeconomic stability. In an exchange rate 
peg (or relatively inflexible nominal exchange rate regime) a higher level of inflation than 
that of partner countries can lead to significant overvaluation in the real exchange rate.
A possible justification of the non-significance of the inflation variables lies in the in­
clusion of the REER variable. When we do not include REER in the model, the inflation 
variable is significant. In previous studies, inflation is significant either when REER is 
excluded, as in Eichengreen et al. (1996b), or when the inflation variable is substituted by 
a dummy variable that takes on the value of unity for periods of abnormal high inflation 
and zero otherwise, as in Kumar et al. (1998).
As expected, high unemployment increases the vulnerability to crises. The slump in 
economic activity, reflected in a rise of unemployment, makes the central bank more 
attentive to domestic objectives, compromising the exchange rate target. But the coeffi­
11 See Agenor, Bhandari and Flood (1992), Flood and Garber (1984), Garber and Svensoon (1995), 
Krugman (1979) and Wyplosz (1986) for a review of the theoretical models on currency crises.
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cient is not significant. We have included this variable in the final specification in rates 
of growth to take into account the historical different levels of unemployment rates in the 
countries under study. The inclusion of the variable in levels changes neither its sign, its 
significance, nor the behavior of the other variables.
As variables that reflect the health of the foreign sector we have included: exports, im­
ports and an indicator of openness. The export variable is included in relative terms to 
GDP and in rate of growth. The different studies on currency crises emphasise the role 
of a sharp slowdown in export growth as a key contributor to currency vulnerability. A 
slowdown in exports is likely to increase the probability of a crisis. This result is confirmed 
here: the sign for the coefficient of the export variable is negative and significant, a result 
consistent with Kumar et al. (1998).
According to our estimates, import growth increases in advance of a speculative attack, 
reflected by the positive sign and significant coefficient. Therefore, an increase in import 
growth helps to predict the probability of the occurrence of a currency crisis event. 12
Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (1998) argue that more open economies are less likely to suffer 
an exchange rate crash. The benefits of trade openness outweigh the higher vulnerability 
to external shocks. Openness reflects how connected the economy is to the rest of the 
world and stands here for trade liberalisation. It is proxied by exports plus imports over 
GDP. As expected, we obtain a negative and significant sign, in line with Milesi-Ferreti 
and Razin’s argument, and with the results of Kumar et al. (1998).
The REER is found to be one of the most important indicators in assessing likely pressures 
against a currency (Kaminsky et al. (1998)). We can consider the REER as a possible 
proxy for the loss of international price competitiveness as well as for exchange rate mis­
alignment. Following Kumar et al. (1998), REER can act as a channel for the contagion 
effect via a competitiveness effect: when one currency is devalued, the trading partners’ 
position deteriorates vis a, vis that economy. This would show up in the trade accounts 
with some lag, but investors act on the expectation of the impact and increases in the 
pressure on the other currencies may follow immediately. A higher value of the exchange 
rate index implies a more appreciated domestic real exchange rate. Therefore, we expect 
the coefficient on the real effective exchange rate index to be positive.
On the other hand, an appreciation of the real exchange rate relative to its historical 
value increases the degree of misalignment. Trend measures of the REER (based on the
12 Some could argue that higher import growth is a consequence rather than a causal factor of currency 
crises because rising expectations of a crisis make importers accelerate deliveries.
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Hodrick Prescott filter) can provide an approximate measure of significant disequilibrium 
in the real exchange rate. We introduce the variable REER as deviations from this trend 
therefore, expecting a negative sign.
According to Table 2.4, the deviation of the REER from its trend variable is signifi­
cant and has the correct sign. Table A.21 in Appendix A includes REER instead of its 
deviations from trend. Again, the sign is as expected and the coefficient is significant. In­
cluding REER or its deviation from trend has no effect either on the rest of the variables or 
on the shape of the base-line hazard function. Therefore, with both REER and deviations 
of REER from its historical trend, we support the hypothesis of REER as, first, a compet­
itiveness indicator, with deteriorations of that indicator leading to higher probabilities of 
speculative attacks, and, second, as a measure of exchange rate misalignment, apprecia­
tions beyond its natural trend result in stronger likelihood of exit into a turbulent episode.
Extending the previously mentioned studies, we introduce deposits over GDP (in terms 
of their growth rate) that serve as a proxy for the existence of deposit runs and loss of 
confidence in the banking system, or of the shrinkage of banks’ balance sheets for other 
reasons. The results show that the coefficient for this variable has the expected sign and 
that it is statistically significant. The absence of falling deposits is reflected in a lower 
probability of a currency crisis event, reflecting the influence of the banking sector on the 
likelihood of a currency crisis. 13
In order to capture Krugman’s effect14 (domestic credit expansion) on the likelihood of a 
speculative attack, past empirical studies include the domestic credit variable. This vari­
able is the sum of claims on central government, local governments, nonfinancial public 
enterprises, private sector, other banking institutions and non-bank financial institutions. 
But what Krugman emphasises is not the behavior of all those components of the total 
domestic credit, but the credit to the government; the credit expansion due to the moneti­
sation of the government budget deficit. In order to capture the effect of this variable on 
the likelihood of a speculative attack, we should take into consideration only the claims 
on government (in net terms) by the central bank and other banks. We have not seen any 
study that makes such a consideration.
The coefficient for the claims on government to GDP ratio is positive and statistically 
significant. An increase of this ratio raises the likelihood of exit into a currency crisis state.
13Some theoretical models argue that a higher rate of growth of bank deposits tends to increase vul­
nerability to crisis, because the financial intermediation system cannnot cope effectively with the influx 
of funds, and that this predisposes to a ‘twin’ crisis’.
14See Krugman (1979).
CHAPTER 2. A DURATION MODEL APPROACH FOR CURRENCY CRISES 43
In order to check the accuracy of this result, we have also estimated the model using 
domestic credit instead of claims on government. The result is shown in Table A.22 of 
Appendix A: domestic credit has the wrong sign and it is not significant.
To double check, we have also estimated the model including both claims on govern­
ment and claims on the private sector. The first remains significant and with the correct 
sign, but the latter is not significant. Moreover, Eichengreen et al. (1996b) introduce 
credit growth and fail to find a significant influence of this variable on the likelihood of 
occurrence of a currency crisis. Therefore, we conclude that claims on government is the 
variable that better reflects Krugman’s effect.
The last two variables included in the regression analysis reflect the composition of capi­
tal inflows: portfolio investment and FDI, both variables deflated by domestic GDP. As 
Frankel and Rose (1996) and Kumar et al. (1998) argue, the hypothesis is that FDI is 
a safer way to finance investment than is portfolio investment. First, FDI is said to be 
directly tied to real investment in plants, equipment and infrastructure; whereas the other 
type of investment goes to consumption and, therefore, does not help to add productive 
capacity to the system, which is necessary to generate exports that go into the service 
of debt in the future. Second, the difference between these two types of capital inflows 
may be an important factor in determining the vulnerability of a country to its capital 
inflows. Portfolio flows are very sensitive to any changes in the international financial 
environment as well as to changes in investor sentiment. In the event of a crash, investors 
can suddenly dump portfolio investments, but multinational corporations cannot quickly 
sell their factories.
Portfolio investment is highly significant and has the expected sign: increases in port­
folio investment raise the probability of occurrence of a currency crisis. Nonetheless, FDI 
is not significant, even if it has the expected sign. We can only compare these results 
with those of Kumar et al. (1998), since Eichengreen et al. (1996b) do not consider the 
effects of these kind of variables. Kumar et al. (1998) obtain the same effect regarding 
portfolio investment variable, a positive and significant effect. Regarding FDI, Kumar et 
al. (1998) find a significant effect but negative, meaning that increases in FDI result in 
higher likelihood of a crisis. The reason is probably due to the different group of countries 
under study: emerging markets in their work, OECD countries in ours.
Summarising and comparing with Eichengreen et al. (1996b) (that is the closest paper 
to this one, both in terms of country sample and the construction of the dependent vari­
able based on an E M P  index), we find a wide range of significant variables, in contrast 
to Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz’s two macroeconomic significant variables (unemploy­
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ment rate and inflation) plus the contagion variable.
In the next section, we discuss the estimation of the base-line hazard and the corre­
sponding hypothesis of duration dependence for episodes of exchange rate tranquility.
2.5.2 Estim ated Base-Line Hazard
The scaled15 estimated base-line hazard for our semiparametric function model is plotted 
in Figure 2.3. With the base-line hazard we want to test whether time already spent on 
the peg has an independent effect on the likelihood of a currency crisis event, that is, 
whether there is a duration dependence beyond the control of time-varying variables.
The base-line hazard function shows a general downward slope from the second quar­
ter after the start of the peg. That is, the likelihood of exit into a currency crisis state 
declines with the length of the peg. Therefore, we can clearly state a negative duration 
dependence: the probability of leaving the peg decreases with duration .16 Our hypothesis 
on the existence of duration dependence, even after controlling for time-varying factors, 
is confirmed, and hence, the use of duration analysis to model the likelihood of currency 
crises is the correct approach.
More specifically, in the first quarter, the probability of a speculative attack is lower 
than in the second quarter. That probability increases from the second quarter and re­
mains around that level for the first year of the peg. These two facts seem to show that 
at the very beginning of the peg the agents are not very confident in it. After the first 
quarter, agents test the exchange rate regime resulting in a higher likelihood of breaking 
the peg in that quarter. After the first year, the probability of exit into a currency crisis 
state declines sharply, stabilising by the end of the second year of the peg, to recover a 
little bit in the initial months of the third year and turning into a flat line afterwards. 
Concluding, this general downward slope of the base-line hazard indicates that agents 
give more confidence to the peg as this progress. This may suggest that a policy-maker 
gains credibility over time with the functioning of the peg, changing the political cost of
15The baseline hazard is scaled to the characteristics of a standard country, defined by setting the 
covariates to their sample mean (see Narendranathan and Stewart (1993) for a similar exercise).
16We have conducted a likelihood ratio (LR) test to assess the overall significance of the duration 
parameters. We reject the null hypothesis of all duration parameters being equal to zero at the standard 
significance levels. We also compare a model that imposes all duration parameters to have the same value 
with a model that allows two different duration parameters, one for the five first quarters and another 
for the sixth quarter onwards (since we claim that the probability of exit into a currency crisis state 
declines sharply after 5 quarters in a tranquil period). Applying a LR test we reject the null hypothesis 
of both parameters being equal. A third LR test was conducted to test the equality of the coefficients 
for the fourth and the sixth quarters of the peg. Again, the null hypothesis of equality between these 
two coefficients is rejected at the standard significance levels. These tests indicate that the probability 
of exiting into a currency crisis state is significantly different during the first quarters of the peg.
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Figure 2.3: E stim ated Base-line H azard
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realignm ent over the duration  of the spell.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have adopted a duration  model approach towards the determ ination 
of the origins of a currency crisis event. We concentrate on the likelihood of a crisis for a 
country in a given period related to some explanatory variables. We differ, then, from the 
trad itional em pirical studies on currency crises th a t adopt probit or logit models in their 
specifications. T he use of duration  models allows us to account for duration  dependence 
am ong the determ inants of the likelihood of speculative attacks, w ithout neglecting the 
use of tim e-varying explanatory variables as used by other researchers. One of the m ain 
objectives of this study is to test for tim e dependence, th a t is, the length of the time 
already spent on the peg as a determ inant of the probability  of exit into a crisis state.
•  From our estim ates, we first s ta te  the influence of some im portan t macroeconomic 
variables on the likelihood of exit into a tu rbulen t s ta te . Increases in the ra te  of 
growth of exports, decreases in the ra te  of growth of im ports, and openness are 
associated w ith a decrease in the vulnerability of the currency to  attacks. R EER  
overvaluation increases the likelihood of the occurrence of a currency crisis. Increases 
in capital inflows in the form of portfolio investm ent help to explain currency crises. 
C laims on government contribute to predict the likelihood of a speculative attack, 
increases in th a t credit position raise the likelihood of exit into a turbulen t state; 
whereas increases in the ra te  of growth of deposits over G D P decrease the probability 
of a crisis event.
•  R egarding the duration  dependence which characterises our data , the maximum 
probabilities of exit are given a t the s ta rt of the peg (tranquil period), b u t w ith a
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clear tendency to decrease after the first year of the peg. That is, we can clearly 
state a negative and highly significant duration dependence. This fact may suggest 
the existence of a political cost of realignment that changes over the duration of the 
spell: growing credibility surrounding an exchange-rate-based stabilisation program 
might reduce the probability that the peg will be abandoned.
Chapter 3
A M ethodology for A ssessing the  
Likelihood of Currency Crises in 
Emerging M arkets1
3.1 Introduction
It is important to regularly monitor the foreign exchange risks in emerging markets given 
the impact of currency crises. Typically, a currency crisis results in a GDP growth loss of 
4-8 percent and lasts between twelve to eighteen months, at great cost to both domestic 
and foreign investors.
In this chapter we develop a statistical and econometric framework to assess the like­
lihood of currency devaluation over a one-month horizon for thirty-six emerging markets 
in five regions. The framework used takes into account the effect of country-specific eco­
nomic and financial factors, as well as global indicators of currency risk. We construct a 
composite indicator called the Emerging Markets Risk Indicator (EMRI), whose monthly 
scores reflect the currency risks in these markets. EMRI provides monthly risk scores that 
can be used in the sovereign risk analysis or in currency portfolio investment decisions.
Our objective was to build a parsimonious, rigorous and transparent framework to quan­
titatively assess the risks of foreign exchange crises. Such a framework can then be used 
to assist in portfolio allocation decisions. EMRI facilitates a consistent comparison of 
emerging market economies that are very diverse in terms of their histories and the cur­
rent state of their fundamentals. Having a systematic way of evaluating the risks faced 
by economies is potentially useful to investors in these markets.
1This research was conducted when I was a part-time consultant at Credit Suisse First Boston, London, 
October, 1999-April, 2001. The dataset used in this chapter remains property of Credit Suisse First 
Boston.
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For our estimations, we use monthly data pooled across thirty-six emerging markets. 
Our framework relies on estimations within a logit framework using an unbalanced panel 
across countries. The countries with the longest historical sample have fifteen years of 
data.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 contains a description of the methodology 
used. In Section 3.3 we define our currency crisis variable, describe the data sources and 
the independent variables. We also present and discuss our sample. The main results and 
applications of EMRI are examined in Section 3.4. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Sum m ary o f M ethodology
The goal of our estimation procedure is to arrive at a good fit for explaining the variation 
in the dependent crisis variable (which is binary and takes on a value of one during a 
crisis period and zero otherwise). The independent or explanatory variables are chosen 
from a list of macroeconomic and financial variables, both global and country-specific. 
Parsimony is essential for good estimation and inclusion of too many variables makes the 
estimation fraught with problems of non-convergence. By using previous studies in the 
literature as a guide, we focus on variables with the greatest forecasting power.
After selecting a small set of variables that are likely to explain currency crises2, the 
next step is the definition of the dependent variable; i.e. the crisis definition. We then 
proceed with the econometric estimation. This is based on the logit model —one of a 
class of models for limited dependent variables. We use maximum likelihood estimation 
techniques: estimation based on choosing the coefficients that actually maximise the prob­
ability of observing the sample data in hand.
The estimated results are used to obtain probabilities of devaluation for each emerging 
market. In this way EMRI can help highlight the vulnerability of a currency. High levels 
of crisis probability, or of changes in this probability, can be used as inputs to specific 
trading strategies for emerging market investors. Formally, these probabilities, under the 
logistic distribution, are calculated as follows
_  exp(ff'x)
1 +  exp(/3'x) V 1
where the /Ts denote the regression coefficients corresponding to the variables from the
2See section 3.3 for a complete definition of these variables.
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estimation and the x’s denote the values of the explanatory variables.
To annualise this crisis probability we simply apply the following formula
^ann =  l - ( l - ^ ) 12 (3.2)
In addition, a measure of the contribution of the explanatory variables to the probability 
of a crisis is obtained. There are two measures that can help us in this direction. If we are 
interested in looking at the contribution of a variable in simple and intuitive terms, we 
compute the raw contribution of a given factor. This raw contribution for a given factor, 
say j , is calculated as follows
R C = ^ / - jr  1  (3.3)PjXj
E h  I A *
The raw contribution is calculated for any given month. Note that N  represents the 
number of explanatory variables in the model. This measure is not the most accurate but 
presents in an intuitive way the share (in crude terms) of the factor of the total sum of 
all the factors contributing to the crisis probability or risk score.
However, the technically more accurate yet less intuitive version of how much a factor 
contributes towards the risk score is given by the marginal contribution of a given factor. 
The computation of the marginal contribution of a factor j  requires the calculation of the 
following expression
5P _ e x p ( E f c i te )  o . . . .
Sxj  (l +  e * p C " l A*l))*ft ( ' J
From this formula it is evident that the relative marginal contribution for two given 
factors, say j  and k , is given by the ratio of the two respective coefficients
I  <«>
Throughout the paper we use the raw contribution to discuss the impact of the different 
factors included in our estimations of the likelihood of currency devaluation and describe 
the contribution of some of these factors to the main historical currency events.
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Figure 3.1: Frequency of Currency Crises over Time
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3.3 Crisis Definition, Explanatory Variables and Data
3.3.1 Crisis D efin ition
Any analysis of the possible likelihood, extent and frequency of currency crises is contin­
gent on a clear definition of currency crisis. We use the concept of depreciation for our 
crisis definition and impose two conditions th a t need to be satisfied in a crisis m onth: (a) 
a currency depreciation in any one m onth exceeds a given cut-off (generally 5 percent, 
although we also study results from a 2.5 percent cut-off to a 10 percent cut-off) and, (b) 
an increase in the ra te  of depreciation greater than  the ra te  of depreciation of the previ­
ous m onth by a certain  factor (generally 2). Formally, we express these two conditions as 
follows
Ac* = (—  -  1) ■ 100 > a
Ct-l
Aet
Ae*_] > ( !  + <?)
where et denotes the exchange ra te  in m onth t m easured in dom estic currency units 
per US dollar; a  denotes the m onthly depreciation ra te  cut-off (default case is taken as 
5 percent); and cp denotes the ra te  of acceleration (here taken to  be 100 percent, th a t is 1).
We are interested in moves and changes in the exchange ra te  th a t are not pre-announced 
or expected. We aim to exclude cases of m anaged depreciation by central banks th a t are 
pre-announced. This is achieved by im posing the second criterion th a t looks a t accel­
eration in the ra te  of depreciation. This criterion allows us to  rule out cases where the 
depreciation in a given m onth might be quite high relative to the cut-off, bu t not double
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Figure 3.2: Currency Crises across Regions
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th a t in the previous m onth.
Using a 5 and a 10 percent cut-off for depreciations and a ra te  of acceleration of 1, 
the frequency of currency crises over our sam ple is as shown in Figure 3.1. These crises 
are calculated for the period 1987:1-2000:3. Using the 10 percent cut-off definition yields 
fewer crises over the same period. This has im plications for the estim ation of the crisis 
probability. We need to  find a fine balance between enough observations of the dependent 
variable — the crisis dum m y—  and too m any crisis observations th a t m ight include an 
element of noise in the m axim um  likelihood estim ations. A very stringent crisis cut-off 
such as 15 percent yields too few crisis observations whereas a very loose cut-off such as 
2.5 percent leads to  too m any observations being labelled as crisis.
In Figure 3.2 we represent the num ber of crises by region. Clearly, L atin Am erica is 
the region w ith the highest frequency of crises in the sam ple period 1987-2000. Once 
we proceed w ith estim ation, the sample size is reduced due to  the lim ited availability of 
m acroeconomic d a ta  for some countries.3
Tables B .l and B.2 in A ppendix B present the exact date  of occurrence of crises for
the different countries under study, for bo th  the 5 percent and the 10 percent cut-offs.
3The sample size for the estimations is specified in the next subsection. We also define there the 
countries enclosed in each of the regions depicted in Figure 3.2.
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3.3.2 Sample
For the model to be of practical use, we need to employ relatively high frequency data. 
For this reason, we construct a large monthly data set of macroeconomic and financial 
variables that may affect the incidence of currency crises. Table 3.1 shows the start dates 
used in the estimations for each of the 36 countries in our data set (the end date is March 
2000 for all 36 countries). Going further back with the initial dates would create incon­
sistencies in the monthly data, as those figures are either difficult to obtain or not very 
reliable.
We conducted two out-of-sample experiments to test the model performance. First, we 
estimated the model with data until December 1996 to assess how it does on the eve of 
the Asian crisis. Then we estimated the model with data until December 1997 to test 
how the model performed prior to the Russian and Brazilian crises.
Most of the data we use are on a monthly basis and are compiled from various regional 
economist teams at Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB). IMF, Bloomberg and national 
data publications are other sources for the data. Some of the data are on an annual fre­
quency, and we use cubic spline interpolation methods to construct monthly series from 
them.
Given the relatively low number of observations, we proceed with combined time-series 
and cross-sectional estimation, pooling together the whole set of country observations.
3.3.3 Explanatory Variables
Out of the vast array of variables that the currency crisis literature has identified, we 
selectively use the subsets presented in Table 3.2 for each of the estimated models. In the 
following paragraphs we summarise the expected relationship between those explanatory 
variables and the occurrence of a currency crisis.
It is worth mentioning at this stage that the raw macroeconomic and equity variables 
for each country mentioned above undergo two stages of transformation. First, they are 
mostly converted in terms of changes which is done on a year-on-year basis or a month- 
on-month basis. Next, the variables are standardised using the historical country-specific 
means and standard deviations for each variable. The reason for standardising the vari­
ables is optimisation. Standardised variables are easier to use in optimisation and this 
facilitates both the speed of convergence as well as the robustness of estimations. All the 
macro variables enter the estimations, after being standardised, with two lags. The equity 
price and oil price variables enter the estimations with a single lag.
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Table 3.1: Sample Estimations
Country Start Country Start Country Start
Asia
China Apr-92 Hong Kong Jan-88 India Jan-87
Indonesia Jan-87 Korea Jan-87 Malaysia Jan-87
Pakistan Jan-87 Philippines Jan-87 Singapore Jan-87
Sri Lanka Jan-87 Thailand Jan-87 Taiwan Jul-87
Latin America
Argentina Jan-87 Brazil Jan-87 Chile Jan-87
Colombia Jan-87 Ecuador Jan-95 Mexico Jan-87
Peru Jan-87 Venezuela
Middle East
Jan-87
Egypt Jan-94 Israel Oct-86 Jordan Nov-89
Kuwait Jan-87
Eastern Europe
Hungary Jan-92 Poland Apr-92 Russia Jan-96
Turkey Jul-91 Czech Republic Apr-95 Slovakia Jan-97
Croatia Oct-97
Africa
Kenya Jan-87 Morocco Apr-94 Nigeria Jan-87
South Africa Jan-87 Zimbabwe Jan-90
As a measure of economic activity we use real GDP growth. A  decline in growth translates 
into pressures to ease financial policies to stimulate economic activity. Among these mea­
sures the monetary authorities may consider depreciation as an economic policy option. 
On the other hand, positive GDP growth generates an optimistic environment in the do­
mestic asset markets attracting external capital and reinforcing the value of the currency. 
Hence, we expect a negative sign for this variable: the greater is growth, the lower is the 
likelihood of a currency crisis. We use real GDP on an annual basis interpolated by means 
of cubic spline techniques. The growth measure is constructed with year-on-year changes 
over the interpolated series. We incorporate this variable with a lag of two months.
To account for the path of credit expansion, we introduce the variable credit to the private 
sector. Given the 1997-98 financial crisis in Asia, this variable has received considerable 
attention. It was evident for the months preceding the 1997 Asian crisis that the existence 
of an excessive credit expansion favored the monetary environment and economic growth. 
In this environment, banks tended to extend credit without a proper study of the risks 
and quality of loans, that is, the lending standards were very lax. This increased the vul­
nerability of the economy to a slowdown in activity. We also consider another monetary 
variable, narrow money growth, as an explanatory variable for currency risk. Excessive
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Table 3.2: Explanatory Variables
Definition Expected sign
Global Model & Asian Model
Weighted regional contagion dummy positive
Foreign exchange reserves over imports negative
External Debt over exports positive
Credit to the private sector year-on-year changes positive
Equity prices month-on-month changes negative
Real GDP year-on-year changes negative
REER overvaluation positive
Oil prices changes measured as deviations from a 18 months negative
moving average (only for exporters of oil)
Latin American Model
Weighted regional contagion dummy positive
Foreign exchange reserves over imports negative
Budget balance over GDP negative
Narrow money year-on-year changes positive
Equity prices month-on-month changes negative
Real GDP year-on-year changes negative
REER overvaluation positive
Oil prices changes measured as deviations from a 18 months negative
moving average (only for exporters of oil)
Metal prices changes measured as deviations from a 18 positive
months moving average (only for importers of metal)
US industrial production year-on-year changes negative
US 3-month interest rate month-on-month changes positive
All variables are included with a two-month lag, except equity prices and oil prices that are 
lagged only one month. The reason for that is that equity prices and oil prices are variables 
available to the user before the other variables included in the model. Moreover, equity and 
oil prices have effects that dissipate very quickly after the first lag.
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money growth plays a role in exacerbating economic imbalances. We use year-on-year 
changes of both these variables in our estimations.
An excessive government budget deficit is said to have been a key factor underlying the 
financial problems for the Latin American countries in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
If a growing budget deficit is financed via monetisation, it tends to create economic im­
balances, with excessive money creation weakening the currency. The role of a growing 
budget deficit is an important determinant of a currency crisis. The alternative of issuing 
debt to finance the budget deficit can lead to vulnerability as well. Issuing debt on a hard 
currency on a short-term basis can also increase the risk premium of a country. The cre­
ation of additional domestic debt tends to increase the likelihood of future tax increases 
and therefore has potential adverse effects too. The budget deficit variable considered in 
this paper is an interpolated series from the original annual data and is expressed relative 
to nominal GDP.
To take into account the effect of external debt, we introduce this variable as a ratio 
to exports. High levels of the external debt to exports ratio can lead to a loss of con­
fidence by domestic and foreign investors as payment difficulties on debt interest arise. 
This creates pressures on the currency leading to a loss of trade competitiveness. A cu­
bic splining technique was applied to the annual data to obtain the monthly data series 
used in the estimations. An appreciable increase of this ratio was observed in Korea and 
Thailand in the year prior to the 1997 crisis.
The level of international reserves is a key indicator of the sustainability of a currency 
peg in any given exchange rate regime. If a country has a high level of reserves relative to 
imports the probability of a speculative attack against its currency is lower (maintaining 
all the other factors at the same level). That is, investors’ confidence may depend on the 
level of reserves a country holds.
A variable that has received considerable attention in the crisis literature is the Real 
Effective Exchange rate (REER). Most empirical studies that include this variable among 
the determinants of a currency crisis find it to be significant and overvalued prior to a cri­
sis. We would expect that an overvalued REER increases the likelihood of a currency crisis 
since4 the higher the REER relative to its equilibrium value, the greater the adjustment 
required in the nominal exchange rate to ensure external balance. In order to measure this 
overvaluation we use the Hodrick-Prescott filter to calculate a historical trend. Deviations 
from this trend are indicative of an overvaluation. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) stress 
the importance of this variable, considering it to be one of the key leading indicators of
4As Ahluwalia (2000) points out.
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currency crises. The REER is constructed using bilateral nominal exchange rates, de­
flated by relative price indices and weighted by bilateral trade. It is a measure of relative 
competitiveness vis-a-vis the main trading partners. If either inflation increases or the 
nominal exchange rate appreciates, we observe an increase in the REER index, denoting 
an appreciation. Overvaluation relative to trend is measured with a positive sign in our 
analysis and as it relates positively to the likelihood of a crisis, we expect the variable to 
have a positive sign in our estimation.
To include a variable that is forward looking and captures the state and sentiment in 
financial markets, we consider equity prices. Sharp and repeated increases in stock prices 
may be indicative of the build-up of a bubble, but regular increases, on the contrary, rep­
resent the state of financial markets in a fundamental asset pricing sense. We introduce 
this variable in terms of monthly changes in stock prices expecting a negative sign.
The influence of industrial countries on the economies of emerging markets has increased 
in recent years. Global macroeconomics and the international financial environment also 
have an impact on the emerging market economies. For this reason we consider global 
variables such as the US industrial production index and the 3-month US interest rate 
within our set of explanatory variables. One contributory factor to the Mexican crisis 
was the tightening of US monetary policy, with a series of increasing interest rates (the 
already troubled Mexican economy was significantly affected by this tightening). We in­
troduce the interest rate variable in terms of month-on-month changes. The US industrial 
production variable is included as year-on-year changes.
For many emerging market economies, an important share of revenues comes from trade 
in primary commodities. On the other hand, several emerging market countries are net 
importers and are therefore vulnerable to commodity price shocks. This justifies the 
inclusion of a commodity price dummy variable to differentiate net importers from net 
exporters. Given the importance of oil and metal commodities for the Asian and Latin 
American countries, we choose these indices as explanatory variables in our model. These 
variables are considered in terms of deviations of the current commodity price from the 
recent 18-month average. The oil price variable is multiplied by a dummy variable that 
takes on the value of 1 for oil exporters, and 0 for oil importers. Therefore, an increase 
in the value of oil prices variable should translate to a lower probability of occurrence of 
a currency crash. Similarly, the metals price variable is multiplied by a dummy variable 
that captures the condition of being a net importer5 of metals. We expect a positive
5 We create the dummy for metals by setting its value to 1 for net importers given the absence of net 
exporters of metal among our selected sample of Asian countries. This way we avoid the problem of a 
nearly singular matrix in the estimation procedure.
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sign on the coefficient for the variable as high values for the variable tend to increase the 
likelihood of currency crises.
Finally, we introduce a weighted regional contagion dummy variable to capture the spillover 
effects of pressures from one currency to another. We model this variable in a very sim­
ple way. The approach taken here is one of regional contagion. We have five regions: 
Asia, Latin America, Middle East, Eastern Europe and Africa, and we create a weighted 
regional contagion dummy variable for each region. The contagion variable is based on 
crisis occurrence in countries within the region with a lag of two months. This takes into 
account the number of countries within a region that have had a crisis two months prior, 
i.e. if 5 countries out of 10 had a crisis in region 1 in May 1998, the contagion variable 
would take on a value of 5/10 in July 1998.
3.4 Em pirical R esults and A pplications
3.4.1 Estimation Results —  Global M odel
We have conducted several estimations based on varying sample sizes (across time and 
across countries), variables included in the model, and methods of standardising the vari­
ables. The baseline model is estimated for the whole sample of countries and for the 
sample ending in March 2000. Within the estimation, we include the independent vari­
ables in standardised form so that they have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 
one. This is done on a country-by-country basis. We refer to this model specification as 
the global model specification.
The estimation results pertaining to the global model can be seen in Table 3.3. We 
present the estimated coefficients along with the z-statistic.6 We have estimated alter­
nate models with different levels of depreciation cut-offs, 10, 8  and 5 percent levels, but 
we focus our attention on the 5 percent model.
The regional contagion dummy variable turns out to be highly significant and with a 
positive sign. This indicates that the occurrence of a crisis somewhere else in the region 
increases the likelihood of a crisis for the rest of the countries in the same region in the 
next two months.
The global factor oil prices has an important effect on the likelihood of a currency crisis.
6 The significance of the parameter estimates can be assessed using a “one-tailed” test based on the 
Normal approximation. Given the size of our sample, the t-statistic is virtually Normally distributed. 
Then we can use the t-tables to assess significance. We use the critical values for the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
significance level, which are 2.326, 1.645 and 1.282, respectively.
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Table 3.3: Estimations Results — Global Model
Variable 1 0 % cut-off 8 % cut-off 5% cut-off
Constant -4.56*** -4.32*** -3.73***
(-28.21) (-29.66) (-34.56)
Contagion 2.86*** 1.44 2.97***
(2.34) (1.21) (3.92)
Oil prices -0 .12 -0 .17 -0.27**
(-0.55) (-0.87) (-1 .64)
Credit to the private sector change 0.44*** 0.33*** 0.20***
(4.09) (3.18) (2.33)
REER overvaluation 0.32*** 0.38*** 0.34***
(3.43) (4.33) (4.58)
Real GDP growth -0.67*** -0.67*** -0.56***
(-6.37) (-7.01) (-7.21)
Import cover -0.39*** -0.32*** -0.21***
(-3.35) (-3.07) (-2.56)
Equity price change -0.29*** -0.32*** -0.22***
(-2.61) (-3.10) (-2.60)
Debt to exports ratio 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.10***
(2.63) (2.74) (2.16)
Log likelihood 
Avg. log likelihood
-352.37
-0 .08
-411.39
-0 .09
-612.17
-0 .14
*, ** and ***, corresponds to the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
Numbers in parenthesis denote the z-statistics.
All variables are included with a two-month lag, except equity prices and oil prices 
that are lagged only one month.
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This denotes that commodity exports still play an important role in foreign currency rev­
enues, even allowing for significant economic transformations and diversification of trade 
by the emerging market economies. Oil prices have the expected negative sign. The in­
crease of oil prices in relation to the recent history for net exporters of oil reduces the 
likelihood of a currency crash.
The next variable in Table 3.3 is credit to the private sector. The effect of year-on- 
year changes of this variable tends to influence risk positively and significantly enhance 
the odds of a currency crisis. As pointed in the last section, this may indicate imbalances 
of credit growth. If excessive credit growth is not carefully monitored (as it seems to 
have been the case in the Asian crisis), the banking sector tends to extend credit with­
out regard to risk and quality of loans especially during what they consider to be good 
economic conditions. This eventually culminates in unsustainable increases in the pace 
of domestic activity, inflationary pressures, the build-up of external imbalances and asset 
price bubbles.
An overvalued REER is highly significant, increasing the probability of currency crises. 
This is consistent with the results of Kaminsky et al. (1998). They found the REER 
to be the main leading indicator of currency crises. This variable may also reflect some 
contagion via the competitiveness effect, which is that the devaluation of one currency in 
a given country deteriorates the trading partner’s position.
A slowdown in economic activity captured by real GDP growth significantly increases 
the likelihood of currency crises. This can be seen in Table 3.3 where the coefficient of 
real GDP growth takes on a negative and highly significant value. The vulnerability of a 
currency to external pressures increases when the domestic economy suffers from a reces­
sion or a slowdown in economic activity.
According to the sign of the equity price variable, we can state that on average increases 
in equity prices were seen as positive in reducing the vulnerability of currencies to crises. 
The increase in stock prices creates a favourable environment, attracting foreign capital 
and helping to reinforce the currency.
The external debt to exports ratio shows a positive and significant sign and the results 
indicate what we expect: high levels of debt not covered by a sufficiently high level of 
exports result in a higher likelihood of a currency collapse. This is reflected in the positive 
and significant sign of the debt to exports ratio in Table 3.3.
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Table 3.4: Type I & II Errors — Global Model
10% cut-off* 5% cut-off*
Actual Actual
Crises Non-Crises Crises Non-Crises
Predicted
Crises
Non-Crises
78.48
21.52
34.44
65.56
Crises
Non-Crises
70.59 34.99 
29.41 65.01
* The cut-off for correct calls is based on the 65th percentile of the risk scores for the
entire sample.
3.4.2 Prediction Classification —  Global M odel
One way to evaluate the accuracy of the models is to look at the prediction classifications 
of the model for crises and non-crises. We want to see how well the model performs by 
predicting a crisis when the actual crisis occurs, and how well it predicts a non-crisis 
when there is in fact no crisis. We need to evaluate the performance on both hypothesis 
simultaneously, as we can always improve one of these hypotheses at the expense of the 
other, that is, we cannot improve both at the same time.
To perform this test we have chosen a 65t/l percentile of the fitted values as the cut­
off to consider an event to be a crisis. If this probability cut-off is low, we will obtain a 
high number of crises predicted accurately, but a substantial number of non-crises will be 
categorised as crises. On the other hand, if the cut-off chosen is high, a high number of 
non-crises will be predicted accurately with an important number of crises considered as 
non-crises.
Table 3.4 shows that the 10 percent global model predicts 78.48 percent of the crises, 
while 65.56 percent of non-crises are predicted accurately. These figures are 70.59 and 
65.01 percent, respectively, for the 5 percent model. We prefer to use the 5 percent model 
as the currency moves post the Asian crisis and collapse of pegged exchange rates seem to 
range within much narrower bands. If we were to use the 10 percent crisis cut-off, while 
it would be historically very good, it might help us capture fewer incidences of currency 
pressures in the near future.
3.4.3 Country Risk Scores —  Global M odel
In this section we present the crisis probabilities or risk scores for selected countries. The 
crisis probabilities are calculated using data on explanatory variables and the estimated 
coefficients following Equation 3.1 and these are then annualised using Equation 3.2. We 
interpret the annualised probability as the probability of at least one crisis during the
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Figure 3.3: Crisis Probabilities — Global Model (Asia)
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course of a year. We assume th a t economic conditions and the values of the independent 
variables rem ain as during the m onth (for which the probability  is com puted) throughout 
the rem ainder of the year.
Figure 3.3 shows the evolution of country risk scores for a sam ple of the Asian coun­
tries based on the 5 percent cut-off depreciation global model. For these countries we can 
see how the risk score was starting  to increase before the 1997 Asian crisis. The chart for 
Thailand shows th a t the probability of crisis began to  increase towards mid 1996. The 
risk score for June and July  1997 was 3.75 tim es the risk scores a t the  end of 1995. These 
values rem ain high relative to historical values for T hailand  indicating the possibility of 
further crises (as did occur in December 1997 and June 1998). Similarly, values of the 
risk score index were roughly 3 times higher for the repeated  currency crisis in June 1998.
In the case of M alaysia, the risk score s ta rted  picking up towards the second half of
1996, achieving relatively high values (the scores alm ost tripled) a t the onset of the 1997 
crisis. The scores for Indonesia s ta rted  increasing a b it later, a t the beginning of 1997, but 
rem ained a t high levels for a longer period, cap turing  the repeated  depreciations along
1997, 1998 and 1999. Only a t the beginning of 2000 did the crisis probabilities come back 
to  w ithin the norm al range for Indonesia.
Korean risk scores s ta rted  increasing a t the end of 1996 bu t stabilised a t relatively high
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Figure 3.4: Crisis P robabilities — Global Model (Latin  America)
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values. In Septem ber 1997 the risk scores sta rted  to pick up again. A fter th a t, risk score 
values decreased, increasing again from May 1998.
Figure 3.4 shows the risk score trajectories for some Latin  Am erican countries. It clearly 
shows higher levels of risk scores for A rgentina before adopting a currency board in April 
1, 1991. The only increases are observed in 1995 and 1996 following m ajor currency ad­
justm ents in L atin  Am erican countries. By the second half of 1998 and a t the beginning 
of 1999 we again observe some increase in the crisis probabilities after the problems in 
Brazil. In Ecuador the reviving of the crisis probability  is obvious from mid 1998, when 
soon after th a t a chain of devaluations occurred. The Ecuadorian scores rem ain a t high 
levels until the end of 1999, when crisis probabilities re tu rn  to historical values. The high­
est Mexican risk scores are observed m ainly a t the end of 1994 and the beginning of 1995 
when the Mexican currency crisis took place. Peruvian risk scores behave in a completely 
different way before 1993 and after th a t year. From 1988 till 1993 the average risk score 
is 57 percent, whereas the average risk scores drops to  18 percent in the 1993-2000 period.
Figure 3.5 displays risk scores for Russia and the Czech Republic. Russian scores started  
to pick up by the end of 1997, going from values of 19 percent in November 1997 to 62 
percent ju s t before the onset of the currency crisis in A ugust 1998. Only from July  1999 
did the risk scores came back to the levels prior to  the Russian turbulence. The risk 
scores for the Czech Republic s ta rted  increasing in the last quarte r of 1998, anticipating
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the February 1999 depreciation of the currency. From May 1999 risk scores returned to 
the norm al range of values as in 1997.
3.4.4 Factor C ontribution —  G lobal M odel
In order to investigate the factors behind crises, we look a t the raw factor contributions 
of the variables. Figure 3.6 shows a series of graphs for T hailand  raw factor contributions 
on different dates. The dates are chosen to show the different im pact of variables used 
in our model to  predict the 1997-98 Asian crisis. T he top two panels depict the m ain 
factors behind the first wave of the Asian crisis for T hailand  in July  1997. In those panels 
we observe the role played by credit to the private sector, the R E E R  and the debt to 
exports ra tio  prior to  the July 1997 devaluation (factors th a t contribute to  the May and 
June 1996 risk scores, when the probability of a currency crisis was increasing, signalling 
the July  1997 crisis).
The next two panels show a ra ther different picture. We have chosen Septem ber and 
October 1997 to  show the factors an ticipating  the December 1997 devaluation of the 
baht. The variables th a t contribute to an increase in the likelihood of a  currency crisis 
are of the more trad itional nature: a slowdown in real G D P growth and equity prices. 
Note th a t real G D P growth before the July 1997 devaluation was lowering the risk score 
as the economy was undergoing a boom  period. We also note the role played by the con­
tagion variable in increasing the probability of a  currency crisis. This variable is switched 
on after devaluations in other Asian countries. These charts also show the effects of the 
first devaluation slowing down the economic activity in T hailand and the im m ediate ef­
fect of the bah t devaluation in the behaviour of foreign exchange reserves-im ports ratio. 
Stock m arkets also did reflect the low a ttrac tio n  of investors to the  T hai economy and 
contribute towards increasing the risk score prior to the crisis.
The two bo ttom  panels reflect the raw factor contribution  in June and July 1999 to 
Figure 3.5: Crisis P robabilities — Global Model (E ast Europe)
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Figure 3.6: Raw Factor C ontribution —  Global Model (Thailand)
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Figure 3.7: Raw Factor Contribution — Global Model (Indonesia)
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explain the Septem ber 1999 crisis. Again, real G D P growth is the m ain contributor of 
the increase in risk scores prior to Septem ber events.
W hen discussing the Indonesian risk score charts, we pointed out th a t risk scores started  
to pick up la ter than  for the rest of the Asian countries. To find an explanation for this 
fact we graph the raw contribution behind the A ugust 1997 devaluation. One thing is 
clear, the favourable evolution of oil prices before April 1997 contributed  to lower risk 
scores, preventing a  clear signal of the currency crisis well before it occurred. It is only 
from April th a t oil prices act to  increase risk scores (see Figure 3.7). Moreover, the con­
tribu tion  of credit to the private sector is sm aller th an  in the T hai case.
To determ ine the  factors behind the Russian 1998 crisis, we present the raw contribu­
tions from November 1997 to the onset of the crisis in A ugust 1998 in Figure 3.8. We 
would like to  highlight the role of oil prices. Since early November 1997 this factor con­
trib u ted  to increase the risk scores for R ussia and its im portance seems to increase the 
closer we get to  the onset of the Russian crisis. Moreover, from M arch 1998 on alm ost 
all the factors considered in our model contribute positively to the risk score values. The 
slowdown in economic activity  is marked by the positive contribution  to  the risk scores 
of real G D P growth.
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Figure 3.8: Raw Factor C ontribution — G lobal Model (Russia)
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Figure 3.9: Crisis Probabilities — Sample Ending December 1996
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3.4.5 R educed Sam ple E stim ations
To assess the forecasting power of our model we have estim ated two reduced samples. 
The first one restric ts the sample to end in December 1996 w ith the aim  of studying the 
predictive power prior to  the 1997 Asian crisis. T he second exercise estim ates our model 
w ith sam ple d a ta  ending in December 1997 in order to evaluate predictive power prior 
to the Russian crisis and the Brazilian crisis. The estim ated param eters for these models 
are represented in Tables B.3 and B.4 in A ppendix B.
Figure 3.9 illustrates the risk scores for the m ain Asian countries involved in the 1997 
crisis. T he dashed line represents forecasted risk scores from January  1997. All four 
countries in Figure 3.9 had higher risk scores before the onset of the  1997 crisis. Only 
Indonesian scores seemed to increase more slowly, but, nevertheless they too did signal 
the upcom ing currency crisis. We can therefore say th a t, had we applied this model prior 
to  the Asian financial crisis, we could have predicted th a t crisis.
A sim ilar exercise was done to  evaluate the m ain events of the currency disturbances 
of 1998 sta rtin g  w ith the Russian crisis. If we look a t the graphs brought together in Fig­
ure 3.10 we can appreciate the evolution of the risk score series for Russia, and see th a t 
the 1998 crisis was very strongly anticipated by the fundam entals. From  the beginning of 
1998 the risk scores increased dram atically, from an average of a 20 percent risk score to 
a m axim um  of 81 percent. For Poland, risk scores s ta rted  increasing in the second half
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Figure 3.10: Crisis Probabilities — Sample Ending December 1997
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of 1998 anticipating the February 1999 currency crisis. The January  1999 Brazilian high 
depreciation was predicted correctly; note th a t the risk score line s ta rted  increasing in the 
second half of the year prior to the crisis from values of around a 20 percent probability to 
values of over 70 percent w ith the onset of the crisis. Those values have not yet gone back 
to their initial levels, bu t have rem ained in a range between 30 and 40 percent. Lastly, 
the crisis probabilities for the Czech Republic singled out the February 1999 crisis as the 
scores s ta rted  increasing in mid 1998.
3.4.6 W hole Panel Standardisation
The reason for conducting an estim ation w ith a different m ethod of standard isation  of the 
explanatory variables is to  show the sensitivity of our results. The m ethod of country- 
by-country standard isation  of variables based on a country’s own history provides a more 
consistent risk score history for any particu lar country, whereas the whole panel s tandard­
isation m ethod allows for a b e tte r cross-country risk score comparison.
In Table B.5 of Appendix B we present the estim ated param eters for the global model 
using a 5 percent cut-off depreciation and the whole panel standard isa tion  m ethod. In 
Table B.6 we depict the Type I and Type II errors to assess the prediction classification 
of the model estim ated in this way.
The risk score evolution for the different countries resulting from the whole panel stan-
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Table 3.5: Estim ations Results — Asian Model
Variable Coefficient z-statistic
Constant -4.70*** -17.36
Contagion 2.45 0.63
Oil prices -0.767* -1 .4
Credit to the private sector change 0.23 1.03
REER overvaluation 0.31** 1.93
Real GDP growth -0.41** -2 .2 4
Import cover -0 .0 5 -0 .2 3
Equity price change -0.56*** -3 .1 3
Debt to exports ratio 0.52*** 2.55
Log likelihood 
Avg. log likelihood
-126.71
-0 .0 7
*, ** and ***, corresponds to the 10%, 5% and 1% significance 
levels, respectively.
All variables are included with a two-month lag, except equity 
prices and oil prices that are lagged only one month.
dard isation  m ethod follows a sim ilar p a tte rn  to the one calculated using the country-by- 
country standard isa tion  process, bu t w ith this new standard isation  we can compare risk 
scores across countries to assess vulnerability to  a currency crisis across countries.
3.4 .7  R egional M odels
In th is section we present the results for the regional models. We estim ate regional models 
to  try  and find a b e tte r fit taking into account region-specific characteristics. We only 
estim ate regional models for Asia and Latin  Am erica as the frequency of crises in the 
o ther regions is too low to  perm it robust estim ation. The regional models are estim ated 
for the 5 percent cut-off depreciation. The 10 percent depreciation cut-off gave far too 
few crises, yielding less robust statistica l results.
Asia
T he Asian model uses the same specification (in term s of the variables included in the 
equation) as the global model. The estim ated param eters are reported  in Table 3.5. The 
signs of the variables are as expected, and consistent w ith those corresponding to the 
global model.
T he prediction classification for the Asian model is b e tte r than  for the global model. 
T ype I and Type II errors are shown in Table 3.6. Notice th a t we obtain  a 75.00 percent 
of the crises correctly classified and a 69.37 percent of non-crises are predicted accurately.
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Table 3.6: Type I & II Errors —  Asian Model
5% cut-off*
Actual
Crises Non-Crises
Predicted
Crises 75.00 30.63
Non-Crises 25.00 69.37
* The cut-off for correct calls is based on the 64th 
percentile of the risk scores for the entire sample.
Figure 3.11: Crisis P robabilities — Regional Model (Asia)
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The corresponding classification num bers for the global model using the same 5 percent 
depreciation cut-off were 70.59 percent and 65.01 percent, respectively.
As an illustration, we plot the regional risk scores for the same group of countries as 
we did for the global model. We can see from Figure 3.11 th a t the evolution of the crisis 
probability  is sim ilar to th a t for the global model. I t is w orth noting th a t the values of 
the probabilities seem to achieve more extrem e values th an  those obtained w ith the global 
model specification, perhaps because w ith the regional model we are able to capture the 
particu lar dynam ics of a  specific region.
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Table 3.7: Estimations Results — Latin American Model
Variable Coefficient z-statistic
Constant —3.17*** -17.23
Contagion 0.07 0.05
Narrow money change 0.21** 1.64
REER overvaluation 0.17** 1.68
Real GDP growth -0.44*** -2 .98
Import cover -0.43*** -3.11
Budget balance -0.38*** -2 .58
Equity price change -0.31*** -2.41
US industrial production change -0.53*** -3.65
US 3-month interest rate change 0.26** 1.68
Metal prices 0.19 0.98
Oil prices -0 .16 -0 .89
Log likelihood 
Avg. log likelihood
-234.13
-0 .20
*, ** and ***, corresponds to the 10%, 5% and 1% significance 
levels, respectively.
All variables are included with a two-month lag, except equity 
prices and oil prices that are lagged only one month.
Table 3.8: Type I & II Errors — Latin American Model
5% cut-off
Actual
Crises Non-Crises
Predicted
Crises 78.08 36.42
Non-Crises 21.92 63.58
* The cut-off for correct calls is based on the 64th 
percentile of the risk scores for the entire sample.
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Figure 3.12: Crisis Probabilities — Regional Model (Latin America)
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In the Latin  American region we include government budget balance, narrow money, the 
US industrial production (in year-on-year changes) and the US 3-m onth interest ra te  (as 
m onth-on-m onth changes). We exclude the debt to  export ra tio  and credit to the private 
sector variables.
The coefficients from the estim ation are presented in Table 3.7. All the variable coef­
ficients have the expected sign as discussed in Section 3.3 earlier. R egarding Type I and 
Type II errors, we obtain a b e tte r fit than  th a t obtained for the global model. In Table 
3.8 we predict accurately 78.08 percent of the crises, and 63.58 percent of the non-crises 
for the Latin  American model.
F igure 3.12 displays the crisis probabilities for countries using the L atin  Am erican model. 
It shows higher risk scores during crisis periods th an  the ones obtained in the global 
model. However, the path  is the same, accounting for the same crises. The movements 
in the risk scores are sharper in the regional model than  in the global model.
In order to test the hypothesis th a t the government budget deficit was highly respon­
sible for the currency problems of L atin  Am erican countries in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, we present the raw factor contribution for A rgentina and Brazil for those dates in 
Figure 3.13. We clearly see th a t  the bar corresponding to the public deficit contributes
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Figure 3.13: Raw Factor C ontribution  — Regional Model
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Figure 3.14: Raw Factor C ontribution — Regional Model (Mexico)
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positively to increase the risk score for both countries at the time of the crises.
The economic literature points out that US interest rates played an important role in 
the 1994 Mexican currency crisis. In order to check this argument, we use our Latin 
American model and present the raw factor contribution for the onset of the 1994 Mexi­
can crisis in Figure 3.14. We show four charts corresponding to the three months prior to 
the December 1994 devaluation and this same month. In all four charts we see the positive 
contribution of the US 3-month interest rates to the risk scores. It is worth noting that 
the negative evolution of the metal prices variable and the import cover ratio contributed 
to enhance the probability of crisis.
3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we have developed a consistent quantitative framework to assess currency 
risks across thirty-six emerging markets. This rigorous and transparent framework helps 
us assess currency risks in a clear fashion. We are able to identify and track the factors 
that drive and influence currencies during a crisis period. Our risk indicator, EMRI, 
produces monthly risk scores that can also be viewed as a summary indicator of sovereign 
risk based on a small set of fundamentals.
• The main results point to the relevance of a contagion variable in a model to forecast 
currency crises. There is strong evidence of spillover effects on the occurrence of a 
currency crisis.
• Commodity prices (oil and metal prices) help predict the occurrence of currency 
crises. Higher commodity prices benefit commodity exporters reducing the likeli­
hood of crises.
• Credit to the private sector is an important variable to asses the likelihood of cur­
rency crises. In the case of the Asian crisis in 1997-98 this is confirmed in our factor 
contribution charts.
• Following earlier studies, an overvalued REER is indicative of a high probabiliy of a 
currency crisis. This is highly consistent with the currency crisis empirical literature. 
An overvalued REER stands for exchange rate misalignments and contagion effects 
via competitiveness.
• A slowdown in economic activity and lower equity prices help to explain incidences 
of currency crises. Currency collapses are explained too by high debt related to 
the level of exports and high imports in relation to the amount of foreign exchange 
reserves.
CHAPTER 3. FORECASTING CURRENCY CRISES IN EMERGING MARKETS 75
Given the relevance of the group of fundamentals to forecast currency crises stated in our 
model, we can derive an important policy implication: it is crucial for the stability of 
exchange rates and for avoiding currency crises, to regularly monitor the evolution the 
macroeconomic indicators here proposed.
Chapter 4
M odelling Currency Crises in 
Emerging Markets: A Dynam ic 
Probit M odel w ith  Unobserved  
H eterogeneity and A utocorrelated  
Errors
4.1 Introduction
The debate on the nature of banking and currency crises has intensified in the wake of the 
financial crises in Asia (1997 and 1998), Russia (1998), and Brazil (1999). Although the 
empirical literature has mainly focused on currency crises, a parallel stream on the origins 
of banking crises has also flourished.2 More recently, the joint occurrence of banking and 
currency crises associated with the Mexican crisis in 1994 and the Asian financial turmoil3 
has given impetus to a new wave of empirical studies that focus on the casual linkages 
between banking and currency crises. Twin crises, the dual incidence of currency and 
banking crises, are not a new phenomenon, though: over the last century, for example, 
the US experienced a series of banking crises, the most severe being the one of 1931 during 
the Great Depression.
In principle, the causality between the two types of crisis may run in any direction.
Banking crises may lead to currency crises, currency crises may cause banking crises, or
1The dataset used in this chapter was jointly collected with Elisabetta Falcetti (LSE) and further 
analysed in Chapter 5 of this Thesis as joint research with Elisabetta Falcetti.
2See Caprio and Klingebiel (1996), Demirgiig-Kunt and Detragiache (1998a), Demirgiig-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998b), Demirgiig-Kunt and Detragiache (2000), Eichengreen and Rose (1998), Gonzalez- 
Hermosillo (1996) and Garcia-Herrero (1997).
3Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Korea in 1997-98.
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they can be a joint event, due to common causes.
The case were banks’ unsoundness contributes to currency crises has been studied in 
Calvo (1997), Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1996), Miller (1999), Obstfeld (1994) and Velasco 
(1987). Obstfeld (1994) points to the government’s trade-off between inflation, fostered 
by the excessive money creation that is associated with a bailout of the banking system, 
and exchange rate stability. Policymakers would choose inflation, rather than defend a 
fixed exchange rate, in order to avoid bankruptcies and impose further strains on the 
banking sector. In the end, banking sector weaknesses might precipitate a currency crisis 
if rational speculators anticipate the government’s choice of devaluing the currency.
Velasco (1987) presents a model of the interaction of the banking system and the bal­
ance of payments in the context of a small open economy. Extending the balance of 
payments crises literature to a situation in which the private banking system is explicitly 
modelled, Velasco (1987) shows that the excessive rate of domestic credit creation result­
ing from a governmental commitment to guarantee the liabilities of the banking system 
is inconsistent with a stable exchange rate.
Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1996) argues that a change in the expectations that a banking 
crisis may occur would increase the relative risk of holding bank deposits. This would 
lead to a new equilibrium where bank deposits would be withdrawn and converted into 
cash, both in domestic and foreign currency. The cross-elasticities between the different 
assets could be such that a significant portion of the deposits withdrawals is directed into 
foreign currency at the expense of the domestic currency, triggering a currency crisis.
Arguments in favor of the opposite causal link, i.e. currency crises generating banking 
problems, rely on the assumption that the banking sector is intrinsically vulnerable due 
to the liquidity mismatch between assets and liabilities. Long-term assets denominated 
in the national currency are confronted with short-term liabilities denominated in foreign 
currency and thus the well-being of the banking sector is highly sensitive to currency de­
preciations or increases in interest rates. The transmission mechanism from currency to 
banking crises can be direct, due to the deterioration of banks’ balance sheets generated 
by a currency depreciation, or indirect, as in the case of a central bank decision to raise 
interest rates in order to deter a speculative attack. These type of arguments can be 
found in Miller (1996), Mishkin (1996), Obstfeld (1994) and Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod 
(1996).
A third family of models contends that currency and banking problems are originated 
by common factors. The macroeconomic developments in Mexico, following the adop­
CHAPTER 4. A DYNAMIC PROBIT MODEL FOR CURRENCY CRISES 78
tion in 1987 of an exchange-rate-based stabilisation program ,4 are a good example of 
the mechanisms at work behind the occurrence of a twin crisis. The introduction of the 
stabilisation plan induced a remarkable real exchange-rate appreciation, since national 
inflation converged to international inflation only gradually. The contemporaneous boom 
of imports and economic activity was financed by borrowing abroad. This generated a 
growing current account deficit that became unsustainable and triggered a speculative 
attack against the domestic currency. The capital outflow that followed the collapse of 
the domestic currency led to a banking crisis, since banks were relying on foreign capital 
for their financing.5
In spite of the proposed theoretical links between banking and currency crisis events, 
the empirical literature has seen only few attempts to analyse this phenomenon. Notable 
are the studies by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Glick and Hutchison (1999) and Rossi 
(1999).
This chapter contributes to the empirical literature on currency crises by studying the 
causal link from banking crises to currency crises. Specifically, this study is conducted for 
92 developing and emerging markets economies for the 1975-97 period. Using quarterly 
data we estimate a dynamic probit model and evaluate the hypothesis that banking crises 
lead currency crises, after controlling for a wide range of economic variables.
The dynamic probit model proposed allows for unobservable heterogeneity and auto­
correlation in the error structure. In order to estimate these models we use maximum 
smoothly simulation likelihood techniques. With this approach we depart from the exis­
tent literature on currency crises. A dynamic probit model fully exploits the information 
contained in a panel dataset. When we identify episodes of currency crises we do not 
delete the time observations immediately following such an event. This information is 
incorporated in the model (previous studies on currency crises obviate this information 
contained in the data). We do this by introducing a lagged dependent variable among the 
regressors, modifying the error structure to include an unobserved heterogeneity element 
and to allow for the errors to be autocorrelated over time.
The consideration of the lagged dependent variable on the right hand side of the probit 
equation allows one to test for the presence of state dependence, i.e. if past occurrences of 
currency crises influence the probability of a future crisis.
The unobservable heterogeneity is modelled by a country-specific and time-invariant error
4 See Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999).
5 Argument borrowed from Reinhart and Vegh (1995).
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term. This term is meant to capture idiosyncratic differences in the institutional, political 
or historical background of countries. These are factors that cannot be fully explained by 
economic fundamentals but can exacerbate the likelihood of a currency crisis. To avoid 
the identification of unobserved components as spurious state dependence, we also add an 
AR( 1 ) error term that captures the effect of country differences that may be correlated 
over time (persistent shocks).
The results show that currency crises in developing and emerging markets are signifi­
cantly influenced by a set of macroeconomic, debt and global variables. There is weak 
evidence of state dependence among the episodes of currency crises in the sample we 
consider here. In fact, the past occurrence of a currency crisis significantly decreases the 
probability of observing another crisis only in extreme cases, that is, if the first devalua­
tion is particularly severe.
A general result is that past banking crises significantly lead currency crises. This result 
considerably strengthens the argument originally provided by Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999), because it is based on a multivariate econometric approach and it restricts the 
twin crisis window to one year only.6
We find evidence in the data of some unobserved country-specific heterogeneity that may 
account for differences in the institutional, political and historical background of these 
countries.
Finally, we show that the determinants of currency crises differ according to the type 
of exchange rate regime. The results of the estimations over the two sub-samples of fixed 
and flexible exchange rates suggest that policymakers are more reluctant to devalue if the 
exchange rate is pegged. Indeed, the probability of a currency crisis under pegged ex­
change rates increases significantly only in extreme cases, i.e. if a banking crisis preceded 
the currency crisis, while the mere existence of symptoms of banking system distress is 
enough to trigger a crisis under flexible regimes.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The methodology is explained 
in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 describes the dataset used in the empirical analysis and the 
definition of banking and currency crises adopted. The main results are gathered in 
Section 4.4. Finally, Section 4.5 concludes.
6 Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) define a twin crisis as a banking crisis followed by a currency crisis 
within a period of 48 months since the occurrence of the first event and use univariate approach.
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4.2 Em pirical M ethodology
Using panel data on emerging markets and developing countries to study the determinants 
of currency crises we estimate a general dynamic limited dependent variable model. This 
technique allows us to relax the assumption of no intertemporal correlation among unob­
served determinants for the occurrence of a currency crisis.7 The motivation behind this 
choice is that the occurrence of a crisis is clearly an intertemporal event and its probability 
should be estimated with panel data and an appropriate econometric specification of the 
intertemporal linkages. Indeed, if a country experienced a crisis in the past, the proba­
bility of observing another crisis will most likely depend on that previous crisis occurrence.
There are two distinct explanations for this empirical regularity.8 One is that, as a con­
sequence of experiencing the event, constraints or conditions relevant to the occurrence 
of a currency crisis are altered. In this case, past experience has a genuine behavioral 
effect, in the sense that an otherwise identical country that did not experience a currency 
crisis would behave differently from the one that did experience the event. This is what is 
known as true state dependence. To capture this effect we introduce a lagged dependent 
variable among the regressors.
The second explanation is that countries may differ in their propensity to experience 
a currency crisis. We have to distinguish between two components here. The first is 
related to the existence of unobserved country-specific attributes that are time-invariant. 
This is what is called unobserved heterogeneity and we control for it by including a time- 
invariant and country-specific error term. This may reflect political and institutional 
factors that are difficult to control for. The second component takes into account the fact 
that countries’ differences may be correlated over time, due for example to the existence 
of persistent shocks. If this problem is not addressed properly, past episodes of currency 
crises may turn out to be significant solely because they are a proxy for persistent and 
autocorrelated unobservables. An improper treatment of the structure of the errors may 
thus give rise to a conditional relationship between future and past experience that is 
termed spurious state dependence. We avoid this problem by assuming an AR{ 1) struc­
ture for the error term.
The problem associated with these techniques is the high-dimensional integration of the 
associated likelihood function. These econometric models may be estimated in their full 
generality only by simulation estimation methods. We apply the method of maximum
7This restrictive assumption underlies, to our knowledge, all the previous studies on currency crises 
that make use of probit or logit analysis.
8We follow Heckman (1981) and Borsch-Supan, Hajivassiliou, Kotlikoff and Morris (1992) in the 
explanation of the methodology.
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smoothly simulated likelihood (M S S L ) developed in Borsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou 
(1993) and Hajivassiliou and McFadden (1998) to estimate these models. An additional 
complication arises from the treatment of the set of initial conditions that, for simplicity, 
are assumed to be exogenous.
In the next two subsections we present, following Borsch-Supan et al. (1992), the econo­
metric specification and the estimation procedure.
4.2.1 Econometric Specification of Alternative Error Processes
Let I  be the number of discrete events that can occur in each time period and T  the 
number of waves in the panel data. The space of possible outcomes is the set of I T 
different sequences of events {zf}, t = 1, . . .  ,T. To structure this problem, we assume 
that in each period the event it occurs if it maximises an unobserved vector ua. This
vector is the sum of a deterministic component uit = u(xu,p), which depends on the
vector of observable variables xa and a parameter vector (3 to be estimated, and on a 
random component 8^:
uit = v(xit, fi) + eit (4.1)
where v{xit, /3) =  xitf3.
The probability of a sequence of events {z*} can be expressed as integrals of the dif­
ferences of the unobserved components of uu relative to the event that has occurred.
Define
Ujt =  £jt ~ £it for i = it, j  ^  it (4.2)
These D = (I — 1) x T  error differences are stacked in the vector u  and have a point 
cumulative distribution of F.
For the event i to occur, the error differences can be at most as large as the differ­
ences in the deterministic components of ua. Because uu — xaPAeu  and Ujt = Xjtj3 + £jt 
we have Ua > Ujt if and only if xu/3 — Xjt/3 > ujt.
The areas of integration are therefore:
Aj(i) = {ujjt\ -  oo < < xu/3 -  Xjt/3} for j  ±  i (4.3)
and the probability of the sequence of events {z*} is:
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i
X  . . .  X I{ujj T €  Aj (IT ) I j  =  1, • .■ , I , j }dF(u) (4.4)
Unless the joint cumulative distribution function F  and the area of integration Aj = 
Aj(ij) x . . .  x A jfa )  are particularly benign, the integral in Equation (4.4) will not have 
a closed form.
Concentrating on the first two moments, we assume a multivariate normal distribution of 
the Ujt in Equation (4.2), characterised by a covariance matrix M  that has (D + l)xD /2 —l 
significant elements: the correlation among the Ujt, and the variances except one in order 
to scale the parameter vector /? in the deterministic components v(x,/3).
We can estimate this multiperiod-multinomial probit model with different specifications 
of the covariance matrix M :
• The simplest specification M  =  I  yields a pooled cross-sectional probit model that 
is subject to the independence of irrelevant alternatives (H A) restrictions and ig­
nores all intertemporal linkages.
There are several ways to introduce intertemporal linkages:
• A random-effects structure is imposed by specifying:
Sit —  Oli ~ |- (4.5)
where are i.i.d., for i =  1, . . . ,  I  — 1
This yields a block-diagonal equicorrelation structure of M  with (I — 1) param­
eters a(a) in M  that need to be estimated.
•  An autoregressive error structure can be incorporated by specifying:
(4.6)
where are i.i.d., for i =  1 , . . . , /  — 1
Again, this yields a block-diagonal structure of M  where each block has the fa­
miliar structure of an AR( 1) process. The (I  — 1) parameters pi in M  have to be 
estimated.
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• The last two error structures can also be combined by specifying:
S{t  ~  +  7fat, 7]it — PiTjit— \  “I- (4*7)
where are i.i.d., for i = 1 , — 1
Almost by definition, the limited dependent variable models defined above may embody 
an error term that is correlated with the explanatory variables on the right hand side 
(RHS) of the probit equation. This correlation would impair the statistical properties of 
the estimated coefficients and must therefore be corrected for. We take explicit account 
of the linear dependence of the RHS variables and the error term, by letting:
<*i =  7 'xi. +  Vi, (4.8)
where is the mean value of Xu over time, and is a residual term that will act as the 
former country specific effect, a*.
The error specification adopted throughout is the one in Equation (4.7), with a, de­
fined as in Equation (4.8) in order to take into account the likely correlation between the 
autocorrelated error term and the regressors.
4.2.2 Estimation Procedure: Simulated M aximum Likelihood
The likelihood function corresponding to the general multiperiod-multinomial problem is 
the product of the events’ probabilities given in Equation (4.4):
N
£((3,M) = IP(fc n}l{*i«,n h P ,M )  (4.9)
7 1 = 1
where the index n denotes an observation in a sample of N  countries and the cumula­
tive distribution function F  in Equation (4.4) is assumed to be multivariate normal and 
characterised by the covariance matrix M. Estimating the parameters in Equation (4.4) 
is a formidable task because it requires, in the most general case, the evaluation of the
D = (I — 1) x T  dimensional integral in Equation (4.4) for each observation and each
iteration in the maximisation process.
One may be tempted to accept the efficiency losses due to an incorrect specification of 
the error structure and simply ignore the correlations that make the integral in Equation 
(4.4) so hard to solve. However, unlike the linear model, an incorrect specification of the 
covariance matrix of the errors M  biases not only the standard errors of the estimated 
coefficients but also the structural coefficients (3 themselves.
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Numerical integration of the integral in (4.4) is not computationally feasible since the 
number of operations increases with the power of D, the dimension of M. To overcome 
this problem, we simulate the probabilities P({it>n}\{Xit,n}] P, M) by drawing pseudo­
random realisations from the underlying error process.
We use MSSL in conjunction with the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) simulator to 
overcome the computation intractabilities of the multiperiod panel limited-dependent- 
variable (LDV) models. This method has the additional feature of overcoming the an­
alytical intractabilities associated with LDV models with complicated correlations and 
endogeneity.
In the next subsection we borrow from Hajivassiliou (2002) the explanation of the GHK 
approach.
4.2.3 The GHK Simulator
Define q as a mapping that takes a uniform (0,1) random variate into a truncated standard 
normal random variable on the interval [a, b]:
q(u, a, b) = 4>_1(<3>(a) • (1 — u) +  $(&) • u) (4.10)
where 0  < u < 1 and —o o < a < b < o o  and $  is the univariate normal cumulative 
distribution function.
P roposition  1 . Consider the multivariate normal M  x 1 random vector Y  ~  N (Xfi, f2) 
with Q, positive definite, the linear transformation Z  = F Y  ~  N(FXf3, E), with F  non­
singular and S =  FOF' , and the event B =  {a* < Z  — F Y  < b*}, with — oo < a* < 
6* < -l-oo.
Define P  = f f fn(z;FX/3,E)dz, a = a* — F X fi, b =  b* — F X fi, and let L denote the 
lower-triangular Cholesky factor ofE.
Let (ui, . . . ,  um) be a vector of independent uniform (0,1) random variates.
Define recursively for j  = 1 , . . . ,  M:
ej =  Qiuj> (aj ~  S jiei — ~  L jj_iej_i) /L jj, (bj — Lj\e\ — . . .  — L jj -\e j-i) f  Ljf) (4.11)
Qj  — 4?((6j Ljiei . . .  L jj_iej_i) /Ljj) ^((oj Lj\e\ . . .  L jj- \e j- \) / Ljf) (4.12)
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Define e =  (ci, . . . ,  6m )', Y  = X fi + F~lLe with covariance E and subject to a* < F Y  < 
b*, and Q(e) = Q i ■ . . .  • Qm • Then Y  is a random vector on B,  and the ratio of the 
densities o fY  and Y  a ty  = X fi + F~lLe, where e is any vector satisfying a < Le < b, is 
P/Q{e). Therefore, the probability of a* < Le <b* is correctly simulated by the probability 
of a < Le < b, that is, Q(e). This can be approximated by the simulator
(4.13)
with 6ir drawn from truncated N (0 ,1 ), where R  denotes the number of replications.
Hajivassiliou and McFadden (1998) prove that the MSSL estimator will be consistent, 
asymptotically normal, and fully efficient asymptotically, provided R , the number of sim-
where N  is the sample size.
For a complete implementation of the GHK approach we use the procedures written
c =Cholesky factor of w;
vectors a and b, defining the restriction region a < Z  <b\
R  =  number of replications;
u =  a m  x R  matrix of i.i.d. uniform [0,1] variates;
and are publically available at h ttp ://e c o n .ls e .a c .u k /~ v a s s ilis /p u b /s im u la tio n . 
The procedures used here are written in GAUSS.
Application
To illustrate the application of the MSSL/GHK to our problem let us define a latent 
dependent variable c*t and a binary limited dependent variable Ca as follows:
ulations employed per individual observation rises without bound at least as fast as y/N,
by Vassilis Hajivassiliou. These procedures that return the simulated probability, P, are 
a function of the following arguments: 
m  =  dimension of multivariate normal vector Z\ 
mu = E[Z]\ 
w = V{Z];
wi = w 1
0 otherwise
For a typical observation it:
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Cn
1 €it +  xit/3 > 0
0 e»t +  x'aP < 0
In terms of the canonical GHK formulation:
ac < ec < bc
we obtain the configuration:
Cit ac bc
1 -x'itP oo
0 —0 0 - x 'itP
We define the vectors an, bn, and en- Stacking all the T* periods of observation for coun­
try i gives the T{ x T* var-covariance matrix with structure characterised by the precise 
serial correlation assumptions made on the e^’s. For example, one-factor random effect 
assumptions will imply and equicorrelated block structure on £ e, while our most general 
assumption of one-factor random effects combined with an AR(1) process implies that Ee 
combines equicorrelated and Toeplitz-matrix features.
Through this representation, the probability of a complete sequence of the observable 
C behaviour for individual country i :
P(Cl , . . . ,C Ti)
are given by the events of the form:
Prob(ai < €{ < bi)
Consequently, our approach incorporates fully the one-factor plus AR( 1 ) serial correlations 
in ti
4.3 T he D ata
In this chapter we use a broad country- and time-series dataset. Specifically, we investi­
gate 92 developing and emerging markets’ economies for the 1975-97 period. The purpose 
of such a large sample, which includes countries that have never experienced a currency 
crisis, is to be able to draw general conclusions on the origins of currency crises and the 
causal chain from banking to currency crises.
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The data is of quarterly frequency and collected from the International Financial Statis­
tics (IFS) publication of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and from the Global 
Development and Finance database issued by the World Bank.9
4.3.1 Defining Banking and Currency Crises
In the next sections we provide the definitions for currency and banking crises and we 
summarise some descriptive statistics for these variables.
Currency Crisis Definition
To define currency crises we look at the percentage change —in any given quarter— of 
the nominal bilateral exchange rate with the US dollar and use two criteria to qualify 
an episode as currency crisis. The first criterion selects only exchange rate depreciations 
that exceed a 10 percent cut-off level in a single quarter. The second focuses on the rate 
of depreciation, by requiring this same 10 percent depreciation to also be a 25 percent 
increase in the rate of depreciation with respect to the previous quarter (we shall refer 
hereafter to the dependent variable so defined as 10% cut-off). The last condition is added 
in order to avoid counting as currency crises instances of managed devaluations like the 
ones announced by Latin American countries during periods of hyperinflation, when the 
first criterion was met quarter after quarter.10 (See Tables C.14-C.20 in Appendix C for 
a detailed classification of currency crisis episodes).
The reason why we focus on this type of measure to define currency crises, instead of 
using an index of exchange market pressure is mainly that this study refers to developing 
and emerging markets’ economies. Indices of exchange market pressure combine changes 
in the trajectories of exchange rates, interest rates and central bank reserves by applying 
some weighting scheme. Periods in which the index is above its mean by a certain thresh­
old times its standard deviation are defined as a crisis. By looking at abnormal behaviours 
of interest rates and international reserves it would be possible to capture unsuccessful 
speculative attacks, under the assumption that the monetary authorities would use these 
two instruments to deter an attack on the currency. Unfortunately, few emerging and 
developing countries have market-determined short-term interest rates for long periods of 
time. Additionally, reserve movements in emerging and developing countries are far less 
important in avoiding a speculative attack than other measures such as the tightening 
of reserve requirements, emergency rescue packages from international institutions or the
9Appendix C contains a complete list of variable definitions, together with their original frequency 
and source (see Tables C.21-C.23).
10 A similar procedure is followed by Frankel and Rose (1996), but with different thresholds for the two 
criteria.
CHAPTER 4. A DYNAMIC PROBIT MODEL FOR CURRENCY CRISES 88
Figure 4.1: Different Definitions of Currency Crises
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definition of crises
im position of controls on capital outflows.11
In order to  check the sensitivity of the cut-off definition to different threshold levels, 
we have com pared the list of episodes of currency crises th a t are obtained by progres­
sively increasing the cut-off threshold on the nom inal exchange ra te  depreciation while 
sim ultaneously relaxing the second condition on the ra te  of depreciation. In Figure 4.1 we 
plot the num ber of currency crises identified12 Varying the depreciation level from 5 to 50 
percent and the ra te  of depreciation threshold from 30 to  0 percent. The first measure, 
the 5% cut-off, which implies a depreciation of a 5 percent and an increase in the rate 
of depreciation of 30 percent, identifies too m any currency crises events, calling crises 
periods of only currency distress. The la tte r definitions includes the well-known episodes 
of currency crises. It is worth noting th a t the to ta l num ber of crises decreases sharply 
when we move from the 5% cut-off definition to the 10% cut-off. The difference between 
the num ber of crises identified w ith the 10% cut-off definition and the 15% cut-off — th a t 
requires a 15 percent depreciation and a 20 percent increase in the ra te  of depreciation— 
is much smaller. W hat is crucial is th a t beyond this point the to ta l num ber of currency 
crises stabilises independently of the definition adopted. T his fact supports our choice of 
adopting a discrete variable to  analyse episodes of currency crises.
11 Nonetheless, in order to check the sensitivity of the results to the particular definition of currency 
crisis adopted, we also construct an EMP measure. This index is a weighted average of quarterly changes 
in the nominal bilateral exchange rate —with respect to the US dollar— and quarterly changes in reserves. 
The weights are chosen so that the two components of the index have the same conditional volatility. 
Periods in which the index is above its mean by more that 1.5 standard deviations are defined as crises.
12 We have used the total number of observations in our initial sample. Notice that for the econometric 
estimation the number of observations is smaller due to the lack of data for some of the explanatory 
variables.
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Banking Crisis Definition
To identify and date episodes of banking sector distress the banking crises literature relies 
mainly on the work of Caprio and Klingebiel (1996), Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996) 
and Demirgiig-Kunt and Detragiache (1998a).
Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) gathered data on episodes of bank insolvencies from the 
late-1970’s to 1995 for 69 countries. This information relies upon the assessment of a va­
riety of finance professionals in pulling together characterisations that have caused crises. 
According to Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) it is difficult to date episodes of bank insol­
vency. Crises that involve runs on banks and/or on a country’s currency are relatively 
easy to date, nevertheless these are only a subset of the banking crises reviewed by Caprio 
and Klingebiel (1996). Events in which the banking system has negative worth may per­
sist over longer periods before being detected. It is for these reasons that the accuracy 
of the dates attached to the crises reviewed is difficult to determine, but they are those 
generally accepted by finance experts familiar with the countries. Table 1 in Caprio and 
Klingebiel (1996) presents the entire sample of 69 countries for which information was 
available, with those countries in which the episode appeared to be systematic, in the 
sense of much or all of bank capital being exhausted.
Lindgren et al. (1996) distinguish between banking crises and significant banking prob­
lems. They study 181 countries over the period 1980-96. Cases where there were runs 
or other substantial portfolio shifts, collapses of financial firms, or massive government 
intervention are termed banking crises. Periods of extensive unsoundness short of a crisis 
are what Lindgren et al. (1996) call significant problems in the banking sector.
Demirgiig-Kunt and Detragiache (1998a) identify and date episodes of banking sector 
distress during the period 1980-94. To do so they use previous studies on dating banking 
crises episodes, among them Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) and Lindgren et al. (1996). 
According to Demirgiig-Kunt and Detragiache (1998a) it is important to distinguish be­
tween fragility in general and crises in particular, as well as between localised crises and 
systemic crises. With this in mind, Demirgiig-Kunt and Detragiache (1998a) establish 
that for an episode of distress to be classified as a full-fledged crisis at least one of the 
following conditions must hold: (a) the fraction of non-performing assets in the bank­
ing system exceeds 1 0  percent; (b) the cost of the rescue operation comprises at least 2  
percent of GDP; (c) the banking sector problems result in a large scale nationalisation 
of banks; (d) extensive bank runs take place or emergency measures are enacted by the 
government in response to the crisis.
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In order to identify episodes of banking crises for this study, we have borrowed the episodes 
provided in Table 2 of Lindgren et al. (1996). This work is the most detailed in terms 
of information given about the nature of the banking crises identified and inclusive in 
terms of the number of countries covered. Notwithstanding, and for the purpose of fixing 
the quarter in which the banking crisis occurred and, in order to cover the entire sample 
period, 1975-97, for all the 92 countries, we have investigated additional sources: the IMF 
and the Economist Intelligence Unit country reports.
In this way banking crises are identified if one of the following events occurs:
• A bank run with consistent deposits withdrawals.
• The license withdrawal, closure, liquidation or take over of one or more financial 
institutions.
• The adoption of emergency measures like deposits freeze or prolonged bank holidays.
• Government intervention to recapitalise, reform or partially take over troubled 
banks.
Following DemirgiiQ-Kunt and Detragiache (1998a), in addition to the above criteria we 
impose the following conditions:
• The ratio of non-performing assets in the banking system must exceed 10 percent,
• The cost of the rescue operation must be at least 2 percent of GDP 
The total number of banking crises identified in this manner is 205.13
4.3.2 Some Descriptive Statistics
In this section we characterise episodes of banking and currency crises by providing some 
summary statistics. 14 For the purpose of this analysis, we will focus on two measures of 
currency crises: the so called 10% cut-off and 15% cut-off.
Currency crises tend to be evenly distributed over time during the last decades except for 
the 70’s, that are partially covered in our sample and in which we count very few episodes 
of sharp devaluations. Table 4.1 shows the break down by time and currency crisis defini­
tion, as well as for the banking crises. Episodes of banking crises in developing countries
13The complete list of episodes, together with a short description of the causes of the crises is presented 
in Tables C.1-C.13 in the Appendix C.
14 The summary statistics are calculated for the actual number of observations included in the estima­
tions.
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Table 4.1: Distribution of Crises over Time
Period 10% cut-off 15% cut-off banking crisesnumber percent number percent number percent
1970s 1 0.27% 1 0.27% 1 0.27% 376
1980s 77 4.37% 51 2.89% 6 8  3.85% 1764
1990s 118 5.34% 72 3.26% 136 6.15% 2 2 1 0
total 196 4.51% 124 2.85% 205 4.71% 4350
Table 4.2: Distribution of Crises across Regions
Region 10% cut-off 15% cut-off banking crises obsvnumber percent number percent number percent
Asia 25 2.95% 17 0.27% 54 6.38% 847
Latin America 45 3.55% 36 2.84% 44 3.47% 1268
East Europe 28 7.35% 21 5.51% 34 8.92% 381
Middle East 9 2.45% 3 0.82% 5 1.36% 368
Africa 89 5.99% 47 3.16% 6 8 4.58% 1486
total 196 4.51% 124 2.85% 205 4.71% 4350
have doubled during the last decade, possibly due to the increased financial liberalisation 
enjoyed by these countries. The practically absence of banking crises during the 1970s is 
possibly a consequence of the highly regulated financial system of the 1970s.
By looking at the distribution of crises by regions, shown in Table 4.2, it is interest­
ing to note that Africa has the highest absolute number of currency and banking crises, 
followed by Latin America. The ranking changes if we take into account the total number 
of observations in each subsample. It is important to note that Eastern Europe here 
includes not only transition countries, like Bulgaria or Russia, but also Turkey. This 
consideration can explain the high percentage of currency and banking crises falling into 
this subsample. 15
Finally, Table 4.3 focuses on joint episodes of banking and currency crises. The first 
row reports the percentages of currency crises in our sample that are associated with a 
simultaneous banking crisis. The remaining rows depict the number of banking crises 
preceding currency crises, by one quarter and then up to one year. 16 Similarly, we report
15 If we exclude Turkey from the Eastern European region, the percentage of currency crises falls by 
about 2 percentage points, from 7.3 to 5 percent in the case of 10% cut-off and from 5.5 to 3.5 percent 
for 15% cut-off.
16Contrary to Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), we have decided to restrict the crisis window to only 
four quarters in order to minimise the risk of counting as twin crises episodes of banking and currency 
crises that are not related by a clear causal relationship.
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Table 4.3: Twin Crises1
10% cut-off 15% cut-off 
Contemporaneous Crises
number 
% of cc 
% of bkc
2 2
1 1 .2 2 %
10.73%
15
1 2 .1 0 %
7.32%
10% cut-off 15% cut-off 10% cut-off 15% cut-off
Banking Preceding Currency Currency Preceding Banking
One Quarter
number 16 14 number 14 9
% of cc 8.16% 11.29% % of bkc 6.83% 4.39%
OnerTwo Quarters
number 24 2 1 number 28 2 1
% of cc 12.24% 16.94% % of bkc 13.66% 10.24%
One:Three Quarters
number 35 27 number 43 34
% of cc 17.86% 21.77% % of bkc 20.98% 16.59%
One:Four Quarters
number 41 31 number 48 39
% of cc 20.92% 25.00% % of bkc 23.41% 19.02%
cc stands for currency crises and bkc for banking crises. One:Two Quarters refers to 
banking(currency) crises that have occurred either one or two quarters before the 
currency(banking) crisis considered. Similarly, One:Three and One:Four refer to a time 
interval of three or four quarters before the occurrence of a currency(banking) crisis.
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the number and percentages of currency crises preceding banking crises.
If we focus on a one-year interval, the data reported in Table 4.3 show that the num­
ber of currency crises in the twelve months preceding a banking crisis is higher than the 
correspondent number of banking crises preceding currency crises —for both measures of 
currency crises presented here. Based on this comparison, we may be induced to infer that 
currency crises are more likely to lead banking crises than vice-versa. But a more careful 
analysis of the data reveals that the same conclusion cannot be drawn if we restrict the 
time interval to one quarter before a crisis. The choice of the lag structure appears to be 
crucial when assessing the causal link between banking and currency crisis.
In summary, any tentative conclusion based on descriptive analysis needs further inves­
tigation using more sophisticated tools of analysis. The summary statistics presented in 
this section cannot unanimously solve our original question on what type of interaction, 
if any, links the various episodes of currency and banking crises in our sample. Further­
more, the mere existence of a temporal relationship between crises does not necessarily 
imply causation. To shed light on this matter we would have to introduce some dynamics 
between the two and control for the effects of common shocks that may be the driving 
forces behind the occurrence of financial crises. The results presented in the next section 
have been derived along these lines.
4.3.3 Explanatory Variables
We classify the explanatory variables into six different groups, depending on their na­
ture. There are macroeconomic variables, monetary and financial variables, bank-specific 
variables, debt variables, global variables, and control variables.
Macroeconomic Variables
This set of variables includes real GDP growth, inflation, and a measure of real exchange 
rate (RER) overvaluation.
These real variables are meant to characterise the general domestic conditions of the 
economy and measure the repayment capacity of each country. In fact, a weakening in 
economic activity is likely to be associated with an increase in the vulnerability of the 
currency. When growth is declining, there are pressures on policymakers to implement 
lax financial policies, such as currency depreciations, to boost economic activity. On the 
other hand, an increasing rate of growth may generate optimism in the domestic asset 
market and attract foreign capital in support of the currency. We would thus expect the 
real GDP growth variable to have a negative sign in our estimations.
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As argued by Corsetti et al. (1999b), when currency values are fixed or semi-fixed and 
domestic inflation is above foreign inflation, a real currency appreciation implies a loss of 
external competitiveness for the domestic country, eventually undermining the credibility 
of its peg. Therefore, we expect a positive sign on domestic inflation.
The RER variable is calculated as follows: we first obtain the Hodrick-Prescott trend 
from our RER series17 and then measure the distance of each RER series from this trend. 
Negative values of this measure indicate that the RER is overvalued with respect to its 
historical trend. An overvalued RER would harm tradeables’ producers and reduce for­
eign exchange earnings. It might also create the expectation of a future weakening of 
the currency and lead to a preemptive speculative attack. At the same time, low export 
growth would increase the incentive for the government to devalue in order to stimulate 
the economy and increase its competitiveness, thereby validating public expectations. The 
expected sign for the RER undervaluation variable is, hence, negative.
Monetary and Financial Variables
This group includes the import cover ratio —defined as total international reserves over 
imports—, total domestic credit growth and its sub-components, i.e. total credit to the 
private sector and net claims on the central government, all expressed as ratios over GDP.
The import cover ratio is an indicator of the adequacy of foreign exchange reserves. It 
measures the government’s ability to finance current account deficits. Increases in this 
ratio should decrease the likelihood of a currency crisis.
The domestic credit measure captures the existence of lending booms. Fast increases of 
domestic credit increase the vulnerability of the financial system. In this context banks’ 
ability to discriminate marginal projects declines and the probability of ending with a 
large share of non-performing loans in their portfolios increases. Since banks are more 
vulnerable to fluctuations in the business cycle, central banks may find themselves in the 
undesirable position of having to choose between bailing out domestic banks and defend­
ing the exchange rate peg that is under pressure because of the increase in central bank’s 
domestic liabilities. 18 Domestic credit to the private sector is the best candidate to cap­
ture this effect and we would expect the estimated coefficient of this variable to be positive.
Net claims on the central government would capture the Krugman effect: credit expansion
17The RER series are author’s computations, based on nominal exchange rates and relative CPI indexes. 
Both series were obtained from the IFS statistics of the IMF.
18 This is also pointed out by Ahluwalia (2000).
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due to the monetisation of government’s budget deficits. Thus, we would expect increases 
of this variable to translate into higher probabilities of observing a currency collapse.
Bank-specific Variables
The third group of explanatory variables consists of a series of bank-specific indicators. 
These include the interest rate differential between lending and deposit rates, and the 
growth rates of banks’ deposits over GDP and banks’ foreign liabilities over GDP. The 
sign of the first of these variables is a priori undetermined. On the one hand, it might 
increase banks’ profit margins and thus decrease the probability of a liquidity crisis. On 
the other hand, an increase in the interest rates on loans might lead to adverse-selection 
problems and increase the probability of borrowers’ default.
A decrease in banks’ deposits would signal the existence of bank runs and deposits with­
drawals, that might undermine the stability of the currency.
The amount of foreign liabilities measures the degree of the banking system’s reliance 
on off-shore capital to fund its activities and thus captures the systemic vulnerability to 
a sudden capital inflow reversal.
Global Variables
Here, we focus on real GDP growth and price inflation in the United States, as well as a 
composite measure of international interest rates, and commodity prices. These variables 
represent common shocks and may play a major role in inducing pressures on the curren­
cies of several countries simultaneously.19
Following Eichengreen and Rose (1998) we have constructed a composite measure of the 
level of the world interest rates by weighting the interest rate series of France, Germany, 
Japan, Switzerland, the UK and the US.20 An increase in this variable would imply a 
higher debt service burden and thus increase the probability of an insolvency crisis. Al­
ternatively, it may cause an outflow of funds and eventually a currency devaluation if the 
economy is too small and the option of rising interest rates is too costly with respect to 
the one of devaluing.21
Moreno and Trehan (2000) argue that a deflationary shock in the US can have a di­
rect effect on economies that are exporters to the US market because it would lower their
19See Caramazza, Ricci and Salgado (2000).
20 The choice of this particular set of countries is motivated by the high share of external debt denom­
inated in their currencies.
21 As in Moreno and Trehan (2000).
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export revenues and, consequently, domestic economic activity. The resulting unemploy­
ment would make it more difficult for them to maintain a pegged currency. Therefore, 
disinflation in a major economy, like the US, could be associated with an increase in the 
probability of a currency crash.
We have also included as global variables a set of commodity price indexes: fuel, metal, 
raw materials, food and beverages. We multiply these indexes by a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if a country relies on one of these commodities for its exports’ 
revenues. Intuitively, an increase in these prices should decrease the probability of a crisis 
by increasing export revenues.
Debt Variables
We explore different debt indicators: total external debt as a ratio of reserves, both in 
levels and growth rates, to measure the degree of indebtedness of developing countries; 
short-term debt as a ratio of foreign reserves and the shares of private non-guaranteed 
or publicly and public guaranteed long term debt to take into account the maturity and 
structure of external debt.
Control Variables
We control for the effect of financial liberalisation on the probability of experiencing a 
currency crisis, by defining a dummy variable that takes the value of one during the 
first three years following the liberalisation of domestic interest rates. The inclusion of 
this control has been suggested by the stream of literature that focuses on the effects of 
financial liberalisation and increasing financial fragility.22 Financial liberalisation tends 
to increase the probability of a currency crisis, especially in the period right after the 
deregulation of the domestic interest rates.
4.4 R esults
This section reports the results of the estimation by simulated maximum likelihood 
(M SSL) of the dynamic limited dependent variable model specified in Equation (4.9) 
and applied to currency crises. These are defined according to the cut-off selection crite­
ria described in section 4.3.1. The results reported here are derived for the 10% cut-off 
definition, but similar results are obtained using alternative definitions.
22See, among others, Demirgiig-Kunt and Detragiache (1998b), Demirgiig-Kunt and Detragiache (2000), 
and Glick and Hutchison (1999).
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Table 4.4: Benchmark Model1
Variables (3 coeff.2 z-stats.
Constant -0.853*** -27.478
Real GDP growth -0.027* -1.445
Foreign reserves over imports -0.433*** -3.930
Growth of external debt over reserves 0 .0 0 0 ** 1.752
Short-term debt over reserves 0.003** 1.955
Growth of domestic credit over GDP 0.274*** 3.540
Inflation for fuel prices -0.008 -1.179
Inflation for metal prices -0.090*** -2.287
World interest rate 0.044*** 2.352
US CPI inflation -0.298*** -3.725
RER undervaluation -0.018*** -5.117
Currency crises last quarter -0.116 -0.383
Banking crisis indicator 0.172* 1.572
a2 0.377*** 5.534
P 0.083
1 Dependent variable: 10% cut-off. Number of observations: 4350. Function value at 
optimum: -700.511. All variables are lagged one period, unless otherwise specified. 
The banking crisis indicator is a dummy taking the value of 1 if there is a banking 
crisis in the year preceding the currency crisis.
a 2 is the variance of the underlying distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity.
2The significance of the parameters can be assessed using the Normal approximation.
Given the size of our sample, the t-statistic is virtually Normal. We can therefore use
the t-tables to assess significance. We use the critical values for the 1%, 5% and 10%
significance levels, which are 2.326, 1.645 and 1.282, respectively, for a “one-tailed”
test, and 2.576, 1.960 and 1.645 for a “two-tailed” test.
*, ** and ***, corresponds to the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
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4.4.1 Benchmark Model
Table 4.4 shows the results of the benchmark model that includes a wide range of explana­
tory variables, all lagged (one quarter) in order to avoid endogeneity problems. Indeed, 
the inclusion of contemporaneous regressors could result in a misleading chain of causality, 
with the outcomes of a crisis erroneously treated as its precipitating causes. Since market 
sentiments tend to react quickly to changes in the economic stance of a country and spec­
ulative attacks come all of a sudden, we initially use a specification with variables lagged 
at most one quarter. The results seem to confirm that currency crises react promptly to 
changes in economic fundamentals and global variables: most of the explanatory variables 
included in the baseline specification are indeed significant determinants of a crisis one 
quarter ahead. Contrary to the main existing logit/probit studies, we add to the right 
hand side of our probit equation the lagged dependent variable —entered with the first 
lag— and a dummy variable capturing episodes of banking crises that occurred during 
the four quarters preceding the currency crash.23
The results indicate that fundamentals do matter. Real GDP growth is significant at 
the 1 0  percent level and has the expected negative sign, meaning that a decline in eco­
nomic activity increases the probability of occurrence for a currency collapse.
The import-cover ratio is among the variables with the highest elasticities and is strongly 
significant (at the 1 percent level). As expected, the higher the ratio of reserves to im­
ports, the lower the probability of an attack to the currency.
When turning to the debt variables, the results show that it is not the level of the external 
debt outstanding but rather its increase that has a positive effect on the likelihood of a 
currency crash. In fact, the first lag of the change in the ratio of external debt over re­
serves is significant at the 5 percent level in the baseline specification, while the ratio itself 
is not. The results also show the importance of debt maturity. The ratio of short-term 
debt over reserves is also significant at the 5 percent level but has a higher elasticity than 
the growth of total external debt.
The baseline specification in Table 4.4 also includes the growth rate of domestic credit 
over GDP, that has a positive coefficient and is highly significant. This result seems to 
support the view of lending booms driving currency crises.24
23 The results do not change significantly in terms of fundamentals if we vary the lag structure of the 
lagged dependent variable.
24We alternatively used the two sub-components of total domestic credit, namely credit to the private 
sector and net claims on the government. Only the second variable is positive and significant if lagged 
two periods. This last variable will capture the traditional view of currency crises caused by excessive 
money creation.
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RER overvaluation has been included into the benchmark specification in order to assess 
the sustainability of the external position of these countries. The estimated coefficient is 
significant at the 1 percent level and has a negative sign. Indeed, the more undervalued 
is the RER, the less likely is a speculative attack .25
The remaining explanatory variables in the benchmark specification are meant to char­
acterise the external conditions. The first two are commodity indexes, fuel and metal, to 
proxy for terms-of-trade shocks to exporters of these commodities. Both variables have 
the expected negative sign, but only metal inflation is significant at the 1 percent level.
US inflation is also a significant determinant of crises probabilities. Its negative sign 
confirms the predictions that a deflation in the US might be associated with an increase 
in the likelihood of a crisis because of the relative loss of competitiveness experienced by 
developing countries.
Finally, we introduce a weighted average of the interest rates in France, Germany, Japan, 
Switzerland, the US and the UK, as a composite measure of international interest rates. 
The weights are chosen according to the shares of external debt denominated in each of 
these currencies and are calculated quarter by quarter. This variable reflects the effects 
of increased interest rates on the debt repayment capacity of a country. The estimated 
coefficient is significant but only at the 10 percent level. The sign of the variable is as 
expected: an increase in the level of international interest rates adds to the debt service 
burden, fuelling expectations of a future currency devaluation.
The first lag of the dependent variable has a negative sign, implying that once an unex­
pected attack on the currency has occurred, the probability of observing another specu­
lative attack, one quarter ahead, decreases but is not statistically significant.26
The occurrence of a banking crisis in any of the four quarters preceding a currency cri­
sis, significantly increases the probability of a devaluation. This last result reinforces the 
evidence provided by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), because we use a larger sample of 
countries, adopt a more restrictive crisis window and use a multivariate approach that 
looks at the effect of past banking crisis episodes on the probability of a currency crisis 
four quarters ahead, after controlling for a wider range of fundamentals.
25 The associated elasticity is positive because it is evaluated at the variable mean that is also positive. 
This means that, on average, real exchange rates were overvalued, increasing the probability of currency 
crises.
26 This result is not surprising given the definition of currency crises here adopted that selects only 
those episodes of depreciation that are also a 25 percent increase in the rate of depreciation with respect 
to the previous quarter.
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Table 4.5: Different Cut-offs to Define Currency Crises1
Dependent Variable 
Constant
Real GDP growth
Foreign reserves over imports
Growth of external debt over reserves
Short-term debt over reserves
Growth domestic credit over GDP
Inflation for fuel prices
Inflation for metal prices
World interest rate
US CPI inflation
RER undervaluation
Currency crises last quarter 
(10% cut-off)
Currency crises last quarter 
(15% cut-off)
Currency crises last quarter 
(5% cut-off)
Banking crisis indicator
<j2
P
Function value at optimum
10% cut-off 15% cut-off 5% cut-off
—0.853*** -0.773*** -0.618***
(-27.478) (-20.407) (-24.938)
-0.027* -0.040** - 0 .0 0 1
(-1.445) (-1.859) (-0.062)
-0.433*** -0.495*** -0.252***
(-3.930) (-3.516) (-3.219)
0 .0 0 0 ** 0 .0 0 0 * 0 .0 0 0 **
(1.752) (1.628) (1.912)
0.003** 0.006*** 0 .0 0 1
(1.955) (3.081) (0.805)
0.274*** 0.426*** 0.152***
(3.540) (4.352) (2.339)
-0.008 0.003 -0.005
(-1.179) (0.624) (-0.933)
-0.090*** 1 O H-1 to o * * * - 0 .0 1 2
(-2.287) (-2.857) (-0.585)
0.044*** - 0 .0 2 2 0.031**
(2.352) (-0.825) (2.107)
-0.298*** -0.181** -0.178***
(-3.725) (-1.770) (-2.889)
-0.018*** -0.016*** -0.017***
(-5.117) (-4.149) (-5.280)
-0.116
(-0.383)
-0.634***
(-3.532)
-0.375
(-0.863)
0.172* 0.300** 0.073
(1.572) (2.225) (0.792)
0.377*** 0.446*** 0.326***
(5.534) (3.781) (7.003)
0.083 0.504*** 0.183
(0.538) (4.782) (0.657)
-700.511 -469.349 -1226.9257
1See comments in Table 4.4.
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After controlling for this large set of explanatory variables, we still find a significant 
effect of the unobserved country-specific and time-invariant component of the error term. 
This unobserved heterogeneity may be due to intrinsic differences in the institutions and 
political background of the countries included in our sample, or even historical reasons, 
that are not captured by the other regressors. The autocorrelation structure of the error 
term is not statistically different from zero.
4.4.2 Alternative Specifications for the Dependent Variable
Table 4.5 reports the estimates of the baseline specification using alternative definitions of 
the dependent variable in order to check the sensitivity of the results to the currency crisis 
definition. The first column corresponds to the benchmark specification described above. 
The results in column 2 are derived by adopting a more restrictive definition of currency 
crises, 15% cut-off —that implies 15 and 20 percent thresholds for the depreciation and 
increase in the rate of depreciation of the nominal exchange rate, respectively.
Interestingly, some of the results are stronger. Domestic GDP growth is now significant at 
a 5 percent level of significance. The lagged dependent variable becomes significant and 
has a negative sign. This seems to suggest that past occurrences of currency crises may 
significantly decrease the probability of observing another crisis only in extreme cases, 
i.e. if the first devaluation is particularly severe. The banking crises indicator increases in 
significance, from a 10 percent to a 5 percent level, suggesting a greater role of banking 
crises in determining the likelihood of a more severe currency crisis. It is worth noting 
that the autocorrelated structure of the error term is also significant, implying that some 
unobserved persistent shocks (correlated over time) might be driving the occurrence of 
severe episodes of currency crisis.
The third column of Table 4.5 reports the same specification but refers to the depen­
dent variable 5% cut-off (crises identified on the basis of a 5 percent cut-off depreciation 
and a 30 percent increase in the rate of depreciation). The weaker results are due, in our 
view, to some inaccuracy in the crises identification process. Indeed, with a 5 percent 
threshold on the nominal depreciation we may erroneously classify episodes of controlled 
devaluation.27
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Table 4.6: Importance of the Error Term Structure1
Dependent Variable 10% cut-off benchmark model random effects pooled data
Constant —0.853*** -0.973*** -1.462***
(-27.478) (-2.430) (-10.841)
Real GDP growth -0.027* -0.029* -0.036*
(-1.445) (-1.517) (-2.336)
Foreign reserves over imports -0.433*** -0.410*** -0.271**
(-3.930) (-3.848) (-4.194)
Growth of external debt over reserves 0 .0 0 0 ** 0 .0 0 0 ** 0 .0 0 0 **
(1.752) (1.763) (1.950)
Short-term debt over reserves 0.003** 0.003** 0 .0 0 1
(1.955) (1.932) (0.706)
Growth domestic credit over GDP 0.274*** 0.278*** -0.024
(3.540) (3.637) (-0.751)
Inflation for fuel prices -0.008 -0.008 -0.005
(-1.179) (-1.175) (-0.855)
Inflation for metal prices -0.090*** -0.096*** -0.081***
(-2.287) (-2.374) (-2.473)
World interest rate 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.032**
(2.352) (2.426) (2.088)
US CPI inflation -0.298*** -0.301*** -0.301***
(-3.725) (-3.754) (-4.115)
RER undervaluation -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.017***
(-5.117) (-5.157) (-5.664)
Currency crises last quarter -0.116 0.024 0.415***
(-0.383) (0.155) (3.013)
Banking crisis indicator 0.172* 0.184** 0.254***
(1.572) (1.726) (2.706)
<72 0.377***
(5.534)
0.419***
(5.278)
P 0.083
(1.537)
Function value at optimum -700.511 -702.675 -739.790
1See comments in Table 4.4.
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4.4.3 Random Effects plus Autorregressive Errors
After checking the robustness of the results with respect to changes in the definition of 
currency crises, we performed a sensitivity test over the structure of the error term. So far, 
we have assumed a composite error term as it appears in Equation (4.7), with a country 
specific error term to control for unobserved heterogeneity, and a persistent shock that 
is autocorrelated over time. While the first element is always significantly different from 
zero, the second is not. The first column of Table 4.6 shows the baseline results, obtained 
by estimating a simple random effects model, as specified in Equation (4.5). The baseline 
results are unaltered and the random effect is still very significant.28 This table highlights 
the importance of relaxing the assumption of identically and independently distributed 
errors (i.i.d.) that underlies most of the existing studies on currency crises that make 
use of probit or logit analysis. In order to clarify this point, we present in column 3 the 
results of a simple probit model that assumes i.i.d. errors and pools all the observations 
together, ignoring the panel dimension of the data.
What is striking is the high z-statistics associated with the banking crisis dummy. This is 
due to the fact that this variable partially reflects institutional and political characteristics 
specific of each country that are not controlled for in an i.i.d. error structure. According 
to these results, the estimates of standard probit models, that stress the importance of 
banking crises as determinants of currency crises, might have been artificially inflated by 
omitting the panel structure revealed in this study.
4.4.4 Robustness of the M odel
In order to assess the robustness of the baseline specification, we removed and added a few 
explanatory variables. The results are shown in Table 4.7. The first column shows that 
the the dummy for past episodes of banking crises remains significant even after the in­
clusion of variables that have been found to be significant determinants of banking crises. 
The growth rates of bank deposits and bank liabilities over GDP also have a direct effect 
on the probability of observing a currency crisis. The associated estimated coefficients 
are significant at the 5 percent level and have opposite signs. The specification in column 
1 is more general than the benchmark specification of Table 4.4 because it also includes 
domestic inflation and the share of long-term debt that is private and non-guaranteed. 
The inclusion of inflation is necessary to correct the nominal interest rate differential be-
27This might also explain why the number of 5% cut-off crises is so high compared to 10% cut-off and 
15% cut-off, as shown in Figure 4.1.
28 It is worth noting that the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable —once the autocorrelated 
structure is omitted— turns out to be positive. This indicates that, had it been positive in the first 
instance, it might have turned to be significant now, due to the omission of the autocorrelated error 
term, p.
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Table 4.7: Testing the Robustness of the Specification1
Dependent Variable: 10% cut-off (1 ) (2 ) (3)
Constant -0.908*** -1.219*** -0.913***
(-27.739) (-27.541) (-28.316)
Real GDP growth -0.023 -0.024 -0.023
(-1.215) (-1.265) (-1.243)
Foreign reserves over imports -0.468*** -0.469*** -0.451***
(-4.136) (-4.377) (-4.022)
Growth of external debt over reserves 0 .0 0 0 ** 0 .0 0 0 ** 0 .0 0 0 **
(1.704) (1.722) (1.660)
Short-term debt over reserves 0.003** 0.003** 0.003**
(2.103) (2.294) (2.116)
Private, non-guaranteed debt over 1.445** 1.291** 1.505**
long-term debt (2.134) (1.978) (2.260)
Growth of domestic credit over GDP 0.259*** 0.276*** 0.256***
(3.248) (3.467) (3.243)
Inflation for fuel prices - 0 .0 1 0 * - 0 .0 1 0 *
(-1.356) (-1.411)
Inflation for metal prices -0.078** -0.076**
(-1.992) (-1.953)
World interest rate 0.038** 0.038**
(1.990) (2.028)
US CPI inflation -0.302*** -0.303***
(-3.782) (-3.814)
RER undervaluation -0.019*** - 0 .0 2 0 *** -0.019***
(-5.247) (-5.337) (-5.237)
Inflation (lagged 2 periods) 0.005** 0.004** 0.005**
(2.278) (2.199) (2.271)
Lending minus deposit interest rate - 0 .0 0 1 ** - 0 .0 0 1 ** - 0 .0 0 1 **
(lagged 2  periods) (-1.781) (-1.702) (-1.821)
Growth of banking liabilities over GDP 0 .0 0 0 ** 0 .0 0 0 ** 0 .0 0 0 **
(lagged 2  periods) (1.861) (1.804) (1.870)
Growth of banking deposits over GDP -0.004** -0.004** -0.004**
(lagged 4 periods) (-1.823) (-1.832) (-1.789)
Financial liberalisation 0.350**
(1.671)
Currency crises last quarter -0.183 -0.245 -0.105
(-0.746) (-1.116) (-0.406)
Banking crisis indicator 0.197** 0.231** 0.192**
(1.780) (2.092) (1.748)
a 2 0.352*** 0.356*** 0.343***
(5.165) (5.217) (5.199)
P 0.127 0.196** 0.079
(1.024) (1.742) (0.623)
Function value at optimum -687.120 -699.166 -685.848
See comments in Table 4.4.
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tween lending and deposit rates. The other debt component may proxy for the degree of 
financial openness of these countries and the degree of liquidity of their secondary mar­
kets for debt. Indeed, countries where debt is mostly sovereign-guaranteed are likely to 
be more closed and less vulnerable to capital inflows reversals, while countries with higher 
shares of private non-guaranteed debt may be relatively more open and ‘developed’ and 
thus exposed to speculative attacks.
The second column of Table 4.7 seems to indicate that the omission of the global vari­
ables artificially increases the z-statistic associated with the unobserved autocorrelated 
error component. According to this result, p is capturing the effect of the omitted global 
variables that may act as a proxy for shocks that are correlated over time and have 
country-specific effects.
Finally, the last column of Table 4.7 controls for the effects of financial liberalisation. 
Our findings seem to confirm that financial fragility increases in the three years that 
follow the liberalisation of domestic interest rates.
4.4.5 Exchange Rate Regime
In order to examine whether the determinants of currency crises differ according to the 
exchange rate regime, we estimated the same specification over different samples. The 
first column of Table 4.8 refers to the whole sample of 4350 observations, while the es­
timations reported in columns 2 and 3 are based on the two subsamples of observations 
characterised by fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes, respectively.29
The magnitude and significance of the estimated coefficients in the two subsamples are 
dissimilar, pointing to the existence of intrinsic differences in the behaviour of crises prob­
abilities, depending on the type of exchange rate regime. Not only are currency crises 
under fixed exchange rates less frequent than under flexible regimes, but they are also less 
responsive to changes in domestic fundamentals, as shown by the smaller elasticities. This 
implies that, other things being equal, fundamentals must be significantly worse under 
fixed exchange regimes than under flexible exchange regimes, to trigger a crisis.
This finding seems to support the view of the time-inconsistency literature regarding 
the existence of a credibility cost associated with the decision to abandon a pegged ex­
change rate. This is also confirmed by the different behaviour of the banking variables. 
Under fixed exchange rates, the probability of a devaluation increases only when a bank-
29The first subsample of fixed exchange rates includes a total of 2514 observations, with 84 episodes 
of currency crises, while currency crises under flexible exchange rates are 101, out of a total of 1622 
observations.
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Table 4.8: Exchange Rate Regimes1
Dependent Variable: 10% cut-off whole sample fixed FX float FX
Constant -0.908*** -1.729*** -0.533***
(-27.739) (-18.640) (-17.859)
Real GDP growth -0.023 0 .0 0 1 -0.019
(-1.215) (0.028) (-0.838)
Foreign reserves over imports -0.468*** -0.213* -0.736***
(-4.136) (-1.302) (-3.700)
Growth of external debt over reserves 0 .0 0 0 ** 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0
(1.704) (1.249) (1.169)
Short-term debt over reserves 0.003** 0.003** 0.097*
(2.103) (1.670) (1.641)
Private, non-guaranteed debt over 1.445** 0 .1 1 2 2.942***
long-term debt (2.134) (0.092) (2.908)
Growth of domestic credit over GDP 0.259*** 0.240* 0.265***
(3.248) (1.381) (2.584)
Inflation for fuel prices - 0 .0 1 0 * -0.029*** 0 .0 0 0
(-1.356) (-2.741) (0.043)
Inflation for metal prices -0.078** -0.096 -0.090**
(-1.992) (-0.921 (-1.921)
World interest rate 0.038** 0.085*** - 0 .0 0 1
(1.990) (3.050) (-0.040)
US CPI inflation -0.302*** -0.370*** -0.118
(-3.782) (-3.310) (-0.836)
RER undervaluation -0.019*** -0.039*** -0.013***
(-5.247) (-4.547) (-2.924)
Inflation (lagged 2 periods) 0.005** -0.005 0.006***
(2.278) (-0.416) (2.427)
Lending minus deposit interest rate - 0 .0 0 1 ** 0 .0 0 1 - 0 .0 0 1 **
(lagged 2  periods) (-1.781) (0.273) ( - 2 .0 2 0 )
Growth of banking liabilities over GDP 0 .0 0 0 ** 0 .0 0 1 * 0 .0 0 0 *
(lagged 2  periods) (1.861) (1.413) (1.406)
Growth of banking deposits over GDP -0.004** -0.005 -0.008***
(lagged 4 periods) (-1.823) (-0.703) (-2.326)
Currency crises last quarter -0.183 0.032 -0.260
(-0.763) (0.023) (-0.900)
Banking crisis indicator 0.197** 0.318** 0.141
(1.780) (1.805) (0.872)
£72 0.352*** 0.190*** 0.340***
(5.165) (2.337) (3.586)
P 0.127 -0.057 0.186
(1.024) (-0.088) (1.114)
Function value at optimum -687.120 -304.998 -321.306
1See comments in Table 4.4. The number of observations for the fixed FX equation is 2514; whereas 
for the float FX regression is 1622.
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ing crisis has occurred in the past, while under flexible exchange rates the government 
may be tempted to let the currency depreciate at the first sign of banking system distress, 
such as a decrease in banks deposits or an increase in foreign liabilities.
The results of Table 4.8 also suggest that pegs are more sensitive to changes in global 
variables than flexible rates, maybe due to the presence of speculative behaviours. Over­
all, these results are important because they show that exchange rates do matter when 
we assess the probability of a currency crisis.
4.4.6 EMP  Index to Define Currency Crises
Finally, Table 4.9 compares the results obtained using a different definition of currency 
crises. The cut-off measure used throughout this chapter, 10% cut-off, is the dependent 
variable in the estimations reported in column 1 ; while in column 2  we use the exchange 
market pressure index, EMP 1.5.30 This last measure is a weighted average of quarterly 
changes in the nominal bilateral exchange rate —with respect to the dollar— and quar­
terly changes in reserves. Periods in which the index is above its mean by more than 1.5 
standard deviations are defined as crises.
The main results still hold true even if we adopt this second definition of currency crises, 
but a2, the coefficient associated with the unobservable country-specific error term, is 
not significant any more. This seems to suggest that the country-specific error term in 
column 1 is a good proxy for the willingness and ability of the central bank to defend the 
currency. These country-specific characteristics are already incorporated into the defini­
tion of the exchange market pressure index. This may explain why the o2 coefficient loses 
significance in the second set of estimations.
4.5 C onclusions
This chapter has analysed the causal linkages between banking and currency crises in a 
sample of quarterly observations for 92 developing and emerging markets’ countries from 
1975 to the end of 1997. In particular, we have empirically tested whether episodes of 
banking system unsoundness lead to currency crises by estimating a multiperiod dynamic 
probit model of currency crises via maximum smoothly simulated likelihood techniques.
One of the main features of this model, that is also one of the points of departure from 
the existing literature on currency crises, is the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable 
on the right hand side of the probit equation to be estimated. In this way we are able to
30The number of currency crises this way identified are 210.
CHAPTER 4. A DYNAMIC PROBIT MODEL FOR CURRENCY CRISES
Table 4.9: Exchange Market Pressure Index1
Dependent Variable: 10% cut-off EMP1.52
Constant -0.908*** -1.481***
(-27.739) (-40.156)
Real GDP growth -0.023 -0.052***
(-1.215) (-3.384)
Foreign reserves over imports -0.468*** -0.271***
(-4.136) (-3.083)
Growth of external debt over reserves 0 .0 0 0 ** - 0 .0 0 1
(1.704) (-0.771)
Short-term debt over reserves 0.003** 0.007**
(2.103) (3.170)
Private, non-guaranteed debt over 1.445** 0.281
long-term debt (2.134) (0.501)
Growth of domestic credit over GDP 0.259*** 0.302***
(3.248) (4.186)
Inflation for fuel prices - 0 .0 1 0 * -0.009
(-1.356) (-1.250)
Inflation for metal prices -0.078** -0.069**
(-1.992) (-1.980)
World interest rate 0.038** 0.031***
(1.990) (1.855)
US CPI inflation -0.302*** -0.118**
(-3.782) (-1.728)
RER undervaluation -0.019*** -0.019***
(-5.247) (-6.501)
Inflation (lagged 2 periods) 0.005** 0.003
(2.278) (1.123)
Lending minus deposit interest rate **ooo1 0 .0 0 0
(lagged 2  periods) (-1.781) (0.599)
Growth of banking liabilities over GDP 0 .0 0 0 ** 0 .0 0 0
(lagged 2  periods) (1.861) (1.262)
Growth of banking deposits over GDP -0.004** 0 .0 0 1
(lagged 4 periods) (-1.823) (0.534)
Currency crises last quarter -0.183 0.955***
(-0.746) (4.265)
Banking crisis indicator 0.197** 0.115
(1.780) (1.075)
<72 0.352*** 0 .0 0 0
(5.165) (0.058)
P 0.127 0.006
(1.024) (0.057)
Function value at optimum -687.120 -719.334
1See comments in Table 4.4.
2EMP 1.5 means 1.5 standard deviations over the mean of the EMP index. 
The number of currency crises corresponding to this definition is 210.
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test for the presence of state dependence, i.e. whether past occurrences of currency crises 
influence the probability of a future crisis. We have also included among the regressors 
a dummy variable for past episodes of banking crises, to take into account their possible 
leading effect on currency crises, as originally found by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) in 
a different sample of emerging and industrial countries. We have made specific assump­
tions about the structure of the unobserved error term. In particular, the econometric 
techniques applied here allow us to relax the assumption of no intertemporal correlation 
among unobserved determinants of the occurrence of a currency crisis that underlies, to 
our knowledge, all the previous studies on banking and currency crises that follow a logit 
or probit approach.
The main results of this chapter can be summarised as follows:
• Domestic macroeconomic and financial variables are important determinants of 
instances of currency crises in developing and emerging markets. Low domestic 
growth, a low import cover ratio and an increase in domestic credit significantly 
increase the probability of observing a currency crisis. Furthermore, an overvalued 
exchange rate increases the probability of a currency crash.
• An increase in the stock of external debt can undermine the stability of domestic 
currencies. Debt is expressed here as a ratio to reserves, and thus directly measures 
the ability of a country to pay back its debt. The composition and maturity of this 
debt are also key determinants of the likelihood of a currency crisis. The higher the 
share of short-term debt, the higher the probability of a currency crash. The same 
applies to the share of private non-guaranteed debt.
• Small open economies in developing countries are also subject to changes in global 
macroeconomic conditions. An increase in the level of international interest rates or 
a worldwide deflation considerably increase the probability of a domestic financial 
crisis. Equally, a drop in commodity prices is harmful to the stability of the currency 
in countries that rely on those commodities for their exports revenues.
• Countries that have experienced sharp devaluations in the past are less likely to 
experience another crisis.
• We also find that banking crises are good leading indicators of currency crises in 
our sample.
• The determinants of currency crises differ according to the type of exchange rate 
regime. Currency crises episodes under fixed exchange rates are less frequent and 
require a much worse deterioration in domestic fundamentals to be triggered. Also,
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the international macroeconomic environment seems to have a stronger impact on 
pegged exchange rates than under flexible regimes.
• After controlling for this large set of explanatory variables, we still find evidence 
in the data of some unobserved country-specific heterogeneity, meaning that crises 
are not all the same across countries due to intrinsic differences in the historical, 
institutional or political background of the countries included in our sample.
This final result highlights the importance of exploiting the full information content of 
the data, by adopting panel estimations techniques and relaxing the hypothesis of non­
autocorrelated errors. As shown in Table 4.6, should we estimate our benchmark model 
by pooling all the observations together, without taking into account the intrinsic panel 
dimension of the data, we would tend to overestimate the importance of banking crises as 
determinants of currency crises. This result also questions the conclusions of some of the 
previous studies that make use of simple probit/logit models to estimate the likelihood of 
currency crises.
Chapter 5
Banking and Currency Crises: Are 
They Intertwined?
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter we further analyse the phenomenon of twin crises: the joint occurrence of 
banking and currency crises. We jointly estimate the two types of financial crises with 
two aims in mind. First, we seek to find the underlying common pattern associated with 
financial crises and the particularities of each type of crisis. Second, we investigate the 
causal links between banking and currency crises. We determine the causes of banking 
crises and currency crises by maximising a likelihood function derived from a system of 
two equations: one for the banking crisis episodes and another for the currency crisis 
events. In the currency crisis equation, we include an endogeneous variable describing 
banking crises among the regressors so we can study the contemporaneous linkage be­
tween banking and currency crises. Including lagged values of the banking crisis variable 
into the currency crisis equation allows us to test the hypothesis that banking crises lead 
currency crises.
Specifically, we define a system of two equations of the type described in Chapter 4. 
In this way, we have two dynamic probit equations with unobservable heterogeneity and 
autocorrelated errors. Furthermore, we allow for the error term to be contemporaneously 
correlated across equations. That is, we are controlling for possible omitted common 
causes of both types of crisis. The likelihood function derived for this system of two 
equations is maximised using the method of maximum smoothly simulated likelihood.
In this framework, we can easily reverse the chain of causality and analyse the con­
temporaneous and leading effects of currency crises on the probability of banking crises.
The countries analysed in this chapter are those of Chapter 4: 92 developing and emerg­
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ing markets’ economies. The period covered spans the 1970s through 1997. The data 
frequency is quarterly. For more details on the sample characteristics we refer the reader 
to Chapter 4, Section 4.3. The definitions of currency and banking crises, as well as the 
set of independent variables are fully referenced in Chapter 4, Section 4.3 and Appendix C.
The rest of the chapter is organised in the following way. In Section 5.2 we explain the 
econometric technique we use to model the phenomenon of twin crises. The main results 
of the econometric analysis are gathered in Section 5.3. Finally, Section 5.4 concludes.
5.2 Econom etric M odelling o f Tw in Crises
Using our sample of 92 developing and emerging markets’ economies, we jointly estimate a 
system of two equations that defines the twin crisis problem. The first equation explains 
the occurrence of banking crises. It has a probit structure, since an indicator variable 
identifies whether a country is in a regime of banking crisis or not. The second equation 
explains the likelihood of observing a currency crisis. We also use a probit equation to 
address this problem. The indicator variable is constructed to distinguish two regimes: 
a currency crisis regime and a tranquil regime —i.e. when we do not observe a currency 
crisis for that period.
Let us define ybt as a vector of limited dependent variables. Where i =  {1, . . . ,  N}, with 
N  the number of countries in our sample, and t = {1, . . .  ,7}}, where is the number of 
periods (quarters) over which country i is observed. The variable ybt takes on the value of 
one if a banking crisis is observed for country i in period t, and zero otherwise. Similarly, 
yft is a limited dependent variable which has a value of one if country i experiences a 
currency crisis in period t , and zero otherwise.
We assume that ybt is an indirect observation on a latent vector according to a many- 
to-one mapping y\t = r(ybt*), with ybt* given by a linear model
!& = *&** + 4 , (5-1)
where X#  is an array of explanatory variables, (5b is a vector of parameters to be estimated 
and ebit is the disturbance vector.
In Equation (5.1), X bt includes, among other regressors, lagged values of both ybt and 
yft. With the lagged values of ybt, we want to test whether past instances of banking 
crises have an influence on the probability of a banking crisis occurring. This is called 
state dependence and means that if a country has experienced a banking crisis in the past,
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the probability of observing another banking crisis would likely depend on that previous 
crisis. The lagged values of yft are included to test for a leading effect of currency crises on 
banking crises. The concrete specification for the lagged values of yft is lQ 3j=i v i t s  > o), 
where l(-) is the usual indicator function (it takes on the value of one if the argument is 
true, and zero otherwise). With this indicator we want to asses the effect on a banking 
crisis of currency crises occurred in any of the four quarters preceding that banking crisis.
In a similar way we define y\t as an indirect observation of the latent vector y^. Here, y^ 
is given by
y.? =  y?«7 +  ^ c +  4  (5.2)
The term y\t7  captures the contemporaneous relationship between banking crises and cur­
rency crises: the effect of a banking crisis on the probability of a currency crisis in the 
same period. The rest of terms of Equation (5.2) are defined in a similar way to those of 
Equation (5.1). The variable Xft includes lagged values of yft and y\t (in the form of and 
indicator of the type 1 ( $ ^ =1 Vi,t-s > 0 ))- The lagge(l values of the dependent variable are 
included in order to test for state dependence among currency crisis events. The consid­
eration of lagged values of y\t allows us to test the hypothesis of banking crises leading 
currency crises.
It still remains to fix a concrete specification for the error term, £it = [4> 41- For 
the banking crisis equation we define
4  =  4  +  4 > 4  =  1+ 4  (5.3)
where
f ‘ ~JV(o,i) ,  ^ ~ J V ( o , 4 ) ,
stationarity implies that <7q6 =  crj> =  1 / ( 1  ~ pb), 4  and v\ are independent 
Correspondingly, for the currency crisis equation we define
4  =  tA +  4 .  4  =  / 4 - i  +  4 (5.4)
where
(4 ~  jv( o, <£), g  ~  jv(o, 1 ), ~  jv(o, <£),
stationarity implies that cr%c =  4 c =  1/(1 — P°), Pit an(l 4  are independent
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Moreover, we allow for a contemporaneous correlation between the terms and
ptUu ^  0 (5-5)
The ^  terms represent what is called unobservable heterogeneity. These terms in the error 
structure are meant to capture the fact that countries may differ in their propensity to 
experience a financial crisis (a banking crisis or a currency crisis). These different propen­
sities may be due either to the existence of unobserved country-specific attributes that 
are time-invariant, given by Hu or to countries’ differences that are correlated over time. 
For this last reason we need to include the AR(1) component in the disturbance, i.e. the 
vit terms as previously defined. If this problem is not addressed properly, past episodes 
of financial crises may turn out to be significant solely because they are a good proxy 
for persistent and autocorrelated unobservables. The dynamic discrete choice models’ 
literature refers to this as spurious state dependence.
In economics terms, Hi may reflect political, institutional and historical factors that are 
difficult to control for with traditional economic variables, and V{t may reflect the exis­
tence of persistent shocks, not captured by the explanatory variables.
The contemporaneous correlation between the terms and ££t is meant to capture com­
mon causes to banking crises and currency crises that we fail to explain with the economic 
variables included in the two-system equation.
Due to the intertemporal linkages allowed in our model, classical estimation by the method 
of maximum likelihood is computationally intractable. The intertemporal correlation that 
we allow in our model necessitates the calculation of probabilities that are given by high­
dimensional integrals, requiring the use of recently developed simulation estimation meth­
ods. See Borsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou (1993), Hajivassiliou and McFadden (1998) and 
Borsch-Supan et al. (1992) for an explanation of these techniques. We specifically apply 
the MSSL/GHK approach to overcome these difficulties
5.2.1 The GHK approach
To explain the application of the GHK approach to this particular problem, we follow 
Hajivassiliou (2002). Consider the two latent variables and y^ , and the two binary 
limited dependent variables yft and y\t as defined above. For the sake of illustration we 
strip out the banking crisis indicator from the matrix Xft and the currency crisis indicator
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from the matrix X bt so we can write:
y t t = { 1 if ytt' = 47 + z m  + H Z U i  v l,,- , > 0)SC + eft > 0
1 1 0 otherwise
= / 1 !f + > W' + > 0
1 1 0 otherwise
Consider the probability expression:
Prob(y%5, ybi5, . . . ,  y-Ti,y bTi\Z*, Z\, y^ , . . . ,  y?4, yhiu . . . ,  ybi4, 0) 
where 0 summarises all the parameters to be estimated.
For a typical observation it:
4  = i 
4  =  o
Vu > o
4  < o
4  + 4 7  +  Z ‘tfi‘ + l(E ?= i > o)*5'  >  0 
4  +  v ia  + z t f t  + i ( E « i  4 < -  > °)^c < o
4  =  i 
4  = o
4* > o 
4 < o
4  +  z & l +  i(E *=i v it- , > o)<5‘ > o 
4  + z t f l  + i(E »= , v l ,- . > o)i‘ < o
Therefore:
Prob(y?t, ybit, . . .  \Z\, Z \ , y^ , . . . ,  yci4, y?1}..., ybi4, 0)
4
Pro6{(l -  2y?()[4 + y \a  + ZS# + 1(£4«-» > 0)<5C] < 0,
3=1
4
(1 -  2y‘)[4 + Z l f i  + 1(]Ty?(. a > 0)<5‘] < 0,...}
3=1
In terms of the canonical GHK formulation:
ac \  ec \ I bc
<r , < U  ' <,6 I I ,b I ' I y,
we obtain the configuration:
yft vi ac bc ah bh
0 0 — oo -(y,-t7 + ZftPz + Hybit5<) — oo + H y^)
0 1 —  00 ~(Vit7 + Zftpcz + Hybit6c) -(Zbtf3bz + Hy?t6b) 00
i 0 + ZftPcz + Hy\t8c) 00 —OO ~(ZbtPb + Hy‘it6b)
i 1 -Mi'T + ZZtPz + H y^) OO ~{Z\tP\ + Hyyb) 00
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where Hy\t = 1 (£*=1 vlt-s > 0) and H Vit = Vlt-s > 0)
We have described how the probability of a pair can be represented in terms
of the GHK implementation through the linear inequality:
• Define the 2 x 1  vectors ait, bit, and £it. Stacking all the T* periods of observation 
for individual country i gives the 2 • 7* x 1 vectors a*, bi, and e*, where e* has the 
2 • Ti x 2 • T{ var-covariance matrix with structure characterised by the precise serial 
correlation assumptions made on the eits.
• For example, one-factor random effect assumptions will imply and equicorrelated 
block structure on Ee, while our most general assumption of one-factor random 
effects combined with an AR(1) process implies that combines equicorrelated 
and Toeplitz-matrix features.
•  Through this representation, the probability of a complete sequence of the observable 
(yc, yb) behaviour for an individual country i :
> 2 / 7 i >  2 / i >  ■ • • > VTi)
is given by events of the form:
Prob(a,i < Si < b{)
•  Consequently, our approach incorporates fully
1. the contemporaneous correlations in eu,
2. the one-factor plus AR(1) serial correlations in £a,
3. the dependency of yft on ybt, and
4. the dependency of yft on past occurrences of y\ and vice versa.
5.3 Econom etric R esults
In this section we present the main results of the simultaneous estimation of the two 
dynamic-probit equations. We analyse the determinants of the twin crises and the causal 
links between banking and currency crises. More precisely, we estimate Equations (5.1)
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and (5.2) allowing for an error structure as defined in Equations (5.3), (5.4) and (5.5) 
using MSSL methods.
To test the hypothesis that banking crises are a leading indicator of currency crises, 
we introduce the banking crisis dummy variable lagged by a certain number of periods 
into the currency crisis equation. If the coefficient associated with this variable is signifi­
cant, we can conclude that banking crises lead currency crises. Departing from previous 
studies which have sought to test on the value of this hypothesis —mainly Kaminsky 
and Reinhart (1999)—, we restrict the leading indicator characteristic to one year only. 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) allow for a period of four years between a banking and a 
currency crisis event, defining the former as a leading indicator of the latter. Moreover, 
we test for changes in the lag structure of the banking crisis dummy variable as well as 
controlling for the effect of previous currency crisis events on this causal chain. This lag 
structure is revealed to be of crucial importance.
The contemporaneous banking crisis dummy variable included in the currency crisis equa­
tion allows us to test for a causal link from banking crises to currency crises occurring 
in the same quarter. Moreover, the term g* defined in Equation (5.5), captures all 
those factors common to banking and currency crises that we have not controlled for with 
explanatory variables.
Some of the explanatory variables included in the estimations are common to both equa­
tions, while others are banking or currency specific and are therefore included in only one 
of them. The variables are selected according to the theory of financial crises and data 
availability. Note that because the model is a fully parametric non-linear model and the 
errors are jointly normally distributed the model is identified regardless of parameters 
exclusion condition. Notwithstanding, the currency crisis equation contains some exoge­
nous variables that are not included in the banking crisis equation and the banking crisis 
equation contains some exogenous variables that are not included in the currency crisis 
equation. Therefore, we do not have to rely on the normality/non-linearity property of 
the model to assure identification of the model.1
The estimation results present five additional parameters derived from the specific as­
sumptions on the error structure of the two-equation system. The parameters a^b and 
cr^ c allow for unobservable heterogeneity that is country-specific and time-invariant in
1Also note that the system contains two structural equations (dictated by economic theory), one for 
currency crises and another for banking crises. But the banking crisis equation is equivalent to a reduced 
form equation (in the sense that it does not contain the conditioning currency crisis endogenous variable). 
We do not consider a contemporaneous currency crisis dummy in the banking crisis equation because 
banking crises need some time to develop and cannot occur as fast as currency crises do.
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the banking and currency equations, respectively. To allow for persistent shocks corre­
lated over time that have not been identified by the explanatory variables, we include the 
parameters pb and pc. Finally, p^t^e , controls for causes common to both banking and 
currency crises that we fail to capture with the included explanatory variables.
5.3.1 Benchmark Model
In Table 5.1 we present the results for our benchmark model. The first panel in the table 
collects the results for the banking crisis equation. The results for the currency side are 
presented in the second panel. A third panel is introduced to summarise the structure of 
the error term.
All the variables are lagged by at least one period (quarter) to avoid the problems of 
endogeneity.
We now proceed to explain the results presented in Table 5.1, highlighting the main 
differences between the banking and the currency equations. To do this we have to bear 
in mind that for those variables included in both equations the coefficients reported in the 
tables reflect the direct effects of those variable on the probability of a currency crisis. The 
total effect is obtained by adding to the direct effect the indirect effect. The indirect effect 
is derived by multiplying the coefficient for the contemporaneous banking crisis variable 
by the coefficient of our variable of interest reported in the banking crisis equation. We 
do not report these effects in the tables but we explain the coefficients and significance of 
these effects.2
As the coefficient for the real GDP growth variable in Table 5.1 shows, a deterioration of 
economic activity significantly increases the likelihood of a banking crisis. A slowdown of 
growth tends to be correlated with greater difficulties for bank borrowers to service their 
loans. This result is consistent with the findings of Rossi (1999). Nonetheless, variations in 
output growth do not have a direct effect (nor a significant total effect) on the occurrence 
of currency crises, and this is independent of the lag considered in this variable and across 
specifications (including more variables). Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) have found a 
similar result. They point to the role of the real sector as one key difference between 
banking and currency crises which, according to their results, appears to be considerably 
more important for banking crises.
2 Please note that in all the specifications estimated, the signs of the total effects are the same as the 
signs of the direct effects. This feature facilitates the interpretation of the coefficients reported in Table 
5.1 towards their contribution to increases/decreases in the likelihood of a currency crisis.
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Table 5.1: Benchmark Model1
Variables /3 coeff.2 z-stats.
Banking Crisis Equation
Constant -0.976*** -34.531
Real GDP growth (lagged 2 periods) -0.042*** -2.633
M2 over CB reserves 0.079*** 2.540
Real deposit interest rate (lagged 2 periods) 0.000** 1.778
Growth of claims on private sector over GDP (lagged 3 periods) 0.003*** 2.425
Growth of banking deposits over GDP (lagged 3 periods) -0.005** -1.662
Growth of banking foreign liabilities over GDP (lagged 2 peri­ 0.000** 2.171
ods)
Change in US interest rate 1.186*** 3.198
US CPI inflation -0.204*** -2.964
RER undervaluation -0.007** -1.877
Banking crises last quarter 2.030*** 17.359
Currency crisis indicator3 0.144* 1.350
Currency Crisis Equation
Constant -1.146*** -19.945
Real GDP growth (lagged 2 periods) -0.014 -0.793
FX reserves over imports -0.466*** -4.563
Growth of net claims on government over GDP (lagged 2 peri­ 0.000** 1.888
ods)
Growth of external debt over reserves 0.000** 1.664
Short term debt over reserves 0.003** 2.273
Private non-guaranteed external debt over l.t. debt 1.343** 2.195
World interest rate 0.039** 2.132
US CPI inflation -0.332*** -4.084
RER undervaluation -0.017*** -4.708
Inflation for fuel prices -0.009 -1.271
Inflation for metal prices -0.085** -2.232
Currency crises last quarter 0.124 0.439
Banking crisis indicator4 0.162* 1.394
Contemporaneous banking crisis 0.166** 1.659
Error Term Structure
0.195*** 5.879
* 0.357*** 4.970
-0.363*** -7.113
Pc -0.071 -0.571
P tU h 0.352*** 4.538
continued on next page
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Table 5.1: continued
1 Currency crisis definition: 10% cut-off. Number of observations: 4350. Number of banking 
crisis observations: 205. Number of currency crisis observations: 196. Function value at 
optimum: —1331.848. All variables are lagged one period, unless otherwise specified.
2The significance of the parameters can be assessed using the Normal approximation. Given 
the size of our sample, the t-statistic is virtually Normal. We can therefore use the t-tables 
to assess significance. We use the critical values for the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, 
which are 2.326, 1.645 and 1.282, respectively, for a “one-tailed” test, and 2.576, 1.960 and 
1.645 for a “two-tailed” test.
*, ** and ***, corresponds to the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
3 The currency crisis indicator is a dummy taking the value of 1 if there is a currency crisis
in at least 1 of the 4 quarters preceding the occurrence of the banking crisis, and 0 otherwise.
4 The banking crisis indicator is a dummy taking the value of 1 if there is a banking crisis
in at least 1 of the 4 quarters preceding the occurrence of the currency crisis, and 0 otherwise.
Another difference between banking and currency crises lies in the role of the ratios of 
M2 over central bank reserves and of foreign exchange reserves over imports. The first 
of these two ratios is a liquidity indicator of the financial system. Our results indicate 
that the higher the value of this ratio, the higher the probability of observing a banking 
crisis; whereas it does not have a direct effect on the likelihood of currency crises.3 Our 
explanation for this fact is that an increase in the ratio of M2 to central bank reserves 
implies a decline in the amount of central bank resources backing the short-term domestic 
currency liabilities of the banking system, i.e. it is at the root of banking distress. The 
second ratio, foreign exchange reserves over imports, is an indicator of foreign reserve 
adequacy. It measures the government’s ability to finance current account deficits and is, 
therefore, a better indicator for currency stability. Higher values of this indicator signifi­
cantly decrease the likelihood of currency crises.4
Following Rossi (1999), we consider the real interest rate on banks’ deposits among the 
explanatory variables of banking crises. According to Rossi (1999), banking problems are 
more likely to surface when real interest rates are high. This is because banks may be 
unable to extract the higher return paid on their liabilities from borrowers, and, even if 
they can, the quality of their loan portfolio may deteriorate because high real interest 
rates not only make it harder for good borrowers to stay current on repayments, but also 
worsen the average quality of borrowers (this is what is called adverse selection). Our 
results indicate that an increase in the real interest rate on banks’ deposits significantly 
increases the probability of banking crises.5 There is not a significant indirect effect of
3 M2 over central bank reserves ratio is not significant if we introduce it into the currency crisis 
equation. The indirect effect coming from the banking crisis equations in not significant either.
4If in the banking equation we include this ratio, instead of the M2 over central bank reserves ratio, 
it fails to be significant.
5 Alternatively, the inclusion of the lending-deposits rates ratio does not yield significant results.
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this variable on the probability of currency crises either.
An important difference between banking and currency crises lies in the relevant compo­
nent of the domestic credit variable to explain crisis probabilities. This is given by claims 
on the private sector for banking crises and by claims on the government for currency 
crises. These results are widely consistent with the financial crisis literature. Growth in 
the ratio of claims on the private sector to GDP are a proxy for lending booms. In a 
context of fast growth of private domestic credit and in the absence of appropriate bank­
ing supervision, banks’ ability to discriminate marginal projects declines, increasing the 
probability of ending with a large share of non-performing loans in their portfolios. In 
this way the condition of the banking system is aggravated.6 On the other hand, changes 
in the net claims on the central government over GDP capture the Krugman effect: credit 
expansion due to the monetisation of the government’s budget deficit as a factor deter­
mining currency crises.
If we consider claims on the private sector among the determinants of currency crises, 
this variable is not significant (the indirect effect is not significant either). That is, claims 
on the private sector have only an impact on the occurrence of a currency crisis via the 
effect of this variable in the banking crisis equation (indirect effect). The same is true 
for claims on the central government for the banking crisis equation. Moreover, changes 
in the ratio of total domestic credit over GDP fail to be significant in any of the two 
equations if this variable is included.
As banking specific variables we have included the growth of banking deposits over GDP, 
and the growth of banking foreign liabilities over GDP. Banking deposits are introduced 
in the specification as an indicator of deposit withdrawals and onsetting bank runs. De­
creases in the growth of banks’ deposits over GDP significantly increase the probability 
of a banking crisis. Banking foreign liabilities are an indicator of the banking system’s 
dependence on foreign resources. Specifically, it measures the degree to which the bank­
ing system relies on off-shore capital to fund its activities and thus captures the system 
vulnerability to a sudden capital inflow reversal. We find that the higher the value of this 
variable, the higher the probability of observing a banking crisis. These variables do not 
have a significant indirect effect on the likelihood of currency crises.
In this benchmark model, we have included debt variables only in the currency crisis 
equation. The results point to the importance of the amount of debt relative to reserves 
and its composition. When the debt is short term and/or private and non-guaranteed, 
the likelihood of currency crises increases significantly.
6This argument has been emphasised after the Asian financial crisis.
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As a determinant of currency crises, we also include what we call world interest rates. As 
explained in Chapter 4, this variable is constructed by weighting the interest rate time 
series of France, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, the UK and the US according to the share 
of external debt denominated in the currencies of those countries. An increase in the 
world interest rate significantly increases the probability of a currency crisis. An increase 
in the world interest rate defined in this way will raise the cost of servicing variable-rate 
debt, and therefore raise doubts about a country’s ability to meet its external obligations. 
It may also cause an outflow of capital. For small open economies it may be too costly 
to counter this risk by raising domestic interest rates, resulting in a currency collapse.7
The world interest rate variable has a counterintuitive negative sign if we include it in 
the banking equation. What is relevant, though, for the explanation of banking crises is 
the changes in the US interest rate. This variable has a positive and significant sign in 
the banking equation (and a positive and significant indirect effect also on currency crises).
In both equations, we include the inflation observed in the US. We follow Moreno and Tre- 
han (2000) who argue that a deflationary shock in the US can have an effect on economies 
that are exporters to the US market because it would lower their export revenues and, 
consequently, domestic economic activity. Our results indicate that this variable has the 
expected sign and it is significant in both equations. The direct effect of the US inflation 
on the occurrence of currency crises is reinforced by the indirect effect via the banking 
crisis equation, being the total effect negative and significant.
A Real Exchange Rate (RER) undervaluation measure is included in both equations. 
The negative and significant coefficient in the banking and in the currency equations 
means that the less overvalued the RER, the lower the probability of a financial crisis. 
An overvalued RER increases the probability of a banking crisis perhaps because it is 
anticipating a currency crisis. The link between RER overvaluation and currency crises 
lies in the competitiveness effect derived from an overvalued RER. An overvalued RER 
harms tradeables’ producers and, in this way, reduces foreign exchange earnings. At the 
same time, it might create the expectation of a future weakening of the currency and lead 
to a preemptive speculative attack. But we cannot find a total significant effect of RER 
overvaluation on the probability of currency crises.
In the currency crisis equation, we include two additional global variables: inflation for 
fuel prices and inflation for metal prices. The inflation for fuel prices is multiplied by 
a dummy variable that has a value of one for exporters of oil, and zero otherwise. The
7This argument has been proposed by Moreno and Trehan (2000).
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inflation for metal prices variable is multiplied by an analogous dummy variable. Only 
the metal price variable is significant, with a negative sign. This indicates that the higher 
the value of metals, the lower the probability of a currency crisis, which is due to the 
higher export revenues derived from the metal exports.
Looking at the coefficient for the lagged dependent variable in the banking equation, 
we can infer the existence of state dependence among episodes of banking crises. The co­
efficient for the variable corresponding to banking crisis in the previous quarter is positive 
and highly significant, even after controlling for unobservable heterogeneity and autocor­
related errors. The fact that a country has experienced a banking crisis in the previous 
quarter increases the probability of a banking crisis in the current quarter.
We cannot say the same for the currency crisis equation: the variable corresponding 
to a currency crisis in the previous quarter is not significant. There is, therefore, no evi­
dence of state dependence among currency crisis events. This is not surprising due to the 
way we define currency crises. We require a certain level of depreciation and an increase 
in the rate of depreciation with respect to the previous quarter.
In order to test for the causal link between banking and currency crises, we have in­
cluded a currency crisis indicator in the banking crisis equation and, similarly, a banking 
crisis indicator in the currency crisis equation. The currency(banking) crisis indicator 
take on the value of one if in any of the four quarters preceding a banking(currency) crisis 
a currency (banking) crisis took place. As we see in Table 5.1 we cannot draw any definite 
conclusion about the chain of causality between banking and currency crises. That the 
currency crisis indicator is significant at the 10 percent level of significance in the banking 
equation would indicate that currency crises precede banking crises. But the banking 
crisis indicator is significant at the same level of significance in the currency equation. 
This result would indicate that banking crises are a leading indicator of currency crises. 
Moreover, contemporaneous banking crises are significant at a 5 percent level of signif­
icance and with a positive sign in the currency equation. The occurrence of a banking 
crisis in the current quarter helps to explain the probability of a currency crisis in the 
same quarter, i.e. we can find evidence of twin crises. We further analyse this problem in 
the subsections below.
These results about the direction of causality between banking and currency crises are 
completed if we look at the error structure. The coefficient pp p  is highly significant and 
positive. This indicates the existence of common causes to banking and currency crises 
that are omitted in our set of explanatory variables. We could, therefore, conclude that 
rather than one type of crisis leading the other, what we have is common causes behind
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both types of crises, i.e. twin crises driven by common factors.
From the other components of the error term, we can conclude the existence of unob­
served heterogeneity8 (e.g. political, institutional or historical factors difficult to control 
for with traditional explanatory variables) in both equations and of autocorrelated errors 
in the banking equation (persistent shocks that help predict banking crises and that we 
have not included among the regressors in the banking crisis equation). Omitting this 
panel structure would cause severe biases in the standard errors as well as in the estimated 
coefficients.
5.3.2 Robustness Exercises 
Debt and Banking Variables
In order to test for the robustness of the results of our benchmark model, we have added 
some new variables. We, first, estimate the benchmark model adding some debt variables 
in the banking equation. The results of this model are presented in Table 5.2, in the 
column labelled as (1). Furthermore, to this more complete model we add a couple of 
banking variables to the currency equation. The results are those presented in Table 5.2, 
column (2). With this model we try to test if whether once we have controlled for banking 
sector variables, the banking crisis indicator is still significant.
According to column (1) of Table 5.2, the debt variables included in the banking equation 
turn out to be significant determinants of the probability of observing a banking crisis. 
For banking crises, it is the debt service paid over exports that is significant. In contrast, 
the stock of debt is the significant variable in the currency crises equation. This is consis­
tent with the fact that a temporary liquidity shortage can lead to an insolvency crisis if a 
country cannot generate enough export revenues to pay back its debt. Moreover, short­
term debt is significant; whereas the fact that the debt is private and non-guaranteed is 
not a significant determinant in assessing the likelihood of banking crises.
An important observation is the fact that the inclusion of debt variables into the banking 
crisis equation causes the currency crisis indicator to become insignificant. This suggest 
that in the benchmark model the currency crisis indicator was acting as a proxy for the 
debt variables. We can state, then, that currency crises do not significantly lead bank­
ing crises. Moreover, the banking crisis indicator is still significant in the currency crisis 
equation. From this we conclude that banking crises seem to lead currency crises and not 
vice-versa.
8 The inclusion of regional dummy variables does not affect the significance of the unobservable het­
erogeneity.
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Table 5.2: Alternative Specifications (I)1
Variables (1) (2)
Banking Crisis Equation
Constant -1.144*** -1.122***
(-34.674) (-34.390)
Real GDP growth -0.040*** -0.040***
(lagged 2 periods) (-2.442) (-2.443)
M2 over CB reserves 0.082*** 0.082***
(2.556) (2.545)
Real deposit interest rate 0.000** 0.000**
(lagged 2 periods) (1.781) (1.802)
Growth of claims on private sector over 0.003** 0.003**
GDP (lagged 3 periods) (2.227) (2.232)
Growth of banking deposits over GDP -0.005** -0.005
(lagged 3 periods) (-1.657) (-1.714)
Growth of foreign banking liabilities over 0.000** -0.000**
GDP (lagged 3 periods) (1.976) (2.179)
Change in US interest rate 1.216*** 1.220***
(3.235) (3.243)
US CPI inflation -0.195*** -0.197***
(-2.795) (-2.807)
RER undervaluation -0.007** -0.007**
(-1.849) (-1.828)
Debt service paid over exports 0.718** 0.722**
(lagged 2 periods) (1.909) (1.904)
S.t. debt over reserves 0.003** 0.003**
(2.286) (2.261)
Private non-guaranteed external debt 0.229 0.220
over l.t. debt (0.414) (0.398)
Banking crises last quarter 1.977*** 1.973***
(16.731) (16.217)
Currency crisis indicator 0.092 0.094
(0.849) (0.861)
Currency Crisis Equation
Constant -1.291*** -1.307***
(-19.746) (-18.910)
Real GDP growth -0.014 -0.013
(lagged 2 periods) (-0.791) (-0.720)
FX reserves over imports -0.468*** -0.470***
(-4.587) (-4.576)
Growth of net claims on government 0.000** 0.000**
continued on next page
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Table 5.2: continued
over GDP (lagged 2 periods) (1.881) (1.853)
Growth of external debt over reserves 0.000* 0.000**
(1.615) (1.852)
S.t debt over reserves 0.004*** 0.003***
(2.562) (2.450)
Private non-guaranteed debt over 1.377** 1.372**
l.t. debt (2.242) (2.211)
World interest rate 0.040** 0.038**
(2.163) (2.012)
US CPI inflation -0.332*** -0.334***
(-4.094) (-4.087)
REE undervaluation -0.017*** -0.017***
(-4.730) (-4.667)
Inflation for fuel prices -0.008 -0.010*
(-1.242) (-1.360)
Inflation for metal prices -0.085** -0.089**
(-2.230) (-2.284)
Growth of banking deposits over GDP -0.006***
(lagged 4 periods) (-2.603)
Growth of banking foreign liabilities 0.000**
over GDP (lagged 2 periods) (1.753)
Currency crises last quarter 0.154 0.107
(0.538) (0.343)
Banking crisis indicator 0.159* 0.189*
(1.376) (1.622)
Contemporaneous banking crises 0.158* 0.181*
(1.559) (1.636)
Error Term Structure
al ' 0.185*** 0.186***
(5.489) (5.463)
0.356*** 0.366***
(5.103) (4.897)
Pb -0.356*** -0.353***
(-6.735) (-6.142)
P° -0.084 -0.065
(-0.659) (-0.422)
P&'IU 0.349*** 0.358***
(4.344) (3.924)
Function value at optimum -1322.004 -1314.356
1See comments in Table 5.1.
This last result is confirmed in column (2) of Table 5.2. In this augmented benchmark 
model we have included banks’ deposits and banks’ foreign liabilities as regressors in the
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currency crisis equation. The banking crisis indicator is still significant even after the 
inclusion of variables that control for the health of the banking system and that have 
been found to be significant indicators in predicting banking crises.
We can conclude from this section that it is very important to control for a wide set 
of explanatory variables before deriving any definite conclusion on the direction of the 
causal link (if any) between banking and currency crises. This calls into question the reli­
ability of results obtained from past studies using a univariate anyalysis (e.g. conditional 
probabilities) or even multivariate analysis but with few controls.
Financial Liberalisation
To the model of Table 5.2, column (2), we have added two dummy variables in both equa­
tions: capital account restrictions and domestic financial liberalisation. These results are 
collected in Table 5.3, column (1), and we refer to this model as the augmented benchmark 
model The capital account restrictions variable is a dummy variable that takes on the 
value of one for those periods characterised by the imposition of restrictions in the capital 
account. This variable is only significant in the currency crisis equation. Its positive sign 
indicates that the existence of capital restrictions increases the probability of a currency 
crisis. Rossi (1999) obtains a similar result. He argues that the limitations on capital 
movements can be circumvented by setting up offshore or other types of operations that 
can eventually expose the financial system to worse risk. Moreover, the empirical evidence 
suggests that capital account controls are largely applied by countries with unregulated 
and poorly supervised financial systems, and which are thus more vulnerable to specula­
tive attacks.
The domestic financial liberalisation dummy variable takes on the value of one for those pe­
riods in which domestic interest rates are liberalised. This variable significantly increases 
the likelihood of currency crises. The reason for this result is that financial liberalisation 
increases the fragility of the financial system.
Banking Crises Indicators by Decade
In column (2) of Table 5.3, we modify the augmented benchmark model by differentiat­
ing the banking crisis indicator included in the currency crisis equation by decade. The 
variables “Banking crisis indicator (1980s)” and “Banking crisis indicator (1990s)” are 
constructed in a similar way to the “Banking crisis indicator” variable of our benchmark 
model, but distinguishing whether the banking crisis took place in the 1980s or in the 
1990s. The 1970s are taken as the decade of reference. The coefficient for the banking 
crisis indicator in the 1980s is not significant, whereas the one for the 1990s is positive
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and significant at the 5 percent level of significance. The z-statistic increases relative to 
the one corresponding to a unique banking crisis indicator. This means that banking 
crises occurring in the 1990s compared with those occurring in the 1970s (our reference 
dummy) significantly increase the probability of a currency crisis, i.e. the banking crises 
of the 1990s have a significant and positive differential effect on assessing the likelihood 
of currency crises with respect to the banking crises of the 1970s. We cannot state this 
significant difference between banking crises occurring in the 1970s and those observed in 
the 1980s.
Table 5.3: Alternative Specifications (II)1
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Banking Crisis Equation
Constant — 1.574*** -1.604*** -1.576***
(-34.754) (-34.135) (-31.491)
Real GDP growth -0.039*** -0.040*** -0.046***
(lagged 2 periods) (-2.411) (-2.482) (-2.758)
M2 over CB reserves 0.081*** 0.082*** 0.094***
(2.503) (2.510) (2.663)
Real deposit interest rate 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
(lagged 2 periods) (1.802) (1.790) (1.650)
Growth of claims on private sector 0.003** 0.003** 0.003**
over GDP (lagged 3 periods) (2.263) (2.369) (2.123)
Growth of banking deposits -0.005** -0.005** -0.005**
over GDP (lagged 3 periods) (-1.737) (-1.826) (-1.742)
Growth of foreign banking liabilities 0.000** -0.000*** -0.000***
over GDP (lagged 3 periods) (2.207) (2.429) (2.411)
Change in US interest rate 1.217*** 1.148*** 1.227***
(3.243) (3.043) (3.031)
US CPI inflation -0.188*** -0.182*** -0.206***
(-2.681) (-2.581) (-2.699)
RER undervaluation -0.007** -0.007** -0.008**
(-1.861) (-1.932) (-2.086)
Debt service paid over exports 0.745** 0.822** 0.892**
(lagged 2 periods) (1.945) (2.134) (2.120)
S.t. debt over reserves 0.003** 0.003** 0.003**
(2.287) (2.249) (2.117)
Private non-guaranteed external 0.181 0.218 0.072
debt over l.t. debt (0.327) (0.393) (0.120)
Capital account restrictions 0.058 0.052 0.053
(0.438) (0.391) (0.366)
continued on next page
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Table 5.3: continued
Domestic financial liberalisation 0.099 0.076 0.107
(1.051) (0.794) (1.017)
Banking crises last quarter 1.982*** 1.964*** 1.426***
(16.348) (16.167) (12.270)
Currency crisis indicator 0.091 0.086
(0.831) (0.722)
Currency crisis indicator (1980s) -0.198
(-0.970)
Currency crisis indicator (1990s) 0.198*
(1.598)
Currency Crisis Equation
Constant -1.791*** -1.807*** -1.486***
(-19.207) (-19.018) (-18.990)
Real GDP growth -0.011 -0.012 -0.008
(lagged 2 periods) (-0.600) (-0.654) (-0.430)
FX reserves over imports -0.462*** -0.476*** -0.469***
(-4.489) (-4.571) (-4.390)
Growth of net claims on government 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
over GDP (lagged 2 periods) (1.848) (1.814) (2.016)
Growth of external debt over 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
reserves (1.762) (1.770) (1.773)
S.t debt over reserves 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003**
(2.588) (2.559) (2.242)
Private non-guaranteed debt 1.266** 1.349** 1.382**
over l.t. debt (2.022) (2.149) (2.113)
World interest rate 0.053*** 0.056*** 0.049***
(2.786) (2.895) (2.483)
US CPI inflation -0.338*** -0.343*** -0.319***
(-4.089) (-4.124) (-3.786)
RER undervaluation -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.018***
(-4.717) (-4.663) (-4.689)
Inflation for fuel prices -0.009* -0.009* -0.009
(-1.338) (-1.323) (-1.244)
Inflation for metal prices -0.078** -0.078** -0.080**
(-2.047) (-2.050) (-2.017)
Growth of banking deposits -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006***
over GDP (lagged 4 periods) (-2.501) (-2.482) (-2.574)
Growth of banking foreign liabilities 0.000** 0.000** 0.000*
over GDP (lagged 2 periods) (1.762) (1.757) (1.603)
Capital account restrictions 0.428*** 0.428*** 0.442***
(2.651) (2.638) (2.633)
Domestic financial liberalisation 0.332*** 0.330*** 0.306***
continued on next page
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(3.208) (3.159) (2.794)
Currency crises last quarter 0.120 0.114 0.024
(0.415) (0.394) (0.145)
Banking crisis indicator 0.182* 0.067
(1.535) (0.560)
Banking crisis indicator (1980s) -0.055
(-0.222)
Banking crisis indicator (1990s) 0.245**
(1.910)
Contemporaneous banking crises 0.199** 0.190** -0.117
(1.769) (1.677) (-1.447)
Error Term Structure
0.178*** 0.183*** 0.225***
(5.083) (5.096) (4.748)
0.336*** 0.338*** 0.358***
(4.837) (4.841) (5.376)
Pb -0.359*** -0.361***
(-6.206) (-6.240)
Pc -0.086 -0.084
(-0.614) (-0.594)
0.362*** 0.356***
(3.872) (3.872)
Function value at optimum -1305.621 -1303.337 -1319.134
1See comments in Table 5.1.
Similarly, we have also constructed two currency crises indicators by decade. We find that 
currency crises occurring in the 1990s, compared with those of the 1970s, significantly 
increase the likelihood of observing a banking crisis. The significance level is 10 percent. 
Moreover, there is still a significant positive effect of banking crises on currency crises 
occurring in the same quarter. These results are, therefore, not conclusive of a clear 
direction of causality between banking and currency crises. We explore these results 
further in the sections below.
Error Term Structure
In order to test the relevance of the autocorrelated structure of the error term of each 
equation, and the contemporaneous cross-correlation of the error terms between equations, 
we have also estimated the augmented benchmark model ignoring these correlations. The 
results are gathered in column (3) of Table 5.3. The effect of the omission of the pb term 
is obvious in the coefficient for the previous quarter banking crisis variable in the banking 
equation. The magnitude of both the coefficient and its z-statistic is smaller. This is due
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Table 5.4: Controlling for Past Financial Crises1
Variables Banking Crises Currency Crises
Currency crisis indicator 0.134 0.211**
(0.985) (1.678)
Banking crisis indicator 0.435** 0.075
(2.039) (0.550)
Contemporaneous banking crises -0.069
(-0.354)
al b 0.213***
(2.835)
al ' 0.307***
(4.354)
Pb 0.439***
(3.097)
Pc -0.028
(-0.340)
0.060
(0.349)
Function value at optimum
lo____  _ x. , ,
-1323.461
to the initial negative9 and significant value of pb. A similar effect is seen in the currency 
crisis previous quarter variable in the currency crisis equation due to the omission of the 
pc term.
The effects of eliminating the pg g  term are reflected in the contemporaneous effect 
of banking crises on the probability of observing a currency crisis. This variable now 
has a negative sign, and it is significant at the 5 percent level if using a one-sided test. 
Moreover, the banking crisis indicator loses its significance. These results point to the 
importance of estimating these models with an adequate error term structure, otherwise 
the results obtained are distorted and not reliable, both in terms of the standard errors 
and (3 coefficients.
5.3.3 Further Analysis of the Direction of Causality between  
Banking and Currency Crises
To further analyse the main question of this chapter, the direction of causality (if any) 
between banking and currency crises, we have estimated the augmented benchmark model
9 We analyse the negative sign of pb in further specifications
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with a modified lag structure for the past financial crises.
In the banking crisis equation we include our currency crisis indicator, as before, plus 
a banking crisis indicator of the same nature, i.e. this indicator takes on a value of one if a 
banking crisis occurred in any of the four previous quarters, and zero otherwise. Similarly, 
we control for a wider range of currency crises occurred in the past in the currency crisis 
equation. We include a currency crisis indicator (besides the banking crisis indicator) in 
the currency crisis equation.
We find that, once we control for a sufficient number of lags of our dependent variables, 
we cannot state any causal link10: the currency crisis indicator is not significant in the 
banking crisis equation and the banking crisis indicator is not significant in the currency 
crisis equation. Moreover, we do not observe any contemporaneous linkage either: the 
contemporaneous banking variable in the currency crisis equation and the contemporane­
ous correlation across error terms of both equations are no longer significant.
The results explained in the following lines are summarised in Tables 5.4 and 5.5. For the 
shake of brevity, and since the coefficients and significance of our economic fundamentals 
do not change, we show only the results of the relevant variables for this particular analysis.
To test whether this is the case when we differentiate crises by decade, we re-estimate the 
same model but with this differentiation. According to our results, we still can state a 
significant differential effect of currency crises occurring in the 1990s on banking crises. 
But the differential effect of banking crises occurring in the 1990s on currency crises is no 
longer significant. The contemporaneous relationship is not significant either.
Also is it important to note the change in sign, from negative to positive, in the pb term 
once we control for a wider span of past banking crises in the banking crisis equation. 
This suggest that the new specification is more appropriate. A negative and significant 
correlation over time in the error term is difficult to justify.
Given the results concerning the direction of causality, we have re-estimated these last two 
models, but this time including a contemporaneous currency crises in the banking crisis 
equation and not vice-versa. The only difference is that the banking crisis indicator for 
the 1990s in the currency crisis equation is marginally significant, this is maybe due to the 
omission of the contemporaneous banking crisis variable in the currency crisis equation.
10 This is true as well if we include the four lags of the dependent variable separately as opposed to the 
indicator of past crises.
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Table 5.5: Controlling for Past Financial Crises1 (II)
Variables Banking Crises Currency Crises
Currency crisis indicator -0.213**
(1.701)
Currency crisis indicator (1980s) -0.152
(-0.607)
Currency crisis indicator (1990s) 0.240*
(1.639)
Banking crisis indicator 0.423**
(2.080)
Banking crisis indicator (1980s) -0.231
(-0.758)
Banking crisis indicator (1990s) 0.145
(0.991)
Contemporaneous banking crises -0.082
(-0.414)
al b 0.222***
(3.022)
°lc 0.305***
(4.350)
Pb 0.439***
(3.284)
pc -0.030
(-0.367)
0.050
(0.277)
Function value at optimum -1321.334
See comments in Table 5.1.
CHAPTER 5. BANKING AND CURRENCY CRISES: ARE THEY INTERTWINED?!34
We can conclude that there is not a general leading indicator role for banking crises 
with respect to currency crises. Once we control for currency crises occurred in the recent 
past, and not only in the previous quarter, the banking crisis indicator fails to predict 
currency crises in general. Nevertheless, it seems that past currency crises help forecast 
banking crises, but only for the 1990s.
5.3.4 Alternative Definitions of Currency Crises
Table 5.6 presents the results of re-estimating the augmented benchmark model for alter­
native definitions of currency crises. In column EMP1.5%, the definition of a currency 
crisis is the one of an exchange market pressure index (E M P ) as defined in Chapter 4. 
Whereas the results in column 15% cut-off use the same type of currency crisis definition 
as in the previous estimations, but with a higher cut-off to define crises: a 15 percent 
level of depreciation (and a 20 percent increase in the rate of depreciation).
Table 5.6: Alternative Definitions of Currency Crises1
Variables E M P 1.5% 2 15% cut-off
Banking Crisis Equation
Constant -1.389*** -1.503***
(-29.633) (-26.482)
Real GDP growth -0.047*** -0.034***
(lagged 2 periods) (-2.854) (-2.323)
M2 over CB reserves 0.129*** 0.104***
(3.252) (2.738)
Real deposit interest rate 0.000** 0.000**
(lagged 2 periods) (1.654) (1.732)
Growth of claims on private sector over 0.003** 0.003**
GDP (lagged 3 periods) (2.306) (2.225)
Growth of banking deposits over GDP -0.005** -0.005**
(lagged 3 periods) (-1.681) (-1.765)
Growth of foreign banking liabilities over 0.000** 0.004***
GDP (lagged 3 periods) (2.543) (2.440)
Change in US interest rate 1.054*** 1.041***
(2.463) (2.489)
US CPI inflation -0.240*** -0.204***
(-2.973) (-2.668)
RER undervaluation -0.008** -0.010***
(-2.114) (-2.377)
Debt service paid over exports 0.553 0.910**
(lagged 2 periods) (1.206) (1.862)
continued on next page
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Table 5.6: continued
S.t. debt over reserves 0.003** 0.003**
(1.901) (2.016)
Private non-guaranteed external debt 0.133 0.217
over l.t. debt (0.178) (0.311)
Banking crises indicator 0.457*** 0.350**
(3.062) (1.843)
Currency crisis indicator 0.199** 1.286**
(1.648) (1.863)
Currency Crisis Equation
Constant -1.424*** -1.738***
(-16.725) (-14.341)
Real GDP growth -0.067*** -0.017
(lagged 2 periods) (-4.238) (-0.843)
FX reserves over imports -0.350*** -0.428***
(-4.021) (-3.529)
Growth of net claims on government 0.000 0.000***
over GDP (lagged 2 periods) (0.779) (2.730)
Growth of external debt over reserves -0.000 0.000**
(-0.602) (2.175)
S.t debt over reserves 0.006*** 0.006***
(3.192) (2.743)
Private non-guaranteed debt over 0.586 1.269**
l.t. debt (0.938) (1.795)
World interest rate 0.023* -0.008
(1.287) (-0.326)
US CPI inflation -0.144** -0.258**
(-2.034) (-2.369)
RER undervaluation -0.019*** -0.021***
(-6.153) (-4.661)
Inflation for fuel prices -0.007 0.003
(-0.974) (0.624)
Inflation for metal prices -0.046* -0.099***
(-1.557) (-2.555)
Growth of banking deposits over GDP -0.000 -0.007***
(lagged 4 periods) (0.038) (-2.739)
Growth of banking foreign liabilities 0.000** 0.000*
over GDP (lagged 2 periods) (1.787) (-1.289)
Currency crises indicator 0.410*** 0.761***
(3.861) (5.092)
Banking crisis indicator 0.104 0.027
(0.883) (1.184)
Contemporaneous banking crises 0.214* -0.130
continued on next page
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Table 5.6: continued
(1.630) (-0.892)
Error Term Structure
"I" 0.203*** 0.221***
(3.247) (3.648)
0.000 0.197***
(0.095) (3.222)
Pb 0.330*** 0.497***
(3.923) (4.848)
Pc 0.230*** -0.052
(3.748) (-0.580)
0.239*** -0.034
(2.096) (-0.304)
Function value at optimum -1372.452 -1094.820
1See comments in Table 5.1.
2E M P  1.5% means 1.5 standard deviations over the mean of the EMP index.
The number of currency crises corresponding to this definition is 210.
3 The number of currency crises corresponding to this definition is 124.
When using the EMP 1.5% definition some differences arise in the currency crisis equa­
tion. The real sector summarised in output growth has a significant direct effect on the 
probability of occurrence of a currency crisis. Another important difference lies in the 
debt variables. Only short-term debt is important in predicting this type of currency 
crisis.
We note the presence of state dependence among the currency crises defined by the 
EMP1.5%  index. This is due to the omission of a second condition in the definition 
of currency crises demanding an increase in the rate of depreciation, which makes cur­
rency crises less likely to be correlated over time.
Interestingly enough the bank deposits over GDP ratio is no longer significant. Further­
more, past banking crises do not help forecast currency crises. The banking crisis indicator 
is no longer significant. Notwithstanding, a currency crisis indicator constructed with the 
EMP 1.5% measure of currency crises is significant at the 1 percent level of significance 
with a positive sign. Nevertheless, there is still a positive and significant effect of banking 
crises occurring in this quarter on currency crises occurring in the same quarter, and the 
contemporaneous correlation across the error terms of both equations is still significant. 
Again, there is not a clear direction of the causality link that we can derive from these 
results.
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The coefficient associated with the unobservable heterogeneity is no longer significant.11 
This suggests that the country-specific and time-invariant error term of the currency 
equation was depicting the willingness and ability of central banks to defend the cur­
rency. These country-specific characteristics are already incorporated into the definition 
of currency crises using an exchange market pressure index.
Regarding the results for a 15% cut-off definition, it is worth noting that the currency 
crisis indicator included in the banking equation is significant at the 5 percent level of 
significance, even after controlling for the debt variables. This seems to suggest that 
more severe currency crises (as those indicated by a level of depreciation higher than 15 
percent) have a positive and significant impact on the probability of observing a banking 
crisis in the future. Moreover, the banking crisis indicator in the currency crisis equation 
is no longer significant. Even the contemporaneous banking crisis variable loses its sig­
nificance. These last results indicate that when we deal with severe currency crises the 
chain of causality is reversed: severe currency crises act as a leading indicator of banking 
crises, and not vice-versa.
5.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we have examined the empirical regularities of banking and currency crises 
for 92 developing and emerging markets’ economies from the mid 1970s to the end of the 
1990s. Our results shows that financial crises (banking or currency crises) are driven by 
several economic fundamentals. We doubt the self-fulfilling nature attributed to financial 
crises by second-generation models.
Banking crises seem, “in general”, to cause currency crises in poor specifications, i.e. 
if we fail to control for a sufficient number of currency crisis lags. Once we control for 
past occurrences of currency crises, this causal link vanishes. More robust results regard­
ing the linkages between the crises are obtained when we allow for a differential effect by 
decades of banking crises on currency crises and vice-versa. Our analysis shows a statis­
tically significant differential effect on banking crises by currency crises occurring in the 
1990s (independently of the specification chosen).
When we enlarge the definition of currency crises to include unsuccessful attacks or when 
we consider more severe crises (depreciations over a 15 percent threshold), we find a sig­
nificant leading effect of currency crises on banking crises. Whereas, the causal link from 
banking crises to currency crises of one of those two types vanishes.
11 We already obtained this result when we estimated a single equation for this type of currency crises.
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Summarising, after the liberalisation of financial markets banking and currency crises 
become closely intertwined and currency crises seem to precede banking crises. Neverthe­
less, we cannot find an exclusive unidirectional causal link between currency and banking 
crises. Both type of crises share some common factors, other factors remain exclusive 
causes of banking or currency crises, but which crisis surfaces first is only a matter of 
circumstance.
A ppendix A  
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Table A.l: Identification of Currency Crises (1)
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Date Country EMP index unweighted
EMP index 
weighted Third measure
Australia
1974:3 yes yes
1974:4 yes yes
1979:1 yes yes
1981:3 yes yes
1985:1 yes yes
1985:2 yes yes
1986:3 yes yes
1989:2 yes
Austria
1970:1 yes yes
1970:2 yes yes
1970:3 yes yes
1970:4 yes
1971:1 yes yes
1971:3 yes yes
1973:1 yes yes
1973:2 yes yes
1978:4 yes yes
1981:1 yes
1992:3 yes yes
1993:3 yes yes
Belgium
1970:1 yes yes
1970:2 yes yes
1970:3 yes yes
1973:2 yes yes
1976:1 yes yes
1979:3 yes yes
1981:1 yes yes
1981:4 yes
1982:1 yes yes
1982:2 yes yes
1992:3 yes yes
1993:2 yes
1993:3 yes yes yes
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Table A.2: Identification of Currency Crises (2)
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Date Country EMP index unweighted
EMP index 
weighted Third measure
Canada
1977:1 yes yes
1977:4 yes
1978:4 yes
1980:1 yes
1981:2 yes yes yes
1982:2 yes yes
1984:2 yes
1992:1 yes yes
1992:4 yes yes
1994:2 yes
1995:1 yes
Denmark
1970:1 yes
1970:2 yes yes
1971:2 yes yes yes
1971:3 yes yes
1973:3 yes yes
1976:3 yes yes
1977:2 yes yes
1977:3 yes yes
1977:4 yes yes yes
1979:4 yes yes
1980:1 yes yes
1982:1 yes yes
1982:2 yes yes
1992:3 yes yes
1993:3 yes
1995:1 yes yes
Finland
1970:1 yes
1970:3 yes yes
1973:1 yes yes
1973:3 yes yes
1975:1 yes
1977:2 yes yes
1982:4 yes
1991:4 yes yes
1992:1 yes yes
1992:3 yes yes yes
1993:1 yes yes
1993:3 yes yes
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Table A.3: Identification of Currency Crises (3)
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Date Country EMP index unweighted
EMP index 
weighted Third measure
Prance
1971:3 yes
1973:3 yes yes
1973:4 yes
1974:1 yes yes yes
1974:2 yes yes
1976:1 yes
1976:2 yes yes
1976:3 yes yes
1976:4 yes yes
1978:1 yes yes
1978:4 yes yes
1981:4 yes yes
1982:3 yes yes
1983:2 yes yes
1992:3 yes yes
Greece
1971:3 yes yes yes
1973:2 yes yes yes
1973:3 yes
1973:4 yes
1974:3 yes
1980:1 yes yes
1982:2 yes yes yes
1983:1 yes yes
1985:4 yes yes
Ireland
1970:2 yes yes
1970:3 yes yes
1970:4 yes
1972:2 yes yes
1972:3 yes
1973:1 yes yes
1973:3 yes yes
1976:2 yes
1976:4 yes yes
1986:3 yes
1992:3 yes yes yes
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Table A.4: Identification of Currency Crises (4)
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Date Country EMP index unweighted
EMP index 
weighted Third measure
Italy
1970:2 yes yes
1970:3 yes yes
1973:1 yes yes
1973:2 yes
1973:3 yes
1974:2 yes
1974:4 yes yes
1975:4 yes
1976:1 yes yes
1992:3 yes yes
1992:4 yes
1993:1 yes
1995:1 yes
1995:2 yes
Japan
1972:1 yes
1974:3 yes
1979:1 yes yes
1979:2 yes
1979:4 yes
1980:1 yes yes
1989:2 yes yes
1989:3 yes
1990:1 yes
1991:1 yes yes
1995:3 yes
1995:4 yes
1997:1 yes
Netherlands
1970:2 yes yes
1970:3 yes yes
1973:2 yes yes
1973:3 yes yes
1978:3 yes yes
1978:4 yes
1980:3 yes yes
1989:3 yes
1992:3 yes yes
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Table A.5: Identification of Currency Crises (5)
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Date Country EMP index unweighted
EMP index 
weighted Third measure
New Zealand
1970:4 yes
1974:2 yes
1974:3 yes
1975:3 yes
1975:4 yes
1976:2 yes yes
1980:1 yes yes
1980:3 yes yes
1982:1 yes yes
1984:3 yes
1985:1 yes yes yes
1986:3 yes
1988:3 yes yes
1989:3 yes
Norway
1970:2 yes yes
1970:3 yes yes
1973:1 yes yes
1973:3 yes yes
1977:4 yes yes yes
1982:3 yes
1982:4 yes yes
1986:2 yes yes
1986:3 yes yes
1986:4 yes yes
1987:4 yes
1992:3 yes yes
Portugal
1972:4 yes
1976:2 yes
1977:1 yes
1977:2 yes yes
1978:2 yes
1978:4 yes
1983:3 yes yes
1992:3 yes yes
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Table A.6: Identification of Currency Crises (6)
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Date Country EMP index unweighted
EMP index 
weighted Third measure
Spain
1970:2 yes
1973:1 yes
1973:3 yes yes
1976:1 yes yes
1977:3 yes yes
1983:1 yes yes
1992:3 yes yes yes
1992:4 yes yes
1993:3 yes yes
Sweden
1970:1 yes yes yes
1970:2 yes yes
1970:3 yes yes
1970:4 yes yes
1973:1 yes yes
1973:2 yes yes
1973:3 yes
1977:3 yes
1977:4 yes
1981:4 yes yes
1982:4 yes yes
1987:4 yes
1992:3 yes yes
1992:4 yes
1993:1 yes
Switzerland
1970:1 yes yes
1970:3 yes yes
1971:1 yes yes
1972:4 yes yes
1973:1 yes yes
1973:3 yes yes
1978:4 yes
1979:1 yes
1981:1 yes yes
1982:2 yes
1992:3 yes
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Table A. 7: Identification of Currency Crises (7)
Date Country EMP index unweighted
EMP index 
weighted Third measure
UK
1970:2 yes yes
1970:3 yes yes
1972:1 yes
1972:2 yes
1972:3 yes yes
1973:3 yes
1976:2 yes
1976:4 yes
1981:4 yes yes
1983:1 yes
1986:1 yes
1986:3 yes
1986:4 yes
1992:3 yes yes
1992:4 yes yes
US
1970:2 yes yes
1970:3 yes yes
1970:4 yes yes
1971:3 yes yes yes
1973:1 yes yes
1973:2 yes
1973:3 yes
1977:2 yes
1979:3 yes yes
1980:4 yes yes
1985:4 yes
1986:1 yes
1987:1 yes
1992:3 yes yes yes
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Table A.8: Identification of Currency Crises and Official Events (1)
Date Events
1967 Devaluation £
Beginning of the events towards the breakdown 
of Bretton Woods
Early’71 Foreign CB buy $ to prevent the $ from depreciating
May’71 German CB buys a huge amount of $, not useful
Suspended intervention
German and Dutch authorities float their currency
August’71 US suspension of the link between $ and gold
Dec.’71 Smithsonian agreement: intention of re-instituting a
system of stable exchange rates 
o 8% devaluation $ 
o 17% revaluation yen 
o 4% devaluation DM 
o bands enlarges to 2.25%
It lasts 14 months (to February'73)
24 April’72 Basle Agreement: snake in the ($) tunnel: 6 EC members 
(Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg,
The Netherlands) agree to halve the margin of the 
Smithsonian agreement
1 May’72 Denmark, UK, Ireland join the snake
23 May’72 Norway joins the snake
23 June’72 £  and Irish punt withdraw
27 June’72 Denmark withdraws
June’72 £ floats
Speculation against the $ in the following months
10 Oct.’72 Denmark returns
13 Feb.’73 Italy withdraws
Early’73 Swiss franc floats against the $
$ devaluation
Yen float against the $
French Franc floats 
DM floats
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Table A.9: Identification of Currency Crises and Official Events (2)
Date Events
19 March’73 Floating of the $ (end of Bretton Woods), the tunnel 
disappeared leaving the snake as a joint float for the 
participants
Sweden becomes associated
DM revaluation, 3%, because of the depreciation of the $ that 
creates tensions in the snake, but this is not enough, so in =>
June’73 DM revaluation by 5.5% 
Norwegian krone devalued by 13% 
Dannish krone devalued by 6% 
Finnish markka devalued 7%
17 Sept.’73 Dutch guilder revaluation 5%
16 Nov.’73 Norwegian krone revaluation 5%
Middle’73 First oil shock —> $ begins to appreciate against DM and yen
19 Jan.’74 France withdraws (because of problems derived from the oil shock) 
French franc, Belgium-Luxembourg franc and the two 
Scandinavian currencies of Denmark and Sweden are the 
weaker currencies; DM and Dutch guilder are the stronger 
currencies => Clear division in the snake
10 July’75 France returns
Nov.’75 Ramboulliet meeting: legalizes floating
76 IMF legalizes the non-system
9 Feb.’76 Peseta devalued by 13%
15 March’76 France withdraws again (because Chirac implements fiscal 
expansion in the autumn’75 as recession deepened)
August’76 Bundesbank intervention in favour of the smaller non-German 
participants in the snake
17 Oct.’76 Frankfurt realignment: 
o Danish krone devaluation 6% 
o Dutch guilder devaluation 2% 
o Belgian Franc devaluation 2% 
o Norwegian kroner devaluation 3% 
o Swedish kroner devaluation 3%
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Table A. 10: Identification of Currency Crises and Official Events (3)
Date Events
Second half’77 $ begins to weaken
3 July’77 Peseta is allowed to float to a 20% depreciation
78 Kingston (Jamaica): second amendment to IMF articles of 
agreement takes effect, legalizing the float and reducing the 
monetary role of gold
Early’78 Despite intervention of American, Germany and Japanese 
authorities, $ continues to fall
Appreciation DM (7%) difficult to handle for the other 
currencies
13 Feb.’78 Norwegian krone devaluation 8%
17 Oct.’78 DM revaluated 4%
Dutch guilder revaluated 2% 
Belgian franc revaluated 2%
Nov.’78 More interventions to support the $
17 Dec.’78 Norway announces decision to withdraw
13 March’79 EMS comes into being (with the snake participants) 
Belgium franc, Danish krone, DM, French franc, 
Irish punt, Lux. Franc and Dutch guilder band of 
2.25% and Italian lira band of 6%
July’79 UK joins EMS
Sept.’79 Bundesbank intervenes to support: $, Belgian franc 
and Danish krone
24 Sept.’79 DM revaluation 2%
Danish krone devaluation 2.9%
Oct.’79 Dramatic tightening of monetary policy in US
30 Nov.’79 Dannish krone devalued by 4.8% to restore competitiveness 
(with respect to ECU)
From Nov’79 Fiscal expansion in Germany: interest differential in favour
to Feb.’81 of the weaker currencies —t DM near floor of band a lot 
of times, requiring substantial interventions
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Table A .ll: Identification of Currency Crises and Official Events (4)
Date Events
Feb.’81 Bundesbank tights monetary policy: sharp increase in 
interest rates -» DM to the top of the band
22 March’81 Italy 6% devaluation with respect ECU
Oct.’81 DM revaluation 5.5%
French franc devaluation 3%
Dutch guilder revaluation 5.5%
Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark and Ireland: technically 
chosen as pivots, but the realignment implied devaluation 
around 2%
22 Feb.’82 Belgium 8.5% devaluation 
Denmark 3% devaluation 
(with respect to ECU)
14 June’82 DM revaluation 4.25%
Guilder revaluation 4.25% 
French franc devaluation 5.75% 
Lira devaluation 2.75%
(with respect ECU)
2 Oct.’82 Sweden devaluation 15.9%
4 Dec.’82 Peseta is devalued by 8%
21 March’83 DM revaluation 5.5%
Dutch guilder revaluation 4.25% 
French franc devaluation 5.75% 
Italian lira devaluation 2.75% 
(with respect ECU)
1980-85 Appreciation of the $ because of tight monetary policy
21 July’85 Lira devaluation 8% with respect to DM
Sept.’85 Plaza agreement (G5: France, Germany, Japan, UK and US): 
Intervention selling $ for DM and yens to stop appreciation $
85 $ starts to depreciate
86 Depreciation $ 
Appreciation yen
APPENDIX A. DURATION MODEL TABLES 151
Table A.12: Identification of Currency Crises and Official Events (5)
Date Events
7 April’86 DM and Dutch gulder revaluation 3%
Danish krone and Belgian franc revaluation 1%
French franc devaluation 3%
(with respect ECU)
4 August’86 Irish punt devaluation 8% (with respect to ECU)
12 May’86 Norwegian krone is devalued by 10.7%
Oct.’86 Governments want to stabilize $-yen exchange rate: they do
not want the $ to depreciate further —> CBs start to 
intervene buying $
12 Jan.’87 DM devaluation 3%
Guilder devaluation 3%
Belgian-Luxembourg franc devaluation 2%
(with respect to ECU)
Feb.’87 G5 in Paris, Louvre Accord: CBs intervene buying $
Autumn’87 $ continues to fall
Mid October a small increase in DM interest rates very 
criticized, panic in US —> $ falls despite intervention
Oct.’87 French franc falls but reverts in
Nov.’87 By adjustment in interest rate differentials with
respect Germany
Early’88 Depreciation $ ends abruptly because of intervention
July’89 Peseta joins EMS, 6% band
7 Jan.’90 Spain and Italy reduce margins to ±2.25%
Italian lira devaluation 3.75%
Oct.’90 UK joins EMS (6% band)
Norway pegs its currency as it moves towards 
applying for EU membership
May’91 Sweden and Finland peg their currencies as they move
towards applying for EU membership
15 Nov.’91 Finland devaluation 12.3%
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Table A. 13: Identification of Currency Crises and Official Events (6)
Date Events
April’9 2 Portugal joins EMS (6% band)
2 June’92 Tensions in the EMS because of the narrow majority against the 
Maastricht treaty by Denmark
Summer’92 UK postpones ratification of the treaty 
Weakness of $
July’92 Increase in German interest rate to 8.5%
8 Sept.’92 Finnish markka has to abandon its ECU peg
10-11 Setp.’92 Lira under pressure: falls below its EMS floor. Massive 
interventions by Banca d’ltalia and Bundesbank
14 Setp.’92 Cut on German interest rate 
Italian lira devaluation 3.5%
16 Sept’92 Heavy interventions failed to lift sterling from its EMS floor 
Sweden raise its marginal lending rate
Temporarily suspension of both sterling and lira from participation 
Devaluation 5% of peseta
19 Nov.92 Swedish krona breaks its link
22 Nov.’92 Peseta devaluation 6% (capital controls) 
Escudo devaluation 6% (follows Spain)
10 Dec.’92 Norway discontinues the peg on the ECU and its currency is 
allowed to float
30 Jan.’93 Punt devaluation 10%
13 May’93 Peseta devaluation 8% 
Escudo devaluation 6.5%
July’93 French franc under pressure: intervention 
Danish krone under pressure: intervention
29 July’93 France, Belgium and Denmark fall below their EMS floor
1 August’93 Widening of the fluctuations margins to 15%
Over the first month after the decision Danish krone, 
French franc and Belgian franc use a substantial 
part of the new margins
APPENDIX A. DURATION MODEL TABLES
Table A. 14: Identification of Currency Crises and Official Events (7)
Date Events
Autumn’93 Danish krone, French franc and Belgian franc recover
Jan.’95 Austria joins EMS
April-May’95 Falling French franc because Jacques Chirac’s campaign 
promises of more expansionary policies 
Lira and Swedish krone weak 
$ depreciates
May’95 Peseta devaluation 7% 
Escudo devaluation 3.5%
96 French franc most of the time weak 
Irish Punt strong
Autumn’96 Finnish markka and lira enter EMS
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Table A. 15: Currency Crises and Associated Events (1)
Beginning of the 
Currency Crisis Associated Event (if applicable)
Australia
1974:3
1979:1
1981:3
1985:1
1986:3
1989:2
Austria
1970:1
1971:3 US suspension link $/gold
1973:1 19 March: floating of the $, the tunnel (of the snake)
disappears; DM revaluated by 3% because depreciation
of the $ that creates tensions in the snake
1978:4 17 Oct, DM revaluated by 4%
1992:3 EMS tensions: cut on German interest rates, 14 Sept.
1993:3 EMS tensions: widening of the fluctuations margins
to ±15%
Belgium
1970:1
1973:2 DM revaluated by 5.5% (tensions derived from the
floating of the $ the previous quarter)
1976:1 (French franc withdraws)
1979:3 Sept. Bundesbank intervenes to support the Belgian
1981:1 franc Feb. Bundesbank tights monetary policy: tensions
in the snake
1981:4 Oct. DM revaluated by 5.5% and Belgian franc
devalued by 2%
1992:3 EMS tensions: cut on German interest rates, 14 Sept
1993:2 EMS tensions
Canada
1977:1
1981:2
1982:2
1992:1
1992:4
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Table A. 16: Currency Crises and Associated Events (2)
Beginning of the 
Currency Crisis Associated Event (if applicable)
Denmark
1970:1
1971:2 May: Bundesbank buy $
1973:3 (June: Dannish krone devalued by 6%)
1976:3 Bundesbank intervention in favour of the
smaller non-German participants in the snake
1977:2
1979:4 30 Nov: Dannish krone devalued by 4.8%
1982:1 22 Feb: Dannish krone devalued by 3%
1992:3 EMS tensions
1993:3 29 July: Dannish krone falls below their
EMS floor; widening of the fluctuations margins
to ±15%
1995:1 New EMS tensions
Finland
1970:3
1973:1 floating of the $; 19 March: DM revaluated by 3%;
1973:3 problems derived from the oil crisis
1977:2
1982:4 tensions in some EMS currencies
1991:4 15 Nov: Finnish markka devalued by 12.3%
1992:3 EMS tensions: 8 Sept. Finnish markka has to
abandon its ECU peg
1993:1 Renewed EMS tensions
1993:3 widening of the fluctuations margins to ±15%
France
1971:3 August: US suspension of the link $/gold
1973:3 problems derived from the oil shock
1976:1 France withdraws from the snake; Bundesbank
interventions
1978:1 Appreciation of the DM by 7%
1978:4 17 Oct. DM revaluated by 4%
1981:4 Oct. French franc devalued by 3%
1982:3
1983:2
1992:3 EMS tensions
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Table A. 17: Currency Crises and Associated Events (3)
Beginning of the 
Currency Crisis Associated Event (if applicable)
Greece
1971:3 August: US suspension of the link $/gold
1973:2 DM revaluated by 5.5% (tensions derived from the
floating of the $ the previous quarter)
1974:3
1980:1
1982:2 DM revaluated by 4.25%
1983:1 DM revaluated by 5.5%
1985:4
Ireland
1970:2
1972:2 May: joins the snake; June: witdraws
1973:1 floating of the $ creates tensions in the snake
1973:3 problems coming from the oil shock
1976:2
1976:4
1986:3 4 August: Irish punt devalued by 8%
1992:3 EMS tensions
Italy
1970:2
1973:2 DM revaluated by 5.5%
1974:4
1976:1 tensions in the snake
1992:3 EMS tensions: 10-11 Sept. Italian lira falls below its
EMS floor. Massive interventions by Banca d’ltalia
and Bundesbank; 14 Sept. Italian lira devalued by
3.5%; 16 Sept. suspension of Italian lira from
participation
1995:1 Renewed problems in the EMS
Japan
1979:1
1979:4
1989:2
1991:1
1995:3
1997:1
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Table A. 18: Currency Crises and Associated Events (4)
Beginning of the 
Currency Crisis Associated Event (if applicable)
Netherlands
1970:2
1973:2 DM revalued by 5.5%
1978:3 Interventions to support the $ that translates into
ulterior revaluations of the DM
1980:3
1992:3 EMS tensions
New Zealand
1975:3
1976:2 IMF legalize the non-system
1980:1
1980:3
1982:1
1984:3
1985:1
1986:3
1988:3
Norway
1970:2
1973:1 End of Bretton Woods; DM revalued by 3%
1973:3 DM revalued by 5.5%; Norwegian krone
devalued by 13%
1977:4
1982:3
1986:2
1992:3 EMS tensions (10 Dec. Norway discontinues the
on the ECU and its currency is allowed to float
Portugal
1976:2
1977:1
1978:2
1978:4 17 Oct. DM revalued by 4%
1982:3
1992:3 EMS tensions: 22 Nov. Portuguese escudo devalued
by 6%
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Table A. 19: Currency Crises and Associated Events (5)
Beginning of the 
Currency Crisis Associated Event (if applicable)
Spain
1970:2
1973:1 March: end of Bretton Woods;
19March: DM revalued by 3%
1973:3 June: DM revalued by 5.5%
1976:1 9 Feb. Spanish peseta devalued by 13%
1977:3 July: Spanish peseta is allowed to float to a
20% depreciation
1983:1 21 March: DM revalued by 5.5%
1992:3 EMS tensions: 16 Sept. Spanish peseta devalued
by 5%; 22 Nov. new devaluation by 6%
1993:3 (13 May: Spanish peseta devalued by 8%)
Sweden
1970:1
1973:1 March: end of Bretton Woods;
19 March: DM revalued by 3% and Sweden becomes
associated (of the snake)
1977:3
1981:4 Oct. DM revalued by 5.5%
1982:4 2 Oct. Sweden devalued by 15.9%
1992:3 EMS tensions: 16 Sept. Sweden raise its marginal
lending rate; 19 Nov. Swedish krone breaks its link
Switzerland
1970:1
1970:3
1971:1
1972:4 Early 73: Swish franc floats against the $
1973:3
1978:4 17 Oct. DM revalued by 4%; interventions to support the $
1981:1 Bundesbank tights monetary policy
1982:2 14 June: DM revalued by 4.25%
1992:3 EMS tensions
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Table A.20: Currency Crises and Associated Events (6)
Beginning of the 
Currency Crisis Associated Event (if applicable)
UK
1970:2
1972:2 1 May: UK joins snake
23 June: UK withdraws
1973:3
1976:2
1976:4
1981:4 Oct. DM revalued by 5.5%
(UK joined EMS in July’79)
1983:1 21 March: DM revalued by 5.5%
1986:1
1986:3 Depreciation $
1992:3 EMS tensions: 16 Sept. heavy interventions fail to lift sterling
from its EMS floor. Temporarily suspension of the sterling
participation
US
1970:2
1971:3 August: US suspension of the link $/gold
1973:1 March: end of Bretton Woods;
19 March: DM revalued by 3% and Sweden becomes
associated (of the snake)
1979:3 Sept. Bundesbank intervenes to support the $
1980:4
1985:4 Starts depreciation of the $ (after a period of appreciation)
1987:1 Feb. Louvre Accord: G5 intervens buying $
1992:3 weakness of the $
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Table A.21: Maximum Likelihood Estimates (1)
Parameters Estimates Std. error Expected sign
Independent Variables
Growth -0.07 0.08 -
Inflation 0.10 0.08 +
Unemployment 0.01 0.02 +
Export Growth -0.04** 0.02 -
Import Growth 0.03** 0.02 +
Openness 1 o © * * 0.01 -
REER 0.02* 0.01 +
Deposits/GDP (rate of growth) -0.05* 0.03 -
Claims on Government/GDP 0.01** 0.01 +
Portfolio Investment/GDP 0.07*** 0.03 +
FDI/GDP -0.01 0.12
*, ** and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Table A.22: Maximum Likelihood Estimates (2)
Parameters Estimates Std. error Expected sign
Independent Variables
Growth -0.07 0.08 -
Inflation 0.80 0.08 +
Unemployment 0.01 0.02 +
Export Growth -0.04*** 0.02 -
Import Growth 0.03*** 0.01 +
Openness -0.01** 0.01 -
REER (deviation from trend) -0.08*** 0.03 -
Deposits/GDP (rate of growth) -0.05** 0.03 -
Domestic Credit/GDP -0.002 0.005 +
Portfolio Investment/GDP 0.06*** 0.03 +
FDI/GDP 0.002 0.13 -
*, ** and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectevely.
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Table B.l: Crises Occurrence — 5% cut-off
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Country Date Country Date
China Dec-98 Jan-94 Venezuela May-87 Aug-88 May-94
India Jul-91 Mar-92 Sep-87 Nov-89 Dec-95
Indonesia Aug-97 Mar-98 Aug-99 Jun-88 Oct-92 Apr-96
Dec-97 May-98 Nov-99 Egypt Aug-89 Jul-90 Mar-91
Jan-98 Jan-99 Israel Jan-89 Mar-90 Nov-92
Korea Nov-97 Dec-97 Jul-89 Mar-91 Oct-98
Malaysia Jan-94 Aug-97 Dec-97 Jordan Oct-88 Feb-89
Pakistan Nov-95 Jul-98 Hungary Mar-87 Dec-89 Jul-93
Philippines Nov-90 Dec-97 Jul-88 Jan-91 Aug-94
Sep-97 Jul-97 Apr-89 Nov-92
Sri Lanka Jan-93 Poland Feb-87 Aug-89 Mar-92
Thailand Dec-97 Jun-98 Feb-88 May-91 Sep-93
Jul-97 Sep-99 Jun-88 Feb-92 Feb-99
Argentina May-87 Jul-89 Jun-90 Russia Jul-91 Jan-93 Aug-98
Oct-87 Dec-89 Aug-90 Sep-91 Sep-93 Sep-98
Jan-88 Feb-90 Jan-91 Nov-91 Jan-94 Dec-98
Apr-89 Jul-92 Oct-94 Apr-99
Brazil Feb-87 Jun-89 Oct-91 Turkey Mar-91 Apr-94 Jan-95
May-87 Oct-90 Max-95 Oct-93 Sep-94 Nov-98
May-89 Apr-91 Jan-99 Kenya Mar-93 May-95 Aug-97
Chile Oct-90 Dec-90 Dec-94 Jul-97
Colombia Jan-91 Aug-95 Sep-98 Morocco Jun-90 Apr-91 Dec-92
Oct-91 Feb-97 Jul-99 Nigeria Jan-87 Nov-88 Feb-93
Jan-94 Sep-97 Mar-87 Jan-89 Mar-95
Ecuador Sep-87 Nov-95 Mar-99 May-87 May-91 Apr-95
Sep-88 Mar-96 Jun-99 May-87 May-91 Apr-95
May-89 Apr-98 Sep-99 Jul-88 Mar-92
Sep-92 Sep-98 Oct-99 South Africa Jul-88 Jul-98 May-00
Max-93 Jan-99 Jan-00 Jun-98
Mexico Dec-87 Jan-95 Nov-95 Zimbabwe Feb-88 Jan-93 May-98
Mar-94 Mar-95 Aug-98 Mar-91 Jan-94 Aug-98
Dec-94 Oct-95 Aug-91 Nov-97 Jan-99
Peru Jan-87 Aug-89 Dec-90 Oct-91
Feb-87 Sep-89 Apr-91 Taiwan Nov-97
Nov-87 Jan-90 May-91 Czech R. Feb-99
Sep-88 Mar-90 Oct-91 Slovakia Jul-93 Aug-98 May-00
Dec-88 Apr-90 May-92 Croatia Feb-99
Apr-89 Jun-90 Oct-92
May-89 Aug-90
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Table B.2: Crises Occurrence — 10% cut-off
Country Date Country Date
China Dec-89 Jan-94 Venezuela May-87 Aug-88 Dec-95
India Jul-91 Sep-87 May-94 Apr-96
Indonesia Dec-97 May-98 Jan-99 Russia Feb-91 Jul-92 Oct-94
Jan-98 Jul-91 Jan-93 Sep-98
Korea Nov-97 Oct-97 Dec-97 Nov-91 Jan-94 Dec-98
Malaysia Dec-97 Turkey Mar-91 Apr-94
Philippines Sep-97 Dec-97 Kenya Mar-93 May-95 Aug-97
Thailand Jul-97 Dec-97 Nigeria Jan-87 Mar-92 Apr-95
Argentina Oct-87 Jul-89 Aug-90 Jan-89 Mar-95
Jan-88 Dec-89 Jan-91 South Africa Jul-98
Apr-89 Feb-90 Zimbabwe Aug-91 Jan-94 Aug-98
Brazil Feb-87 Jun-89 Oct-91 Oct-91 Nov-97
May-87 Oct-90 Jan-99 Egypt Aug-89 Jul-90 Mar-91
Colombia Jan-94 Sep-98 Israel Jan-89
Ecuador Sep-88 Mar-96 Oct-99 Jordan Feb-89
Sep-92 Mar-99 Jan-00 Hungary Jan-91
Mexico Dec-87 Mar-95 Poland Feb-87 Aug-89
Dec-94 Nov-95 Feb-88 Mar-92
Jan-95 Slovakia Jul-93 Aug-98
Peru Feb-87 Aug-89 Aug-90
Nov-87 Sep-89 Dec-90
Sep-88 Jan-90 Apr-91
Dec-88 Mar-90 May-91
Apr-89 Apr-90 Oct-91
May-89 Jun-90 Oct-92
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Table B.3: Reduced Sample December 1996 — Global Model
Variable Coefficient z-statistic
Constant -3.79*** -27.34
Contagion 3.09*** 3.74
Oil prices -0 .25 -1 .00
Credit to the private sector change 0.15* 1.48
REER overvaluation 0.21** 2.23
Real GDP growth -0.55*** -5 .54
Import cover -0.24** -1 .90
Equity price change -0.11 -0 .97
Debt to exports ratio 0.06 1.10
Log likelihood 
Avg. log likelihood
-400.72
-0 .13
*, ** and ***, corresponds to the 10%, 5% and 1% significance 
levels, respectively.
All variables are included with a two-month lag, except equity 
prices and oil prices that are lagged only one month.
Table B.4: Reduced Sample December 1997 — Global Model
Variable Coefficient z-statistic
Constant -3.71*** -29.87
Contagion 2.90*** 3.51
Oil prices -0 .26 -1 .06
Credit to the private sector change 0.17** 1.73
REER overvaluation 0.31*** 3.45
Real GDP growth -0.53*** -5 .66
Import cover -0.21** -1 .87
Equity price change -0.20** -1 .94
Debt to exports ratio 0.07* 1.34
Log likelihood 
Avg. log likelihood
-467.85
-0 .13
*, ** and ***, corresponds to the 10%, 5% and 1% significance 
levels, respectively.
All variables are included with a two-month lag, except equity 
prices and oil prices that are lagged only one month.
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Table B.5: Whole Panel Standardisation — Global Model
Variable Coefficient z-statistic
Constant -3.79*** -34.03
Contagion 2.70*** 3.40
Oil prices -0.26** -1 .71
Credit to the private sector change 0.17*** 4.32
REER overvaluation 0.22*** 3.66
Real GDP growth -0.62*** -8 .34
Import cover -0.20** -2 .10
Equity price change -0.18*** -2 .55
Debt to exports ratio 0.27*** 3.49
Log likelihood 
Avg. log likelihood
-589.76
-0 .13
*, ** and ***, corresponds to the 10%, 5% and 1% significance 
levels, respectively.
All variables are included with a two-month lag, except equity 
prices and oil prices that are lagged only one month.
Table B.6: Type I & II Errors — Whole Panel Standardisation
5% cut-off*
Actual
Crises Non-Crises
Predicted
Crises 74.51 34.83
Non-Crises 25.49 65.17
* The cut-off for correct calls is based on the 65th 
percentile of the risk scores for the entire sample.
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C .l T he Sam ple C om position
The 92 emerging and developing countries included in our sample are:
Argentina, Armenia, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bul­
garia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Repub­
lic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo Republic, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equa­
torial Guinea, Estonia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea- 
Bissau, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Korea Republic, Lao 
PDR, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, 
Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, 
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Rwanda, 
Samoa, Senegal, Seychelles, Slovakia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela 
and Zimbabwe.
The regional classification follows the IMF World Economic Outlook. The countries in­
cluded in 5 subsamples are:
Asia : Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Fiji, Indonesia, Korea Republic, Lao PDR, Malaysia, 
Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Philippines, Samoa, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vanuatu.
C entral and  E astern  E urope : Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Poland, Russia, 
Slovakia, Turkey and Ukraine.
L atin  A m erica : Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay. Peru, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.
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M iddle E ast : Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia.
Africa : Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Repub­
lic, Chad, Congo Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, 
Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zimbabwe.
The dummy for countries depending on commodities for export earnings has been con­
structed following the IMF classification in Table 1 of Finance &; Development (September
1999). The countries included in each category are:
Fuel exporters : Colombia, Congo Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, 
Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela.
M etal exporters : Chile, Mauritania, Mongolia and Peru.
Food E xporters : Belize, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras and Mauritius.
Raw m aterials exporters : Benin, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Central African Repub­
lic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Latvia, Lebanon, 
Malawi, Mali, Myanmar, Paraguay, Peru and Zimbabwe.
Beverages exporters : Burundi, Cameroon, Colombia, Cote d’Ivoire, El Salvador, 
Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Kenya, Nicaragua, Rwanda and Uganda.
C.2 Tables
In the following pages we present descriptive tables corresponding to the dependent and 
explanatory variables.
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Table C.l: Banking Crisis Episodes (1)
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Crisis date Description
Argentina: 1991:2-1997:4
1994:4 The Mexican devaluation led to bank runs which resulted in a 18% decline in deposits
between Dec. 1994 and May 1995.
1995:1 About 45/205 institutions were closed or merged through Sep. 1995.
1995:2
1995:3
Armenia: 1994:2-1997:4
1995:3 Sep. 1995: the banking crisis peaked, after the central bank (CNB)had closed half of
the active banks since Aug. 1994.
1996:1 A bank rehabilitation programme was launched in early 1996, when most of Armenia’s
35 commercial banks were insolvent according to international accounting standards. 
3 of the largest problem banks, have been restructured.
Bangladesh: 1975:3-1997:4
1990:3 Reform of the banking system. The IDA agreed to provide a credit of $US175m to
enable commercial banks to operate more efficiently.
1990:4
1991:1 Debt recovery, especially by the nationalised commercial banks, was very poor in
1991.
1991:2
1991:3 Overdue repayments to 2 development institutions (Bangladesh Shilpa Bank and
Bangladesh Shilpa Rin Sengutha) amounted to $US444m.
1992:2 End of Apr. 1992: the government and the CB suspended the operations of the
Bangladesh Commerce and Investment (BCI) company, and investment group which 
was acting as a deposit taker. As a result, there was a run against the National Credit 
LTD.
1997:2 Apr. 1997: following the stock market crash in Oct. /Nov. 1996, the government
announced a liquidity injection of $US366m into the banking system to avoid a major 
crisis of confidence.
Barbados: 1972:1-1994:1
Belarus: 1996:1-1997:4
1996:1 Sep. 1995: Belarus Bank was merged by Presidential decree with state-owned Sber­
bank.
Belize: 1986:1-1997:4
Benin: 1993:2-1997:4
Bolivia: 1986:2-1997:4_____________________________________________________________________
1987:3 Oct. 1987: the CB liquidated 2 of 12 commercial banks; 7 more reported large losses.
Non-performing loans (NPL) reached 30% of banking assets.
1994:4 Nov. 1994: 2 banks with 11% of assets were closed. 3 were also deposit runs.
1997:1 Feb. 1997: one bank was rim and fully taken over by the government.
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Table C.2: Banking Crisis Episodes (2)
169
Crisis date Description
Brazil: 1993:3--1997:4
1994:3 July 1994: 17 small banks were liquidated, 3 private banks intervened and 5 state
banks placed under special administration.
1994:4 Dec. 1994: the CB intervened in Banespa. Losses exceeded $US25bn.
Bulgaria: 1993:1-1997:4
1993:4 Dec. 1993: the recapitalisation law passed in Dec. and 1. t. ZUNK bonds had been
issued to replace on the asset side of banks’ balance sheet pre-1991 NPL to enterprises.
1994:3 Aug. 1994: the BNB intervened in one of the two major ailing banks.
1994:4 Late 1994: under a new bad loans law the authorities designed a program for restruc­
turing the 2 major ailing banks.
1996:1 Between Jan. and May 1996 there have been intermittent runs on banks, including a
drawdown of FX deposits from $US2.2bn to $USl.7bn. Liquidation procedures were
initiated against 2 medium sized banks and 4 small banks.
Burkina Faso: 1984:1-1997:4
1991:1 Early 1991: the banking system has undergone significant restructuring. The Na­
tional Development Bank was put under a government-controlled administration and
provided financial support of about CFAF15bn. 3 other banks (BFCI-B, UREBA
and the investment ban,k CAI) were also put under temporary receivership and their
NPL transferred to the government.
1993:4 Nov. 1993: the government liquidated the Development Bank and privatised other
financial institutions.
1994:4 Nov. 1994: another series of operations was carried out to restructure the balance
sheets of the banks in difficulties. Additional NPL were transferred from 3 commercial
banks to the government in exchange of 15 years maturity bonds. The total cost was
estimated at CFAF48bn (equal to 4.7 percent of GDP in 1994).
Burundi: 1987:1-1997:4
1995:2 May 1995: the Meridian bank was closed.
1995:3 Sep. 1995: Meridian bank liquidation.
Cambodia: 1996:1-1997:4
Cameroon: 1975:1-1997:4
1989:3 Liquidation of SCB in Jul. 1989; BCD and CAMBANK in Aug. 1989; PARIBAS in
Sep. 1989.
1991:2 Apr. 1991: liquidation of the BIAOC.
1994:3 BNP closed down and handed over its 34 percent shareholding in the country’s largest
network (BICIC) to the government for the price of one symbolic franc.
1995:3 Sep. 1995: the government appointed a monitor committee which took under forced
administration the BIAO-Meridien Banque du Cameroon, after the liquidation of its
main shareholder, the Bahamas-based Meridien International Bank Limited.
1996:3 Sep. 1996: the Commission Bancaire de l’Afrique Centrale announced that Banque
Meridien BIAO Cameroon had been placed in liquidation.
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Table C.3: Banking Crisis Episodes (3)
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Crisis date Description
1996:4 Oct. 1996: the Credit Agricole du Cameroon was hit by a confidence crisis and faced
large scale witdrawals.
1997:1 March 1997: closure of BICIC, Cameroon’s leading commercial bank.
Cape Verde: 1994:4-1997:4
Central African Republic: 1981:2-1997:4
1990:4 Meridien Bank negotiated to take over most of the African network of the troubled
Banque Internationale pour l’Afrique Occidentale (BIAO).
1995:1 March 1995: the financial crisis of the Meridien-BIAO bank led to a depositors’ run
on the commercial bank and a write-off a CFAF2.1bn claim on its failing parent bank
in Luxemburg.
Chad: 1993:4-1997:4
Chile: 1980:2-1997:4
1988:4 Nov. 1981: following bank runs the government intervened in 4 banks and 4 financieras
(non-bank financial institutions with 33 percent of outstanding loans) that lately
failed.
1982:2 June 1982: almost all banks became insolvent and the CB offered to all domestic
banks a 1.1. repurchase agreement of bad loan portfolios.
1983:1 Jan. 1983: the authorities decided to take over 5 private banks and liquidate 3 other.
The 5 banks included the 2 largest business groups which had expanded rapidly
between 1975-81.
1985:1 Jan. 1985: recapitalisation programme. Assets of intervened banks were transferred to
a publicly owned holding company and the banks subsequently recapitalised. Shares
of the recapitalised banks were then sold to the public at favorable prices. The quasi­
fiscal losses of the CB amounted to 18 percent of GDP in 1985.
China: 1987:1-1997:4
1988:4 Financial institutions faced large withdrawals following political uncertainty.
1989:1 The governor of the People’s Bank of China ordered the closure of all s. t. finance
companies. Insurance firms and rural and urban credit cooperatives were investigated.
1990:4 The government launched a big drive to clear up triangular debts, releasing Rmb60bn
and liquidating 60 percent of the outstanding defaults.
Colombia: 1972:1-1997:4
1982:3 Jul. 1982: the authorities had to assist a number of banks. Banco Nacional became
the first of 6 major banks and 8 finance companies to be intervened. 4 of them were
nationalised.
1997:1 Early 1997: a bank consolidation programme involved mainly commercial finance
companies. The number of deposit-taking institutions declined as a consequence of 9
mergers, 3 interventions and 1 voluntary liquidation.
Congo Republic: 1980:1-1997:4
1994:3 July 1994: the Banque Nationale pour le Developpement du Congo experienced a CFA
Afr.lObn flight after its problems were revealed.
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Table C.4: Banking Crisis Episodes (4)
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Crisis date Description
1994:4 Oct. 1994: the Banque Commerciale Congolaise is put into liquidation. Dec. 1994:
Regulators approved the liquidation of the Banque Nationale pour le Developpment
du Congo.
1995:1 Feb. 1995: the government and the World Bank reached an agreement to reform
Congo’s troubled banking sector.
Costa Rica: 1980:4-1995:2
1994:4 Dec. 1994: the government closed one of the largest state-owned banks.
Cote I’voire: 1980:1-1997:4
1990:1 The crisis of the financial sector worsened in the first half of 1990. 4 main banks have
been liquidated or closed down.
1990:2 June 1990: the holding company of the BIAO was liquidated. BNP handed over
its shares to the Ivorian government on payment of one symbolic franc. A financial
stabilisation plan was drafted by the BCE AO governor.
1991:3 Sep. 1991: The Banque Nationale pour le Developpement Agricole folded in Sep. ,
having failed to recoup more than $US201m in bad debts and to rise capital. The
government authorised its liquidation on Sep. 25.
Croatia: 1995:3-1997:4
1995:4 Nov. 1995: The 5th largest bank entered rehabilitation.
1996:3 July 1996: Privredna, the largest Croatian bank, was taken over by the Rehabilitation
Agency.
Czech Republic: 1994:2-1997:4
1994:2 June 1994: liquidation of Kreditni and Prumyslova Banka.
1995:3 Aug. 1995: liquidation of A B  Banka and Ceska Banka. The CNB produced a compre­
hensive programme for consolidating small banks in order to prevent a domino effect
in this sector. 15/18 banks were included in the programme with radical solutions
adopted for 9 of them.
Dominica: 1990:1-1997:4
Dominican Republic: 1992:2-1997:4
1996:2 April 1996: the Monetary Board intervened in the third largest bank, which repre­
sented 7 percent of the total assets of the banking system.
Ecuador: 1991:2-1997:4
Egypt: 1972:-1997:4
1993:4 Late 1993: the authorities developed a plan for selling the public sectors’ holding in
joint venture banks and for privatising one of the four large public sector banks.
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Table C.5: Banking Crisis Episodes (5)
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Crisis date Description
El Salvador: 1978:1-1994:2_________________________________________________________________
1990:4 Nov. 1990: a new legislation was enacted to restructure and privatise the financial
system. The Fondo de Sanamiento was created in aid or this task.
Equatorial Guinea: 1990:1-1997:4
Estonia: 1994:1-1997:4
1994:3 Aug. -Sep. 1994: the BOE lent the equivalent of 6 percent of base money to the
troubled Social Bank to meet large deposit withdrawals. The activities of the bank 
were suspended in mid-August and then re-opened, with a liquidity intervention of 
EEK231m.
1994:4 Oct. 1994: the BOE merged the Social Bank with another insolvent bank, the Devel­
opment Bank.
1995:1 March 1995: the BOE concluded agreements to sell parts of Social Bank and convert
the reminder to a loan recovery agency. All the depositors accounts were transferred 
to other banks.
Fiji: 1981:1-1986:4
Gabon:1987:4-1996:4
Gambia: 1980:1-1991:4
1985:1 1985: restructuring of the most important commercial bank, the Gambian Commer­
cial and Development Bank.
1989:1 1989: liquidation of the Agricultural Development Bank.
1991:3 July 1991: offering for sale of the Gambian Commercial and Development Bank.
Ghana: 1980:1-1991:4______________________________________________________________________
1989:3 July 1989: adoption of a comprehensive restructuring plan for banks to take over NP
assets from the banks’ balance sheets.
1990:2 May 1990: replacement of banks NPL with government bonds. The total cost of the
intervention reached 6 percent of GDP.
1990:4 Dec. 1990: replacement of NP claims on state-owned enterprises by the financially
distressed banks with Bank of Ghana bonds.
1991:1 March 1991: replacement of banks’ NPL with government bonds.
Grenada: 1988:4-1997:4
Guatemala: 1978:2-1997:4
Guinea-Bissau: 1991:2-1995:4
Honduras: 1984:2-1997:4
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Table C.6: Banking Crisis Episodes (6)
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Crisis date Description
Hungaxy: 1989:1-1997:4
1991:4 End 1991: the state granted commercial banks guarantees for doubtful loans worth
lObn forints.
1993:1 March 1993: a loan consolidation programme was carried out. Banks with a capi­
tal adequacy ratio lower than 7 j  percent sold to the government claims on domestic
enterprises that had been classified as “bad”. In exchange they received credit con­
solidations bonds. The total cost of the operation was 4.2 percent of 1992 GDP.
1993:4 End of 1993: the government purchased a significant share of banks claims against a
selected group of large-state enterprises and transferred these loans to 2 state asset
management companies. 8 banks received a capital injection of FT114bn.
1994:2 May 1994: the 3 largest banks received a capital injection sufficient to rise their capital
asset ratio to 4 percent.
1994:4 End 1994: the state proceeded with the third and final stage of the recapitalisation
of the 3 largest banks to achieve the 8 percent capital asset ratio.
1997:1 March 1997: bank run on Postbank. As a result, in the 5 months of 1997, real
non-cash M3 declined by 6 percent.
Indonesia: 1982:2-1997:4
1990:3 Sep. 1990: failure of PT Bank Duta.
1992:4 Nov. 1992: a large bank (Bank Summa) collapsed and triggered runs on 3 smaller
banks.
1997:4 31 Oct. 1997: 16 commercial banks were closed. Mid Dec. deposit runs on banks
accounting for 1/2 of the banking system. The CB support amounted to 5 percent of
1997 GDP.
Jamaica: 1982:2-1991:1
Kenya: 1977:1-1997:4
1988:1 Early 1988: start of a major restructuring programme of the financial sector.
1993:1 By early 1993 about 1/3 of banks (accounting for about 63 percent of total bank
assets) had been identified as distressed.
1993:2 The stability of the financial sector was restored through a rehabilitation programme
launched in April 1993. This involved the closure of 4 commercial banks, the replace­
ment of the management of 2 other banks and the liquidation of 8 non-bank financial
institutions.
1993:4 Oct. 1993-Sep. 1994: a new one-year economic programme included further measures
to ensure a sound banking system and restructure the National Bank of Kenya, the
largest state bank.
1994:1
1994:2
1994:3
1995:2 June 1995: the state participation into the National Bank of Kenya was reduced below
50 percent. The local subsidiary of Merdien BIAO was closed.
Korea Republic: 1977:2-1997:4
1997:4 Dec. 1997: 14 banks are suspended, 2 large commercial banks taken over by the
government.
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Lao PDR: 1995:2-1997:4 
Latvia: 1994:4-1997:4
1995:1 15 licences were revoked in the first 7 months of 1995. The subsequent closure of one
of the largest bank (accounting for about 30 percent of deposits) and two other banks 
triggered a bank crisis in the spring of 1995.
1995:2
Lebanon: 1991:1-1997:4
Lithuania: 1994:2-1997:4
1995:4 Dec. 1995: the 4th largest bank was closed, 12 small banks were liquidated. Large
deposit withdrawals took place at the end of 1995.
Macedonia: 1995:2-1997:4
1997:1 March 1997: failure of the largest saving house, TAT, which was found to have about
DM 100m in unreported deposits.
Madagascar: 1976:1-1997:4
1995:4 End 1995: expatriated administrators were appointed to take over the management
of both public banks (the National Bank for Rural Development and the National 
Bank of Commerce) that accumulated losses of FMG114bn (13 percent of their credit 
portfolios).
Malawi: 1995:1-1997:4
Mali: 1988:4-1994:2_______________________________________________________________________
1988:4 In 1988-89 steps were taken to restructure the Banque du Developpement du Mali,
including financial restructuring involving CFAF62.5bn worth of NPL. As a result, 
the BDM-SA was stablished on June 30, 1989 as a mixed capital company in which 
the Government holds 20 percent of the shares.
1989:1
1989:2
Malaysia: 1976:1-1997:4
Malta: 1973:1-1997:4
Mauritania: 1986:4-1997:4
1993:2 June 1993: the Development Bank was closed.
1993:3 Late 1993: 3 banks were recapitalised on the basis of external audits. The budgetary
impact of the programme was of 7.5 percent of GDP.
1993:4
1994:3 July 1994: the Loan Recovery Agency took over the loan portfolio of the Union des
Banques de Developpement and the Banque Nationale de Mauritaine.
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Mauritius: 1991:2-1997:4
Mexico: 1980:2-1997:4_____________________________________________________________________
1982:3 Sep. 1982: the government took over the troubled banking system, nationalising
private banks by Presidential Decree.
1994:3 Sep. 1994: the authorities intervened in 2 banks.
1995:1 Jan. 9, 1995: the authorities announced a scheme to recapitalise banks with capital
ratio below the 8 percent minimum. At the end of March, 8 banks had obtained 
assistance from the deposit-guarantee fund (FOBAPROA) under the temporary cap­
italisation programme.
Moldova: 1997:1-1997:4
Mongolia: 1994:1-1997:4___________________________________________________________________
1996:4 Dec. 1996: the Mongolian financial system underwent major restructuring. 2 large
insolvent banks, which together accounted for almost 50 percent of the banking system 
assets, were closed. A debt recovery agency was also established.
Myanmar: 1992:2-1997:4
Nepal: 1978:2-1997:4______________________________________________________________________
1988:1 Early 1988: the reported arrears of 3 banks (95 percent of the financial system)
averaged 29 percent of all assets.
Nicaragua: 1994:1-1997:4
Niger: 1978:3-1997:4_______________________________________________________________________
1988:2 In the late 1980’s Niger’s banking system faced a severe solvency crisis. The Caisse
Nationale de Credit Agricole was liquidated on June 1988.
1990:3 Sep. 1990: the decision was taken to liquidate the Banque du Developpement de la
Republique du Niger.
1994:3 July 1, 1994: closure and complete liquidation of the Caisse Nationale de Credit
Agricole. The unrecovered portion of its portfolio was transferred to the Treasury.
1994:4 Second-half of 1994: the Meridien BIAO was required to consolidate its own resource
base via a capital increase.
Nigeria: 1994:1-1997:1_____________________________________________________________________
1994:4 By the end of 1994 the number of technically insolvent commercial and merchant
banks had risen to 34 and an additional 8 banks were deemed illiquid. Combined, 
they accounted for 10 percent of the deposits liabilities of the banking system.
Panama: 1979:1-1997:4
1988:1 A bank holiday started in March 1988 and lasted for 9 weeks. As a result of uncer­
tainty and loss of confidence caused by a political crisis, public banks were particularly 
affected by a loss of deposits and a rapid deterioration in their loan portfolios. 15 
banks ceased operations.
1988:2
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Paraguay: 1978:4-1995:3
1995:2 A banking crisis erupted in May 1995 following a highly publicised accounting discrep­
ancy in the value of local currency held in the CBP’s vaults. This event shook public 
confidence. The 3rd and 4th largest commercial banks (Banco General and Bancopar) 
were unable to meet their obligations and were intervened by the CBP. Following the 
first intervention, there was a massive withdrawal of deposits from private domestic 
banks. In June, Bancosur and another finance company were intervened.
1995:3 In July a small commercial bank, Banco Mercantil, 2 finance companies and a saving
and loans association were intervened. All together these banks amounted to over 
15 percent of the financial system’s deposits. Government intervention had been 
estimated to amount to 4 percent of GDP by the end of 1995.
Peru: 1990:4-1995:2
Philippines: 1978:2-1997:4
1981:1 Jan-Dee. 1981: a crisis of confidence begem when fraud in the commercial paper
market resulted in large-scale defaults by borrowers in this market and in bankruptcies 
among a number of non-financial intermediaries and their holding companies.
1981:2
1981:3
1981:4
1982:1 Jan. 1982-Sep. 1983: intensification of government intervention to non-financial and
financial institutions. The government increased its emergency lending and equity 
contributions, arranged the takeover of troubled private banks by public financial 
institutions.
1982:2
1982:3
1982:4
1983:1
1983:2
1983:3
1983:4 Oct. 1983: financial panic was provoked by the authorities announcement of a mora­
torium of their external debt payments to foreign commercial banks, resulting in a 
series of runs on the banks.
1986:4 Nov. 1986: a further contraction of banking system credit occurred when some 30
percent of the banking system’s total assets, representing the NPL of 2 government- 
owned banks (the Development Bank of the Philippines and the Philippines National 
Bank), were transferred to a government agency.
1992:4 Dec. 1992: a comprehensive commercial bank debt restructuring programme was
launched.
Poland: 1987:2-1997:4_____________________________________________________________________
1991:4 In late 1991, 1 bank was privatised and 7 out of 9 treasury owned banks (with 90
percent share of total credit market) were recapitalised.
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1993:3 A law on Financial Restructuring of Enterprises and Banks became effective in March
1993 and established the basis to recapitalise banks by transferring treasury bonds to
7 of them in Sep. 1993. This recapitalisation amounted to ZLlltn.
1993:4 Dec. 1993: the PKO-SA, which deals with consumer foreign deposits and transac­
tions and the Bank for Food Economy (BGZ) were provided with Treasury issued
recapitalisation bonds.
1995:1 Since its inception in Feb. 1995, the Bank Guarantee Fund has assisted 3 commercial
banks and 88 cooperative banks in their bankruptcy procedures.
Russia: 1995:2-1997:4
1995:2 A total of 110 banks in 1994 and 96 banks in the first 8 months of 1995 were closed.
1995:3 The interbank crisis in Aug. 1995 demonstrated the liquidity problems of Russian
banks.
Rwanda: 1978:1-1997:4
Samoa: 1980:1 -1995:4
Senegal: 1976:1-1995:4
1989:2 June 1989: start of a restructuring plan for the Union Senegalaise de Barques (USB),
which was completed in the following quarter.
1989:3
1989:4 Oct. 1989: plans to recapitalise 4 state banks were announced.
1990:3 Sep. 1990: the Banque Senegalo-Koweitienne (BSK) had its operating licence revoked
by the regional CB and closed its doors after 1 year of suspension.
1991:3 July 1991: the Bank of Credit and Commerce International Senegal (CBCCI) is
closed.
Seychelles: 1982:2-1996:3
Slovakia: 1994:2-1997:4
1997:4 Dec. 1997: the 3th largest bank, (IRB or Investment and Development Bank) was
taken under forced administration by the NBS and provided credits to the bank to
enable it to pay its depositors.
South Africa: 1996:1-1997:4
Sri Lanka: 1977:1-1997:4
1993:1 March 1993: bonds equivalent to 4.8 percent of GDP were issued to recapitalise 2
state-owned commercial banks with NPL equal to 35 percent of their portfolios.
1996:4 As the guaranteed lending turned NP, the government was forced in 1996 to place
bonds in the state banks equivalent to 1.8 percent of GDP.
1997:1 March 1997: the first two-year Treasury bond was launched by the CB. These secu­
rities were issued primarily to state-owned saving institutions such as the National
Saving Bank and the Employees Prevident Fund.
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Tanzania: 1978:1-1997:4
1992:1 Early 1992: following a comprehensive audit of the National Bank of Commerce —the
dominant state bank— and the Cooperative and Rural Development Bank, a large 
amount of their NPL was transferred to the new Loans and Advances Realisation 
Trust and replaced by government bonds.
1994:1 Beginning of 1994: the authorities commenced the restructuring of the 3 existing
state commercial banks, beginning with the NBC, to be followed by the CRDB and 
the People’s Bank of Zanzibar.
1995:2 Mid 1995: the Tanzania Housing Bank was closed.
1997:3 July 1997: the government decided to split the National Bank of Commerce into 2
banks, the NBC (1997) and the NMB and to create a holding company to manage 
the residual assets and liabilities of the former NBC.
Thailand: 1977:2-1997:4___________________________________________________________________
1979:1 Early 1979: following the stock market crash, one of the largest finance companies
failed and the bail-out of the financial sector began.
1983:4 Oct. 1983: large losses in a finance company lead to runs and government intervention.
1984:1 Between the end of 1983 and 1985 19 finance companies were closed, accompanied
by runs. Throughout the period 1984-87, weakness of the financial sector resulted 
in regulatory intervention or in the CB take over, soft lending, recapitalisation and 
other support arrangements involving 5 banks that accounted for about 25 percent of 
total assets of the system.
1984:2
1984:3
1984:4
1985:1
1985:2
1985:3
1985:4
1986:1
1986:2
1986:3
1986:4
1987:1
1987:1 March to June, 1987: 97 finance companies received liquidity support from the CB.
1997:2 June 1997: the CB suspended the activity of 16 finance companies.
1997:3 July 1997: the currency devaluation was accompanied by a bank run.
1997:4 Dec. 1997: closure of 56 previously suspended finance companies.
Togo: 1977:3-1995:3_______________________________________________________________________
1988:1 Jan. 1988: a first programme for restructuring the Banque Togolaise de Development
was launched. CFAFlbn came from the government.
1990:3 Sep. 1990: the government liquidated the Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole.
1991:2 April 1991: a second tranche disbursed by the government to recapitalise the BTD.
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1992:4 Nov. 1992: most banks were closed for more than 6 months, until the summer of 1993,
during which time the quality of the assets deteriorated substantially and liquidity in
the system was reduced by almost a half.
1993:1
1993:2
Trinidad & Tobago: 1985:2-1997:4
Tunisia: 1988:4-1997:4
1991:4 End 1991: comprehensive prudential regulation introduced strict standards for loan
classification and provisioning. As a result most of the commercial banks were un­
dercapitalised.
1993:3 Mid 1993: the CB set detailed terms of reference for external audits and off-site
reporting requirements. Intervention in favor of a private commercial bank which
had lost a significant proportion of its deposits from public enterprises over a few
days.
1996:4 End of 1996: the CB took over a stock of NPL from the Agricolture Bank (BNA), the
largest public sector bank, to 2 public enterprises in charge of marketing subsidized
foodstuffs.
Turkey: 1987:3--1997:4
1991:1 Jan. 1991: the start of the Persian war led to massive withdrawals and a run on banks
prompting the government to guarantee all deposits.
1994:2 Deposit runs in the spring of 1994 resulted in the closure of 3 medium-sized banks.
The government introduced full deposit insurance in May 1994.
Uganda: 1984:1-1997:4
1993:1 Early 1993: a small bank failed. Several other banks were in difficulties or insolvent,
including state-owned banks accounting for more than 40 percent of the banking
system total assets.
1995:1 First half of 1995: a credit recovery agency, the Nonperforming Assets Recovery
Trust, was established to take over the UCB’s NPL and as part of the restructuring
operations of the UCB.
1995:2
Ukraine: 1996:25—1997:4
Uruguay: 1982:1-1997:4
1982:1 Early 1982: the Banco Hipotecario received substantial financial assistance from the
government.
1982:4 From late 1982 to early 1984 the CBU purchased commercial banks’ NPL with dollar
denominated bonds and promissory notes under the Portfolio Purchase Scheme linked
to bank intervention.
1983:1
1983:2
1983:1
1983:4
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Crisis date Description
1984:1 Beginning 1984: the Banco de Plata was liquidated with deposit being reimbursed.
1984:2 Apr. 1984: the National Office of Asset Recovery was created to try to recover the 
banks’ portfolios of NP assets.
1985:2 May 1985: Banco de Italia, one of the 3 largest private banks, was taken over. The 
CBU oredered the intervention and the Banco de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay 
(BROU) assumed the majority of the equity.
1985:3 July 1985: the Banco Pan de Azucar was taken over after it became insolvent.
1987:1 March 1987: Banco Comercial was recapitalised by the BROU. At the end of the 
operation roughly 90 percent of its capital was held by BROU. This and the previous 
interventions led to a de facto nationalisation of the banking sector.
1989:2 June 1989: the government launched and extensive reform of the financial sector. The 
main objective have been the rehabilitation of 3 of the failed banks absorbed by the 
BROU.
Vanuatu: 1996:1-1997:4
Venezuela: 1973:2-1997:4
1982:4 The Banco de los Trabajadores had to be taken over by the government in late 1982.
1993:4 Oct. 1993: rumors spread about the distressed financial situation of Banco Latino, 
the second largest bank in terms of deposits. The bank had to meet major deposit 
withdrawals through large-scale asset sales and borrowing from the CBV.
1994:1 Jan. 1994: Banco Latino was closed.
1994:2 Early June 1994: 8 distressed financial institutions, with about 21 percent of total 
deposits, had to be intervened. By that date a total of 6 percent of 1994 GDP had 
already been injected into those banks.
1994:3 Jul-Aug. 1994: rumors about the financial situation of 2 large banks, Banco Consol- 
idado and Banco de Venezuela, led to deposit runs.
1994:4 Dec. 1994: the government decided to close Banco del Progreso.
1995:1 Feb. 1995: 3 other banks had to be closed and their deposits migrated to the banks 
nationalised during the crisis.
Zimbabwe: 1981:1-1997:4
References for tables C.1-C.13:
Balino and Sundararajan (1990); P6rez-Campanero and Leone (1991); Doe (1995); Ebrill (1994)
TheEconomist (Various issues); Galbis (1995); Garcfa-Herrero (1997); IMF (Various issues); Turtelboom (1991) 
Lindgren et al. (1996); Moser, Rogers and vanTill (1997); Nascimento (1990); Valdes (1994)
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Argentina 1991:2-1997:4
Armenia 1994:2-1997:4 1994:4 1 1
Bangladesh 1975:3-1997:4
Barbados 1972:1-1994:1
Belarus 1996:1-1997:4 1996:3 1 1
1997:1 1 1
Belize 1986:1-1997:4
Benin 1993:2-1997:4 1994:1 1 1
Bolivia 1986:2-1997:4
Brazil 1993:3-1997:4
Bulgaria 1993:1-1997:4 1993:4 1 0
1994:1 1 1
1994:4 1 0
1996:2 1 1
1996:3 1 1
1997:1 1 1
1997:3 1 0
Burkina Faso 1984:1-1997:4 1991:2 1 0
1994:1 1 1
Burundi 1987:1-1997:4 1988:2 1 0
1991:3 1 0
Cambodia 1996:1-1997:4 1997:4 1 0
Cameroon 1975:-1997:4 1982:3 1 0
1991:2 1 0
1994:1 1 1
Cape Verde 1994:4-1997:4
Central African Rep. 1981:2-1997:4 1982:3 1 0
1991:2 1 0
1994:1 1 1
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Chad 1993:4-1997:4 1994:1 1 1
Chile 1980:2-1997:4 1982:3 1 1
1984:4 1 1
China 1987:1-1997:4 1990:1 1 1
1994:1 1 1
Colombia 1972:1-1997:4 1985:2 1 0
1997:4 1 0
Congo Rep. 1980:1-1997:4 1982:3 1 0
1991:2 1 0
1994:1 1 1
Costa Rica 1980:4-1995:2 1981:4 1 1
Cote D’Ivoire 1980:1-1997:4 1982:3 1 0
1991:2 1 0
1994:1 1 1
Croatia 1995:3-1997:4
Czech Rep. 1994:2-1997:4
Dominica 1990:1-1997:4
Dominican Rep. 1992:2-1997:4
Ecuador 1991:2-1994:4 1992:3 1 0
1992:4 1 0
Egypt 1972:1-1997:4
El Salvador 1978:1-1994:2
Equatorial Guinea 1990:1-1997:4 1991:2 1 0
1994:1 1 1
Estonia 1994:1-1997:4
Fiji 1981:1-1986:4
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Gabon 1987:4-1996:4
Gambia 1980:1-1991:4
Ghana 1984:3-1997:4
Grenada 1978:2-1997:4
Guatemala 1978:2-1997:4
Guinea-Bissau 1991:2-1995:4
Honduras 1984:2-1997:4
Hungary 1989:1-1997:4
Indonesia 1982:2-1997:4
Jamaica 1982:2-1991:1
1991:2 1 0
1994:1 1 1
1981:2 1 0
1984:2 1 1
1991:2
1984:4 1 1
1986:1 1 1
1988:3 1 1
1992:4 1 0
1993:3 1 0
1994:1 1 1
1995:4 1 0
1986:3 1 1
1989:4 1 0
1990:1 1 1
1991:4 1 1
1992:3 1 1
1993:3 1 0
1994:4 1 0
1995:3 1 0
1990:2 1 1
1990:4 1 1
1993:3 1 0
1989:2 1 0
1983:2 1 1
1986:4 1 1
1997:3 1 0
1997:4 1 1
1984:4 1 0
1989:4 1 1
1990:4 1 1
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Kenya 1977:1-1997:4 1981:4 1 0
1983:1 1 0
1991:2 1 0
1993:2 1 1
1995:2 1 0
Korea Republic 1977:2-1997:4 1997:4 1 1
Lao PDR 1995:2-1997:4 1995:3 1 0
1997:3 1 1
1997:4 1 1
Latvia 1994:4-1997:4
Lebanon 1991:1-1997:4 1992:2 1 1
Lithuania 1994:2-1997:4
Macedonia 1995:2-1997:4 1997:3 1 1
Madagascar 1976:1-1997:4 1982:2 1 0
1983:4 1 0
1984:2 1 0
1987:3 1 1
1988:3 1 0
1994:2 1 1
1997:1 1 0
Malawi 1995:1-1997:4
Mali 1988:4-1994:2 1991:2 1 0
1994:1 1 1
Malaysia 1976:1-1997:4 1997:3 1 0
1997:4 1 1
Malta 1973:1-1997:4
Mauritania 1986:4-1997:4
Mauritius 1991:2-1997:4 1991:2 1 0
Mexico 1980:2-1997:4 1982:1 1 1
1982:3 1 1
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Moldova 1997:1-1997:4
Myanmar 1992:2-1997:4
Nepal 1978:2-1997:4
Nicaragua 1994:1-1997:4
Niger 1978:3-1997:4
Nigeria 1994:1-1997:4
Panama 1979:1-1997:4
Paraguay 1978:4-1995:3
Peru 1990:4-1995:2
Philippines 1978:2-1997:4
Poland 1987:2-1997:4
1983:1
1985:3
1995:1
1995:4
Mongolia 1994:1-1997:4 1996:4
Morocco 1977:1-1997:4 1983:1
1991:2
1986:1
1991:3
1982:3
1991:2
1994:1
1984:2
1985:2
1987:1
1989:2
1991:2
1991:4
1983:4
1984:3
1990:4
1997:3
1997:4
1988:1
1989:2
1989:4
1992:2
1993:3
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Country Sample size Crisis date 10% cut-off 15% cut-off
Russia 1995:2-1997:4
Rwanda 1978:1-1997:4 1994:1 1 1
1995:2 1 1
Samoa 1980:1-1995:4 1983:2 1 0
1984:3 1 1
Senegal 1976:1-1995:4 1982:3 1 0
1991:2 1 0
1994:1 1 1
Seychelles 1982:2-1996:3
Slovakia 1994:2-1997:4
South Africa 1996:1-1997:4 1996:2 1 0
Sri Lanka 1977:1-1997:4 1977:4 1 1
Tanzania 1978:1-1997:4 1982:2 1 0
1983:3 1 1
1984:3 1 1
1986:3 1 1
1988:1 1 1
1988:4 1 1
1989:4 1 0
1990:1 1 1
1991:2 1 0
1992:2 1 1
1993:3 1 1
Thailand 1977:2-1997:4 1997:3 1 1
Togo 1977:3-1995:3 1982:3 1 0
1991:2 1 0
1994:1 1 1
Trinidad k  Tobago 1985:2-1997:4 1986:1 1 1
Tunisia 1988:4-1997:4 1991:2 1 0
1993:1 1 0
Turkey 1987:3-1997:4 1988:1 1 1
1991:1 1 1
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1991:2 1 1
1992:1 1 0
1992:4 1 0
1993:3 1 1
1994:1 1 1
1994:2 1 1
1995:4 1
1996:1 1 1
1996:4 1 1
Uganda 1984:1-1997:4 1984:3 1 1
1984:4 1 1
1985:4 1 1
1989:1 1
1990:3 1 1
1991:3 1 1
1992:2 1 1
Ukraine 1996:2-1997:4
Uruguay 1982:1-1997:4 1982:4 1 1
1983:1 1 1
1983:4 1
1984:1 1 1
1984:4 1 1
1984:4 1 1
1985:1 1 1
1989:4 1 1
1990:2 1 1
Vanuatu 1996:1-1997:4
Venezuela 1973:2-1997:4 1987:1 1 1
1989:2 1 1
1992:4 1 0
1994:2 1 1
1996:1 1 1
Zimbabwe 1981:1-1997:4 1983:1 1 1
1984:3 1 0
1991:2 1 0
1991:3 1 1
1991:4 1 1
1993:1 1 1
1994:1 1 1
1997:4 1 1
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Variable Name
Table C.21: The Data (1)
Data Source and Definition
Macroeconomic Variables
Frequency
Real GDP Growth
Inflation
Real deposit interest rate
Growth of total exports 
of goods and services over 
GDP
Growth of total imports 
of goods and services over 
GDP
Real exchange rate
World Bank, World Development Indi­
cators (WDI). GDP at constant 1990 
prices, in national currency (nc), and 
growth rates.
International Monetary Found - In­
ternational Financial Statistics (IFS). 
Growth rate of Consumer Price Index 
(CPI). IFS line 64.
IMF. Deposit interest rate (IFS line 601) 
minus CPI inflation (IFS line 64).
IMF. Total exports in $US (IFS lines 
7aad +  78add), divided by GDP at cur­
rent prices in $US from the WDI series. 
Growth rates.
IMF. total imports in $US (IFS lines 
78abd+78aed), divided by GDP at cur­
rent prices in $US from WDI. Growth 
rates.
Calculated by the authors. We use the 
nominal bilateral exchange rate against 
the $US (IFS line rf). We convert 
these series into real exchange rates us­
ing CPI (IFS line 64). To construct the 
undervaluation/overvaluation measure 
we first calculate the Hodrick-Prescot 
trend and then use the deviations from 
it. A decrease in this indicator means 
increasing overvaluation.
Interpolated from an­
nual data applying cu­
bic spline techniques.
Quarterly.
Quarterly. We stretch 
back some of the series 
by applying the rate 
growth of the discount 
rate when deposit rates 
are not available. 
Quarterly where avail­
able, otherwise inter­
polated from the corre­
spondent annual series 
applying a linear tech­
nique.
Quarterly where avail­
able, otherwise inter­
polated from the corre­
spondent annual series 
applying a linear tech­
nique.
Quarterly.
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Variable Name Data Source and Definition Frequency
Monetary Variables
Foreign exchange reserves 
over total imports
Growth of total domestic 
credit
Growth of total credit to 
the private sector over 
GDP
Growth of net claims to 
the government over GDP
IMF. Reserves of the Central Bank (IFS Quarterly.
line ld.d), divided by total imports
(IFS lines 78abd+  78aed). $US
IMF. Total domestic credit (IFS line Quarterly.
32), divided by GDP at current prices.
In nc and growth rates.
IMF. Claims on the private sector (IFS Quarterly 
line 32d), divided by GDP at current 
prices. In nc and growth rates.
IMF. Net claims on central government Quarterly. 
(IFS line 32an), divided by GDP at cur­
rent prices. In nc and growth rates.
Dummy Variables
Exchange rate regime
Financial liberalization
IMF. Exchange Rate Arrangements 
and Restrictions Reports. Dummy=1 
if the exchange rate regime is classified 
as independently or managed floating, 
0 otherwise.
Demirgiig-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1998b), Williamson and Mahar
(1998), Fanelli and Medhora (1998) 
and Bisat, Johnston and Sundrarajan
(1999). Dummy variable =  1 if 
domestic interest rates are liberalised. 
Dummy =  0 if domestic interest rates 
are not liberalised or information on 
the process of financial liberalization 
was not found.
Quarterly. We could 
identify the exact
quarter from the
information provided 
in the annual reports. 
Quarterly
Global Variables
Change in the US interest IMF. IFS line 60b. Quarterly.
rate
US growth IMF. US nominal GDP (IFS line 99b). 
Growth rates.
Quarterly.
US inflation IMF. Based on the US CPI index (IFS 
line 64).
Quarterly.
APPENDIX C. DYNAMIC PROBIT TABLES
Table C.23: The Data (3)
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Variable Name Data Source and Definition Frequency
Fuel inflation IMF. Commodity price index 1990 =  
100 of fuel (petroleum). IFS line 
001.76aad. Growth rates.
Quarterly.
Metals inflation Commodity price index 1990 =  100 
of metals (aluminum, copper, iron, 
lead, nickel, tin and zinc). IFS line 
001.76ayd. Growth rates.
Quarterly.
Food inflation Commodity price index 1990 =  100 of 
food (bananas, cereals, meat, vegetable 
oils and sugar). IFS line 001.76exd. 
Growth rates.
Quarterly.
Raw materials inflation Commodity price index 1990 =  100 of 
raw materials (cotton, hides, rubber, 
timber, tobacco and wool). IFS line 
001.76bxd. Growth rates.
Quarterly.
Beverages inflation Commodity price index 1990 =  100 of 
beverages (coffee, cocoa and tea). IFS 
line 001.76dwd. Growth rates.
Debt Variables
Quarterly.
Total external debt over WDI. Total external debt in current Annual series. Linear
total exports $US, over total exports of good and ser­
vices.
interpolation.
Total external debt over WDI. Total external debt in current Annual series. Linear
GDP $US, over GDP in current prices and 
expressed in $US.
interpolation.
Total external debt over WDI. Total external debt in current Annual series. Linear
reserves $US, over reserves excluding gold (IFS 
line ld.d)
interpolation.
Total debt service pay­ WDI. Total debt service paid in $US Annual series. Linear
ments over GDP over GDP in current prices and in $US. interpolation.
Short-term debt over re­ WDI. Short-term external debt over to­ Annual series. Linear
serves tal reserves minus gold (IFS line ld.d), 
in $US
interpolation.
Private non-guaranteed WDI. Private external non-guaranteed Annual series. Linear
debt over long-term debt debt over total external long-term debt, 
in $US.
interpolation.
Change in the world inter­
est rate
Author’s computations. The world in­
terest rate is obtained as a weighted av­
erage of the interest rates of US, Japan, 
the UK, Germany, France and Switzer­
land. IFS line 60b. The weights cor­
responds to the shares of total external 
debt denominated in these currencies.
Quarterly.
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